



**University of the Aegean**

**School of Business**

**Department of Shipping Trade and Transport**

**Geoeconomic and Geostrategic Tendencies in Southeast  
Europe and Middle East:  
A Psycholinguistic Approach**

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Advisor: Emeritus Professor J. Karkazis

PhD Thesis

*Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

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# **Geoeconomic and Geostrategic Tendencies in Southeast Europe and Middle East: A Psycholinguistic Approach**

## **ABSTRACT**

Marine Policy and International Law of the Sea have functioned as a driving force of the international system, in light of the fact that it is a cornerstone for states' achieving regional and global hegemony and, ergo, to expand their sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction, at sea, as it not only facilitates their flexibility, but also functions as a means of power projection via navy force. Throughout history, states have been the main protagonists and agents of international society and their actions have played a key role in the development and evolution of the international community. It cannot be defuted that, despite the fact that international relations are a zero – sum game, which means that any shift in the equilibrium is synonymous to a global shift, even nowadays the international society is a field of conflicts among the most powerful states, whose utmost objective is to ensure their safety, acquire greater expansion, have access to more natural resources, and to enhance their position at the international system.

The Middle East and the countries that make it up have served since humanity's birth to this day, as the theater of action of civilizations, the field of development and imposition of the great racial and religious movements and the "bone of contention" of the Great Powers. The peripheral issues that plague the Middle East are deeply rooted of history. This area is the great gateway to the crossroad uniting East and West and

holds the "key" to energy wealth that feeds and moves our technocratic and globalized culture.

However, what is the purpose of linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis and how can they be implemented in our research? In everyday life most of us tend to focus on the content and information of what we hear. Nonetheless, there are other aspects of language that develop in parallel with the transfer of content and information. For example, the way an event or actors are narrated, or even the use of metaphors can convey subconscious messages while revealing elements of the speaker's identity, i.e., conclusions can be drawn through speech. Specifically, the particular branch constitutes a function of linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology.

The present thesis aims at researching the link between the special characteristics of the Middle East (particularly Iran) and South-eastern Europe with common geopolitical strategies and Critical Discourse Analysis. In a nutshell, the current thesis is developing an interdisciplinary approach which brings together traditionally "uncorrelated" disciplines such as marine policy and linguistics.

Keywords: Marine Policy; Law of the Sea; Middle East; Profiling; geo-economy; Critical Discourse Analysis

# Γεωοικονομικές και Γεωστρατηγικές τάσεις στην Νοτιοανατολική Ευρώπη και τη Μέση Ανατολή: Μια Ψυχογλωσσολογική Προσέγγιση

## ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Η Θαλάσσια Πολιτική και το Διεθνές Δίκαιο της Θάλασσας έχουν ενεργήσει ως κινητήριος δύναμη του παγκόσμιου συστήματος δεδομένου ότι η επίτευξη τοπικής αλλά και παγκόσμιας ηγεμονίας είναι ο ακρογωνιαίος λίθος για τα κράτη και, ως εκ τούτου, το ίδιο και η επέκταση της κυριαρχίας, των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων και της δικαιοδοσίας τους στη θάλασσα, καθώς αφενός συμβάλει στην ευελιξία τους και αφετέρου δύναται να λειτουργήσει ως μέσο προβολής ισχύος, επί παραδείγματι μέσω της μεταφοράς στόλου. Καθ' όλη τη διάρκεια της ιστορίας, τα κράτη αποτελούν τους βασικούς πρωταγωνιστές και εκπροσώπους της διεθνούς κοινωνίας και οι ενέργειές τους έχουν αποτελέσει το κλειδί για τη διαμόρφωση και την εξέλιξη της διεθνούς κοινότητας. Δεν είναι δυνατό να αμφισβητηθεί ότι, παρά το γεγονός ότι οι διεθνείς σχέσεις αποτελούν παίγνιο μηδενικού αθροίσματος, το οποίο σημαίνει πως οποιαδήποτε αλλαγή στο ισοζύγιο ισούται με μια αλλαγή παγκόσμιας κλίμακας, ακόμη και στις μέρες μας η διεθνής κοινωνία είναι πεδίο αντιπαραθέσεων ανάμεσα στα ισχυρότερα κράτη, των οποίων απώτερος στόχος είναι να εξασφαλίσουν τη δική τους ασφάλεια, να επεκταθούν περισσότερο, να αποκτήσουν πρόσβαση σε περισσότερους φυσικούς πόρους και να βελτιώσουν τη θέση τους στο διεθνές σύστημα.

Η Μέση Ανατολή και οι χώρες που την αποτελούν έχουν λειτουργήσει από τις απαρχές τις ανθρωπότητας έως σήμερα ως πεδίο δράσης πολιτισμών, ως πεδίο ανάπτυξης κι επιβολής σημαντικών φυλετικών και θρησκευτικών κινημάτων, και ως «μήλον της έριδος» για τις Μεγάλες Δυνάμεις. Τα συναφή ζητήματα που μαστίζουν τη

Μέση Ανατολή έχουν βαθιές ιστορικές ρίζες. Η περιοχή αποτελεί τη μεγάλη πύλη προς το σταυροδρόμι που ενώνει την Ανατολή με τη Δύση και κρατάει το «κλειδί» του ενεργειακού πλούτου που τρέφει και κινεί πολιτισμό μας.

Ωστόσο, ποιος είναι ο σκοπός της γλωσσολογίας και της Κριτικής Ανάλυσης Λόγου; Οι περισσότεροι από εμάς στην καθημερινότητα μας εστιάζουμε στο περιεχόμενο και στις πληροφορίες των όσων ακούμε. Παρ' όλα αυτά, υπάρχουν και άλλες πτυχές της γλώσσας οι οποίες αναπτύσσονται παράλληλα με την μετάδοση του περιεχομένου. Για παράδειγμα, ο τρόπος με τον οποίο περιγράφεται ένα γεγονός ή οι δρώντες ή ακόμη και η χρήση μεταφορικών εκφράσεων μπορούν να εκφράσουν υποσυνείδητα μηνύματα ενώ αποκαλύπτουν στοιχεία της ταυτότητας του ομιλητή, με άλλα λόγια μπορούν να εξαχθούν συμπεράσματα μέσω του λόγου. Ειδικότερα, ο συγκεκριμένος κλάδος αποτελεί συνάρτηση της γλωσσολογίας, της ψυχολογίας, της νευροεπιστήμης και της ανθρωπολογίας.

Η παρούσα εργασία στοχεύει να διερευνήσει τη σύνδεση μεταξύ των ειδικών χαρακτηριστικών της Μέσης Ανατολής (ιδιαίτερα του Ιράν) και της Νοτιοανατολικής Ευρώπης με κοινές γεωπολιτικές στρατηγικές και με την Κριτική Ανάλυση Λόγου. Εν συντομία, η παρούσα διατριβή αναπτύσσει μια διεπιστημονική προσέγγιση η οποία επιδιώκει να φέρει πιο κοντά παραδοσιακά «μη συσχετιζόμενα» επιστημονικά πεδία όπως είναι η θαλάσσια πολιτική και η γλωσσολογία.

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*“Our doubts are traitors, And make us lose the good we oft might  
win, By fearing to attempt.” – William Shakespeare on confidence and  
courage.*

*To our dreams becoming goals*

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CS	Continental Shelf
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA	Energy Information Administration
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IEA	International Energy Agency
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LOS	Law of the Sea
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
R&D	Research and Development
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH FIELD**

Marine policy has functioned as a driving force of the international system in light of the fact that it is a cornerstone for states' achieving regional and global hegemony and, ergo, to expand their sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction. The issue of maritime zones delimitation, as depicted through country practices and customary law, has focused primarily on expanding their state domination over the sea as well as on securing their right to sail in areas beyond their state jurisdiction. It goes without saying, that the particular issue has endured periods of crisis and doubt, not to mention the three International Conventions (1958, 1960, 1973-1982) on International Law of the Sea, which led to corresponding international conventions on international law, and has solidified and coalesced in stable and objective procedures of delimitating the maritime zones.

Throughout history, states have been the main protagonists and agents of international society and their actions have played a key role in the development and evolution of the international community. It cannot be defuted that, despite the fact that

international relations are a zero – sum game, which means that any shift in the equilibrium is synonymous to a global shift. even nowadays the international society is a field of conflicts among the most powerful states, whose utmost objective is to ensure their safety, acquire greater expansion, have access to more natural resources, and to enhance their position at the international system.

A fundamental factor that should be scrutinized is the location of a state and, especially, when surrounded by sea. To be more specific, a state's position in the geopolitical chessboard provides all the necessary factors not only for its survival and self- sufficiency, but also the expansion of their sovereignty and jurisdiction. Furthermore, the combination of marine policy and location is pivotal for maritime transport, economic growth, and development of the state as it tends to tremendously affect their move on the global chessboard, their access to natural resources, raw material, and goods, as well as their transportation.

The Middle East and the countries that make it up have served since humanity's birth to this day, the theater of action of civilizations, the field of development and imposition of the great racial and religious movements and the "bone of contention" of the Great Powers. The peripherals issues that plague the Middle East are deeply rooted of history. This area is the great gateway to the crossroad uniting East and West and holds the "key" to energy wealth that feeds and moves our technocratic and globalized culture.

The competitions of the main actors of the international system determined the balance of power in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean by the 20<sup>th</sup> century, due to its rich hydrocarbon deposits and strategic and diplomatic advantage conferred by the geographical location and its proximity to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, upon the

end of the Cold War, the coveted peace in region was not established. On the contrary, civil wars as well as transnational conflicts and tensions broke out.

In other words, as a result, rivalries emerged in an attempt to balance the region, with the aim of securing the West's energy needs and maintaining the status quo in the region, while at the same time avoiding the strengthening of one of the oil-producing states.

## 1.2 STATING THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

It is a common assumption that one of the most vital and core geopolitical complexes is that of the Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, Fernand Braudel approaches it as a historical-geographical phenomenon. It is worth noting that the particular region has certain geographical features, which tend to strengthen its geopolitical and geostrategic position. For example, it has a seaport, the Suez Canal, making it the communication and supply route for Europe with the oil of the Persian Gulf region. With the specific construction of the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean communicates with the Red Sea and gains access to the Persian-Arabian Gulf, thus being an irreplaceable link in the transport chain. Furthermore, the new discoveries, characterized as "ultra-deepwater" (depth at least 2km), include large reserves of gas as well as methane hydrates.

Ergo, what can be deduced is the fact that these discoveries of energy deposits are an opportunity and at the same time a challenge not only for the geostrategic data of the region but also for the marine policy, sparking new confrontations between eternal rivals and further complicating the already perplexing and complex geopolitical landscape.

At the same time, the region of the Gulf is identical not only with its wealth-producing energy reserves but also with the fact that it bears resemblance with battlefields and controversies. Regarding the rich resources of the region, it is noteworthy that the Persian Gulf and its coastal areas are the largest source of crude oil in the world.

It is worth pointing out the fact that the presence of numerous islands in the Persian Gulf as well as their importance due to the rich energy deposits demonstrates the need for a careful and detailed examination of the application of International Law of the Sea in this region. A typical example is the island of Abu Musa which is located between Iran and the Emirates of Sharjah, Umm-Al-Qaywayn and Dubai and whose territorial zone is rich in oil deposits and therefore, is vital for the economy of all four parts.

However, what is the purpose of linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis? In everyday life most of us focus on the content and information of what we hear. Nonetheless, there are other aspects of communication that develop in parallel with the transfer of content. For example, the way an event or actors are narrated or even the use of metaphors can convey subconscious messages while revealing elements of the speaker's identity, ie conclusions can be drawn through speech. Specifically, the particular branch of linguistics is a function of linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology.

In order to scrutinize the personality of a political leader, their political speeches shall be studied and analyzed, after first be subjected to three important stages: gathering information, grouping information, and, finally, analyzing.

The present thesis aims at researching the link between the special characteristics of the Middle East (particularly Iran) and South-eastern Europe with common geopolitical strategies and Critical Discourse Analysis. More specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis has the capacity to unfold covered leadership patterns and reveal geopolitical strategies of the future. Built on a good understanding and comprehension of global geopolitics and Middle East specific characteristics this research aims to interpret how driving forces of the above domains can streamline possible geopolitical attitudes and reactions in the regional chessboard with particular emphasis on the marine policy.

To this end, in the following chapters, we propose an intelligent fusion of methods for the identification of leadership behavioral patterns in the Middle East and more particularly Iran. As mentioned, the different research domains are considered to detect the possible level of interaction that streamlines leadership decisions. The first is the Middle East as a geopolitical entity with very particular characteristics and institutional trade-offs, the second is Law of the Sea and marine policy, and the third one is Critical Discourse Analysis through which we will attempt to interpret, classify and possibly predict political attitudes and reactions. The idea about examining the geopolitical context in the study area as a result of the triple fusion outlined above is the first major contribution of this thesis in research state-of-art.

Psycholinguistics methods and principles reveal the psychological representations and processes underlying language learning and use. Although research conducted in this field is primarily focused on language studies, we are aiming to take findings of this field further to investigate political semantics in geopolitics. More specifically, we have managed to acquire key political speeches of Iran latest leadership chain which we have scrutinized using psycholinguistics methods. Given the



geopolitical context of this study, those methods have fallen short of our expectations, so it was imperative that some sort of modification/adjustment was needed. The adjustment of well-established psycholinguistics methods to reflect the specificities of geopolitics is the second major contribution of this study to the research state-of-art.

One of the bigger challenges in this approach was to be able to classify common leadership attitudes and profiles. Although there is inherent simplification into narrowing down a wide spectrum of political attitudes to certain leadership profiles, it nevertheless provides a quick-and-dirty way of streamlining political behavior and thus, indicating possible future negotiating positions. We believe that this research identifies some of the landmarks marking Iran's leadership territory, which might be useful for future researchers trying to explore the dynamics of the country's geopolitical role and marine policy in the region. The leadership profiling attempted here—which is based on the latest research in this field—is significantly improved to reflect the recent developments in the region. This profiling is the third major research contribution of this thesis.

In a nutshell, the current thesis is developing an interdisciplinary approach which brings together traditionally “uncorrelated” disciplines such as marine policy and linguistics. It provides the methodological means to do so in a systematic way by developing a specialized model, which is then applied in the case of Iran a proof-of-concept.

### 1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE

The present thesis is structured upon five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the field. It sets the background for the concepts to be scrutinized in the

next chapters. It presents preliminary elements of the dissertation and develops the epistemological background, while it establishes the contribution of the present thesis to the academia.

The second chapter encompasses the literature review and explores the fields of geopolitics and Law of the Sea. In particular, Chapter 2 attempts to provide a broad understanding of the components of the study. With the aid of gracious research fervour, we have managed to form a body of knowledge that explores the energy profiles of the region of interest as well as key features of Islamic Republic of Iran. At the same time, there is a meticulous analysis of the Law of Sea, which includes historic background, core concepts as well as established processes.

Moving on to Chapter 3, we demonstrate our conceptual model for profiling major personalities of the Iranian political stage. In other words, this Chapter attempts to scrutinize three major personalities of the Iranian political stage. The structure is based upon the combination of brief biographies and linguistics. What is worth being highlighted is the fact that the process of political profiling while taking critical discourse analysis can be proved of paramount importance and at the same time function as a cornerstone facilitating the global understanding of the principles and policies. The analysis of the internal environment (intrinsic drivers) is a cornerstone to the comprehension of one's personality. The internal environment is divided into two constituting parts; namely, the ability of situation perception in terms of real factors—which involves primarily cognitive skills—and internal drivers. Cognitive skills include the factual perception of every situation without arbitrary interpretation.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to scenarios with respect to Iran's foreign policy. Applying strategic management, we attempt a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses,

Opportunities, Threats) for every single scenario. To be more illustrative, Chapter 4 examines not only the opportunities for each scenario but also any risk lurking to emerge following any move on the political chessboard.

Finally, the last Chapter encompasses conclusional remarks by presenting quintessential finding regarding the case study at hand (Islamic Republic of Iran). In addition, we present any limitation of research and our suggestions for future research and work.

## 1.4 METHODOLOGY

When it comes to the methodology of the present thesis, it is crucial that we underline the fact that it can be divided into three main parts. First of all, we have perlustrated the literature review as well the state- of – the -art of the domains that constitute the primary domains of the thesis, namely geopolitics, linguistics, and Law of the Sea. Despite the fact that English is not the language of the study area, i.e the Middle Est, what should be stressed is the fact that language is regulated by certain and specific principles universally. To be more specific, human language is regulated by special properties that enable us to examine a language from a linguistic point of view. After all, language is a means of communication and linguistics tend to provide aid towards the analysis of this communication, towards the unfolding of how language serves humanity. At the same time, the Critical Discourse Analysis of the speeches examined in the present thesis, has another point to consider; one of the personalities having been scrutinized is this of a religious leader, which means that the semantics- i.e the invisible meanings of the language- are different and the context is also described

as co-text. Moving on, we form specific scenarios of action and reaction applied in the geopolitical chess and examined by a strategic point of view.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### 2.1 THE CONCEPT OF GEOPOLITICS

Although it is deemed a perplexing topic, it should be highlighted that by the term geography, we refer to the scientific field which describes the position/ location of multiple places of the Earth and their individual parts, aiming to determine and explain in the greatest possible extent the phenomena, which contribute to the development of the distinctive traits present in the various regions of the globe, as well as the activity types practiced by the inhabitants of these regions. Geography has as its focal point the study of the surface of the Earth, on the one hand as a natural habitat, on the other hand as a place that supports and “hosts” human activity while being transformed by it. In the 20th cent. the scientific field of Geography reached a climax of scientific and theoretical analysis regarding nature and its content, as well as its objectives and research methods, in light of the fact that it is subdivided in several individual paths. Nowadays, the science of geography tends to cross and compose theories from a wide range of scientific fields, where, depending on the beginning which can be used to classify geographical phenomena and situations, it is divided into two main sectors, namely Regional (Special) Geography and General Geography.

General Geography is, in turn, divided into 3 major fields, Mathematical Geography, Physical Geography and Biogeography. Biogeography is further divided into Zoogeography, Phytogeography and Human geography. Human geography is, in turn, divided into Social, Political and Economic geography, from which the field of maritime economic geography is derived.

Geopolitics, as a term of the much wider field of geography, follows after Human geography and Political geography. It should be noted that geopolitics, as a field, differs from political geography, since the former emphasizes on the relation between political decisions and natural environment, whereas the latter on the power structures of the various countries which comprise the modern international system.

### 2.1.1 THEORETICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

It is possible, among other definitions, to define geopolitics as the study of international relations under the perspective of a spatial or geographical view. In particular, it is the science that analyzes and correlates a multitude of constant and variable factors, aiming to ascertain the distribution of international power in a specific time frame, as well as in the future (Cohen, 2015). According to Thucydides, Geopolitics is an analytical method of geography, which is based upon the methodological approach of interpreting the international phenomena of power and is every time expressed by the economic, defensive and political power rules. Generally speaking, the traditional approach dealt with and analyzed the relationship between space and power, something that has been redefined nowadays, since the issues that have international impact are better approached when the world is perceived as a unified set. In 1920, the German geographer and professor of the Technical School of Munich

Karl Haushofer, influenced by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel states that: “Geopolitics will be and should be the geographical conscience of the state. Its objective is to study the wider vital correlations of the modern man within the framework of the modern space and its aim is to coordinate phenomena which link the state to the space”. Besides Haushofer, many contemporary Anglo-Saxon theorists have made their own “mark”, highlighting clearly the Geographical epistemological foundation of Geopolitical analysis. In this way, according to Saun Cohen, the essence of geopolitics is the study of the existing relationship between the international politics of power and the corresponding geographical characteristics, mostly of those characteristics from which power sources can be developed” (Cohen,2015). Furthermore, Ladis Kristof stressed that “the modern theorist of geopolitics does not review the world map to determine what nature dictates we do, but what nature advises we do, given our preferences”.

The main pillars of geopolitics are “Geostrategy” and “Goeconomics”. As individual fields of science, they examine the strategic relations of politics and economics to geographic space, with which they interact, thus becoming actual organic quantities of a country’s power. Ergo, as Geostrategy we define the sum of the behavioral mechanism of defense, security and power projection, whereas as goeconomics we define “the method that examines the interaction between homo economicus and the environment”. The aim of goeconomics is to offer to the active subject the ability to take advantage of the resources and markets of a geographic space, as well as the exploitation of the resource and energy production networks. In conclusion, we may state that Geopolitics is a method to analyze the dynamic of a geographic space, whereas geostrategy is the application of this analysis. Nevertheless,

it has been proven through time that the term “geopolitics” has had some disadvantages which have led to misunderstandings. The main reason, to begin with, is that it has been used as a theoretical tendency to evaluate the Nazi imperialism and, also that it has a limited application frame since it is a one-dimensional concept (Chapman,2011).

## 2.1.2. THE MAIN SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN GEOPOLITICS

### a) The German Geopolitics School

The German naturalist and, later, professor of geography Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) was the founder and the first exponent of geopolitics. Ratzel was the creator of the German School, according to whom geopolitics is Geography in the Service of State Politics. Ratzel’s aim was to study thoroughly the theory of the vital space of the countries, which would be later used as the foundation for the imperialistic politics of countries with world domination as the ultimate aim (Tuathail, 2005). A few years later, more specifically in 1920, the German geographer and Professor of the University of Munich, Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) influenced by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel finalized his geopolitical visions during WW1, having already adopted the work of another Swedish theorist, influenced by the ratzelian way of thinking, Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), according to whom geopolitics should focus on analyzing the nature of the state, thus limiting the field of Political Geography in the study of human societies. In accordance with Kjellen’s theory, the geographical dimension was prevailing since “Space is purified”, being the source of vitality and power of the State. Haushofer, on the other hand, is proclaimed, after his service as a German army officer, Professor of Geography in the University of Munich, and devoted himself in the service of the German national ideals, defending the cultural community

through which the Germans would find their place on the global chessboard (Sloan & Gray, 2013).

b) The contradictory theoretical schools of thought in Geopolitics: the naval power theory and land power theory

In the second half of the 19th century, two mutually contradictory, yet, in many parts mutually complementary, theories were formed. The theory of “sea space” and the theory of “land space”, which is another way to define the theories of naval power and land power. The views of the geopolitics theorists differ with respect to which theory should prevail. The first theory was mainly developed by the American historian and strategy scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan who, in his work “The Influence of Sea power upon History (1660-1783)” analyzed the strategic significance of naval power as a means to not only establish but also expand the national economic and diplomatic power, focusing on the case of Great Britain. It can be concluded that Mahan’s theory primarily focuses on the following points:

To begin with, naval power is a "servant to expansion” on the grounds of the fact that it offers to the states the ability to move means of transport much more easily and economically than any other land means. It is also noted that the time of European colonialism coincided with sea domination.

Naval power has the unique ability to safeguard commerce securing sea routes, which can be noted that still applies today.

Sinking ships or ship convoys does not destroy the enemy’s economy totally. On the contrary, solely the ultimate sea domination may intimidate the enemy in order for them to stop sailing.



Furthermore, no country can become a world power without a proper naval army to demonstrate its power at a universal scale. The control of the sea routes by naval armies is the necessary condition for a Great Power aspiring to conquer the world (Gray, 2013).

The second theory was developed by the British Sir Halford J. Mackinder, who analyzed the paramount importance of the vital land space as a means to preserve and enforce power, focusing on the case of Russia. To be more specific, Mackinder stressed that there is a logical continuity and perpetuity in the relations of the countries, provided that the countries move around a fixed geographical space. This “universal process” that takes place within geopolitics, concerns the two poles constituted by land and marine forces. Despite the fact that one of the two was prevailing, Mackinder tended to advocate that land forces would play the most fundamental role. The example of the two main protagonists in the world conflict, namely the British and Russian empires in the beginning of the 20th century, had a major geopolitical interest. Mackinder considered that this situation was “a kind of culmination in the enclosed world of the fact that was steadily spreading in the non-enclosed one of the past. Mackinder was worried about the outcome and believed that land powers were in a more advantageous position” (Cohen, 2015).

### c. The Anglo-Saxon School of Geopolitics

The Anglo-Saxon School of Geography was greatly influenced by the German Geopolitics School of thought. The founder was Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947). Mackinder was a member of the Royal Geography Association of London and founded the Faculty of Geography of London School of Economics (LSE), aiming to illustrate

the economic-geographic dimension of the Anglo-Saxon Geopolitics School of thought, by including geopolitics in the field of economics. One of his works is “Democratic Ideals and Reality”, published in 1919, in which he analyzed the political function of urban liberalism by controlling the commercial sea routes of the world. He also maintained that all the land in the planet constitutes a “World Island”, in the heart of which lies Russia (because of its vast land surface area), which is, because of this, considered to be a “lever” that must be excluded from access to the seas and this should be the top priority of the Western Forces. It is remarkable that he included in his work an opinion about Greece, stating that “should a land Power conquer Greece, then this Power would also control the entire World Island”, illustrating thusly the seriousness of the geostrategic role of the Greek space among the Western geopolitical complex. To Mackinder, “he who rules Eastern Europe, is the ruler of the Earth’s “heart” (Russia). The ruler of the Earth’s heart rules the World Island (Eurasia, Africa). The ruler of the World Island is the ruler of the whole world” (Chapman, 2011).

#### d. The French Geopolitics School

The founder of the French School of Geography was the French geographer Jacques Ancel (1879-1943), who stated that Geopolitics “is nothing more than a meaningless neologism, merely meaning political geography”. Consequently, according to this School of thought, Geopolitics has as its scientific foundation the field of geography, or, as the French geographer Pascal Lorot states, “geopolitics is the daughter of geography”. The French geographer and geopolitics theorist Mickel Foucher additionally highlighted that “geopolitics is an entire method of geographically analyzing specific sociopolitical situations, treated within their geographic framework

along with the usual bio-theories that characterize them”. However, the father of modern French School of thought and analysis in Geopolitics is considered to be Yves Lacoste, who also created the scientific geography/geopolitics journal, named at the beginning “Herodote” - bearing the name of the Greek historian and geographer - and from 1983 onwards “Geography and Geopolitics Review” (“Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique”), clearly stating the geographic scientific methodology of the geopolitical approach. To Lacoste, Geopolitics is not a distinct science, like Geography. It is “a technique to analyze space on earth”, namely, “a technique to analyze human activity in the natural space”. In other words, according to Lacoste, Geopolitics is a technique to analyze the dialectical relationship between “Human space” and “Natural space” (Orain, 2018).

The aforementioned theories constitute the cornerstone of modern geopolitical thinking, while, through them, on the one hand the importance of the field of marine communications for economic and military purposes is recognized and, on the other hand, the geopolitical power of Eurasia is emphasized. Besides these, controlling the production and circulation of energy sources emerges as a crucial geopolitical element. The combination of these elements with geographical position, sociopolitical facts, economy, military forces and the international position of a country define its geopolitical significance.

#### e. Overview of the geopolitical views

Consequently, there is a clear distinction between the developing South and the developed North. The North is mainly constituted by the wealthy (and also marine powers) countries of western Europe as well as U.S.A. and Canada, in contrast with the

countries in Africa and Latin America which constitute the South. The grey areas are generally afflicted by political instability and poverty. It should be noted here that, in the present time period, the countries in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, as well as those in the North African coastline are afflicted by political instability and a series of regime changes, a phenomenon that has been essentially termed “Arab Spring”. Additionally, the territories of “naval” and “land” powers are recorded, while the terms “Heart of the earth” and “Perimeter” are presented.

To conclude, it is worth mentioning the theory of regional dominance which was developed by the American John Mearsheimer at the beginning of the 21st century. According to this theory, given that planet domination is impossible, the aim of every Major Power is on the one hand to dominate over its region and, on the other hand to prevent all other Major Powers from dominating over its region. As the United States have dominated over the American continent since the second half of the 19th century, their constant objective is to maintain this dominance and, at the same time, not to allow any other Major Power to dominate over Europe or Northeast Asia.

Finally, after WW2 a third theory has emerged, that of ideological space, which emphasizes on the importance of ideology, focusing on religious ideology, as a means to create balance and to expand national force. Individual approaches were developed within the wider framework of this theory such as the one by the Jewish-American Samuel Huntington about the clash of civilizations.

## 2.2. THE GEOSTRATEGY OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

### 2.2.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

As it has been mentioned, the Mediterranean constitutes a geopolitical subsystem of Eurasia. The centers of this subsystem are defined based on:

Their part as dominant communicational nodes (in the economic, political and cultural sense).

Their part as energy sources, natural reserves and available resources.

Their part as political and defense power accumulation points.

Their part as sub-metropolitan centers of projection and enforcement of military metropolitan power. This military metropolitan power is projected/ enforced either through the immediate relations – peaceful or not – with the metropolis or through the influence and interaction with the node in the framework of the international or regional collective security system mechanisms, to which the node examined belongs (U.N., NATO, E.U., Islamic Conference etc.)

From the geographical identification of the aforementioned geopolitics centers, it can be deduced that their highest density lies in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, such as in the Sirte Gulf, Crete, the Eastern Aegean Sea as a continuation of the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus straits, the Suez Canal, the area of Otranto-Corfu, the area of Cyprus-Alexandretta-Syria-Lebanon-Israel-Egypt etc. Moreover, the proximity of these centers to the geopolitical centers of instability and financial interests of the wider Middle East is important, as it is understood by the geopolitics analysts, namely of Iraq, Caspian Sea, Iran, Maghreb zone, Turkey etc.

That is the reason why, in that particular area, there can be identified, since the beginning of the 20th century, a horizontal zone of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics influence, in the area between the 36th and the 30th circle of latitude, which is defined, on the one hand by points of established military and economic Anglo-Saxon, and most recently European as well, power in the form of military and commercial/energy facilitations.

In order to be more illustrative. We take as an instance the following: the American-Turkish base in the occupied Lefkonoiko in Cyprus, the British bases in Dhekelia and Akrotiri in the free southern part of Cyprus, the Suez Canal from which approximately 40% of crude oil from the Middle East passes to the Northern European markets and to the corresponding transatlantic ones through Gibraltar, the Dardanelles Straits through which passes an important percentage of the hydrocarbons from Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as the wider sea area among Southeastern Turkey – Cyprus – Syria – Lebanon – Israel can be considered such areas. The last area of the Southeastern Mediterranean, in particular, is the final part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC), the Mosul and Kirkuk via Yumurtalik with the port of Alexandretta as its final destination point, as well as the future, as the U.S.A. and Israel hope to be, important Mosul – Haifa pipeline. The aforementioned “facilitations” in combination with the pressing issues of the area in question (e.g. the Cyprus issue, the naval warfare in the Middle East, the Palestine issue, the Kurdish issue, the Arab turmoil) and also in combination with the central position of Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish-Cypriot disputes justifiably make the geostrategic space of the Eastern Mediterranean the vital space for the strategic national interests, not only of the local and regional countries of the area, but also of the great planetary forces of the West and the East.

## 2.2.2. THE ENERGY PROFILE OF THE SOUTH- EASTERN COUNTRIES

### 2.2.2.1 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF ALBANIA

According to US Energy Information Administration, Albania is ranked in 108<sup>th</sup> position at global scale. In particular, Albania’s production of petroleum and other liquids is 0.041 quadrillion Btu, while the consumption is 0.052 quadrillion Btu (EIA, 2021).





SORT BY: <input checked="" type="radio"/> Energy Source/Activity <input type="radio"/> Country/Region		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
PIN	API					
Total energy production from petroleum and other liquids (quad Btu)						
	 Albania	0.046	0.052	0.039	0.037	0.041
Total energy consumption from petroleum and other liquids (quad Btu)						
	 Albania	0.053	0.055	0.07	0.065	0.052

Figure 1 Petroleum & Other Liquids Source: US Energy Information Administration <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/ALB>

In a more detailed and illustrative depiction, we should refer to the table below (the values are presented in million barrels per day- mb/d)

## Petroleum and other liquids

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Show visualization 

**SORT BY:**  Energy Source/Activity    Country/Region

PIN	API	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
	Petroleum and other liquids production (Mb/d)					
	 Albania	17	16	18	17	16
	Crude oil, NGPL, and other liquids production (Mb/d)					
	 Albania	17	16	18	17	16
	Crude oil including lease condensate production (Mb/d)					
	 Albania	17	16	18	17	16
	Natural gas plant liquids production (Mb/d)					
	 Albania	0	0	0	0	0
	Other liquids production (Mb/d)					
	 Albania	0	0	0	0	0
	Refinery processing gain (Mb/d)					
	 Albania	(s)	(s)	(s)	(s)	(s)

Figure 2 Petroleum and other liquids: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/ALB>


### 2.2.2.2 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA

According to US Energy Information Administration, Bosnia- Hergegovina’s is ranked in 94<sup>th</sup> position in energy production with 0 (zero) quadrillion Btu, while it is ranked in 121<sup>st</sup> position in petroleus and other liquids consumption (EIA, 2021),



## Petroleum and other liquids

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**SORT BY:**  Energy Source/Activity    Country/Region









PIN	API	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Bosnia and Herzegovina							
Production							
		Total petroleum and other liquids (Mb/d)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
		Crude oil, NGPL, and other liquids (Mb/d)	0	0	0	0	0
		Crude oil including lease condensate (Mb/d)	0	0	0	0	0
		NGPL (Mb/d)	0	0	0	0	0
		Other liquids (Mb/d)	0	0	0	0	0
		Refinery processing gain (Mb/d)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

Figure 3 Petroleum and other liquids: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/data/country/BH>

### 2.2.2.3 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF BULGARIA

With respect to Bulgaria's production of petroleum and other liquids, it is 0.002 quadrillion Btu, while the consumption is at 0.192 quadrillion Btu (EIA, 2019)

## Petroleum and other liquids

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**SORT BY:**  Energy Source/Activity    Country/Region

PIN	API	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Bulgaria							
Production							
		Total petroleum and other liquids (Mb/d)	4.7	5.3	6.1	6	6.1
		Crude oil, NGPL, and other liquids (Mb/d)	3.1	3.7	4.5	4.5	4.5
		Crude oil including lease condensate (Mb/d)	1	1	1	1	1
		NGPL (Mb/d)	0	0	0	0	0
		Other liquids (Mb/d)	2.1	2.7	3.5	3.5	3.5
		Refinery processing gain (Mb/d)	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.7

Figure 4 Petroleum and other liquids: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/data/country/BGR>

## 2.2.2.4 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF CROATIA

As it can be concluded by the figures below, Croatia does not constitute a significant energy producer. To be more specific, Croatia's production is at 0.142 quadrillion Btu, while its consumption is at 0.365 quadrillion Btu (EIA, 2019).




Figure 5 Energy profile of Croatia: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/HRV>

### Petroleum and other liquids

Data Options Download Options Notes & Sources Page Help Show visualization +

SORT BY:  Energy Source/Activity  Country/Region

PIN	API	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Croatia						
Production						
	Total petroleum and other liquids (Mb/d)	18	18	18	16	16
	Crude oil, NGPL, and other liquids (Mb/d)	15	15	14	13	12
	Crude oil including lease condensate (Mb/d)	14	14	13	12	11
	NGPL (Mb/d)	1	1	1	1	0.9
	Other liquids (Mb/d)	(s)	(s)	(s)	(s)	(s)
	Refinery processing gain (Mb/d)	3.1	3.1	3.2	3	3.3

Figure 6 Petroleum and other liquids: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/HRV>

### 2.2.2.5 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF MONTENEGRO

Following the pattern of the aforementioned countries, Montenegro does not demonstrate any significant energy producer, while it is worth pointing out the fact that there are not any infrastructures for oil production and exploitation. However, it should be highlighted that Montenegro tends to produce and consume energy produced with hydropower, and coal and lignite burn across the region, which can be illustrated by the figure below (EIA, 2019).



Figure 7 Energy profile of Montenegro: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/MNE>

### 2.2.2.6 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF NORTH MACEDONIA

As far as the energy of North Macedonia is concerned, what should be stressed is the fact that the country is entirely dependent on oil and gas imports. Furthermore, an optimistic fact is that despite the increase in energy consumption, North Macedonia

has managed to decrease CO2 emission index, as it can be depicted in the figure below (IEA, 2019).




Figure 8 Energy profile of North Macedonia, Source: International Energy Agency, available online on <https://www.iea.org/countries/north-macedonia>

## 2.3. THE ENERGY PROFILE OF THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

### 2.3.1 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

It goes without saying that the geopolitical procedures are becoming more and more complex due to the recent events in the marine basin of the Eastern Mediterranean, in light of the discovery of new energy hydrocarbon reserves in the wider sea area between Cyprus and Israel, and also in the area of the sea triangle of the South marine basin of Crete – Kastelorizo – Cyprus. The above discoveries add new factors in our knowledge of the wider area, as well as in the permanent and pressing issues of the Greek-Turkish disputes, the Arab-Israel conflict, the Cyprus and Palestine issues.

By examining the matter further, it can undoubtedly be concluded that the Eastern Mediterranean can be characterized as a marine area of energy competition. Well before the outbreak of WW2, it was the focus of the research interest of well-known companies around the world, regarding the efforts to verify the existence of great amounts of hydrocarbons in the area. The first oil and natural gas reserve explorations in the area in question begun in 1930 and lasted almost 20 years (1948). More specifically, the British company Iraq Petroleum Co. was the first to begin searching the Cyprus region for hydrocarbons, without receiving, however, any notable results. Afterwards, the two superpowers of the region (U.S.A., Soviet Union in the 1960s) take over, and, via taking underwater photographs of the area, manage to map the region, without, however, reaching any definitive conclusion as to the exact position of the alleged reserves. Nevertheless, in 1974 what commenced was the exploration in the sea area of Carpasia, Cyprus, under the supervision of Shell Company. Following, between 1975 and 2000, French and American companies conducted earthquake studies in almost every single area of the Eastern marine basin. However, due to technological constraints, the capability to penetrate the sea bottom was as far as 200 meters and, in the end, the results were once more disappointing to say the least. In spite of all these, Shell Company became once more a pioneer since, after research, following its cooperation with the Egyptian government, it verified the existence of hydrocarbons in the area, a conclusion based upon the presence of the proper sediments that were deposited there for thousands of years by the Nile outflows (Gurel et al, 2013).

Before all other nations, the Cyprus government, in 2000, standardized the procedures regarding hydrocarbon explorations in the sea area between Cyprus and Egypt, as well as in the sea-bed generally, over which the Cypriot government would

be able to obtain and exert sovereign rights. The result of the negotiations with the government of Egypt was the recognition of the boundaries and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and also the 2003 agreement to search for and take advantage of any natural gas reserves that would be discovered within these zones (Karkazis et al, 2018).

Since then, from 2007 till nowadays, in the aforementioned area there have been great events. Typical examples are the earthquake studies that were conducted in 2009 by Noble Energy company, in the wider sea area between Israel and Cyprus, as well as the Leviathan reserve discovery, which is estimated to contain 16 tcl of usable natural gas and lies in the seabed of the Israeli fields Alon A and Alon B.

However, a scientific announcement, in the mid 2010, by the U.S. Geology Studies center (USGS) resulted in a radical change of the energy profile of the Southeastern (SA) Mediterranean. According to the data of this study, in the bottom of the Levantine basin (which is surrounded by Cyprus, Israel, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria) there are vast reserves of natural gas and oil which, at least initially, are estimated to be 1,7 billion oil barrels and 122 tcls of natural gas. The possibility of there being energy resources can be extended to include as far as the Nile delta (Egypt) and the coasts of southeastern Turkey. There are already companies of American-Israel and European interests which cooperate to extract and exploit the natural gas reserves that have already been discovered in the sea area between Cyprus and Israel, within the framework of the energy cooperation agreements the two countries have already signed.

The greatest reserves are located in the borders between the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of these two countries. However, not all Exclusive Economic Zones of the neighboring countries in the area (except Cyprus – Israel in 2010, Cyprus – Egypt in 2003 and Cyprus – Lebanon in 2007) have been outlined, and though because of this issue intense consultations have begun among the parties involved, among which, it must be noted, there are significant disputes about the territorial waters and EEZ boundaries (e.g., the case of Lebanon – Israel) and also there are other issues of intense conflict, such as the Palestine issue. Furthermore, the existence of significant natural gas reserves, not only between Cyprus and Israel and Cyprus and Egypt, but also in the west side of Cyprus, between Cyprus and Crete is possible. The publication of the studies conducted by the U.S. Geology Studies center is indicative, regarding the existence of retrievable natural gas reserves in the sea-bed environment of the wider area, which present an estimate of the total possible existence of retrievable natural gas reserves of 345 tcls and 8 billion of liquified natural gas and oil barrels. The sea region in the south part of Crete and the Greek part of the Herodotus field are of significant interest, due to their geographical relief on the one hand, and, on the other hand, due to the realization that, after the Norwegian Geophysical research company Petroleum Geo-Services carried out research in the area, there is increased possibility of there being hydrocarbons (Karkazis et al).

However, in this way, implications in the Greek-Turkish relations and in the relations among Cyprus, Turkey and Israel have emerged, with Israel having formally proposed to Greece and Cyprus to act as a transportation node towards Europe of the natural gas that will be found in their EEZ, both because they estimate that the construction of such facilities could be funded by the E.U. and because the alternative

route through Turkey seems to be impossible, while Tel-Aviv estimates that the crisis in his relations with Ankara is non-coincidental.

Another issues of paramount importance that should be mentioned is the fact that Cyprus is one of the states having signed and adopted the Law on the Promotion of Renewable Energy Efficiency since the early 2010s due to its ever-increasing rate of CO2 emissions as it can be depicted in the Figure below (IEA, 2022).




Figure 9 Energy profile of Cyprus, Source: International Energy Agency, available online on <https://www.iea.org/countries/cyprus>



# Cyprus

2019 primary energy data in quadrillion Btu



Total Energy: Production 0.005 Consumption 0.119




Figure 10 Energy profile of Cyprus: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/CYP>

As it can be deduced from the analysis above, Cyprus could be transformed and serve as a regional energy hub providing energy to the neighboring states provided that the facilities required for an LNG terminal to be constructed.

## 2.3.2 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF SYRIA

The most important activity of Damascus, as regards energy, used to be oil production. Due to reserve depletion, however, there has been an effort to produce natural gas. Consequently, Damascus, having strategically survived the increase in production, was able to cover the full operation of the natural gas production plant in Haysan, which had the capacity to produce 32 mcf daily. For this reason, a contest was announced in 2010 regarding the research and exploitation of reserves. Petro-Canada and the French Total are the first companies to obtain the necessary authorization. Moreover, Damascus, via the Arab Gas pipeline imports natural gas from Egypt, of up

to 5-6 bcf, and even signed a Cooperation Memorandum with Turkey in 2009 in order to construct a branch of that pipeline towards the Kilisr area in Turkey, with which it would secure, for at least 5 years, approximately 17,5 to 32 bcf of natural gas annually. Also, the cooperation with Azerbaijan was deemed significant, regarding the transportation of Azerbaijani natural gas via the under-construction pipeline with Turkey, which would yield 35bcf a year to the country. Furthermore, in 2011, Syria signed an agreement with Iran and Iraq in order to participate in the construction of the future major Islamic Gas Pipeline, 3.100 miles long, which would transport the Irani natural gas of approximately 1,4 tcm a year to the European market via Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, bypassing in this way the transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) which used to pass through the Ormuz Straits.

Besides these, Syria demonstrated great interest in the recently discovered reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean area, particularly after the studies by the United States Geological Survey on the existence of natural gas reserves in the Levantine field. In this area, which constitutes part of the Exclusive Economic Zone of three independent nations, namely Syria, Lebanon and Israel, Syria had already announced a contest about 4 blocks neighboring a part of the Cyprus EEZ in the area.

Nevertheless, political instability and civil war in the said country and the surrounding area which broke out in 2011 have contributed to the uncertainty as far as the future of the country is concerned. Apart from the delay in the realization of the aforementioned plans, the civil war functioned as a cord of fuse and entailed in putting Syria's oil sector in a state of disarray with dramatic decline in natural gas and oil

production and the cease in crude oil exports. Furthermore, conflicts have also affected tremendously the energy infrastructure should we take into consideration the destruction of gas pipelines and electricity transmission networks. It goes without saying that conflicts and fights between government and opposition forces not only have destroyed and eliminated the oil sector but have entailed in causing tremendous problems in electricity as well (EIA, 2015).




Figure 11 Energy profile of Syria: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/SYR>

### Key energy statistics, 2019

All statistics




Figure 12 Energy profile of Syria, Source: International Energy Agency, available online on <https://www.iea.org/countries/syria>

### 2.3.3 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF ISRAEL

Israel used to have indigenous natural gas reserves of 1,5 to 1,7 tcf, amounts which were not sufficient to satisfy the needs of the country, let alone since it have possessed a significant and rapidly advancing high-tech industry, regarding IT, arms production as well as alternative energy. In this way, Egypt used to supply Israel with natural gas (up to 72 bcf annually), via the Arish – Ashkelon Pipeline, which is a branch of the Arab Gas Pipeline, significantly depending on Egypt. Moreover, despite being one of the countries that have not signed the United Nations Convention of The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it has nevertheless signed an agreement outlining its EEZ with Cyprus and Egypt based on the midline / equal distance.

However, the newly discovered reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone, have been hopeful messages of energy independence and differentiation in this country as well as significant economic recovery prospects. These reserves are the following:

The Leviathan reserve, which is estimated to contain approximately 22tcf of recoverable natural gas, bordering towards the East with block 12 of Cyprus, which has been the great motivation for the outline process of the EEZs of the two countries and the joined exploitation agreement with Cyprus to proceed (EIA, 2016).

Furthermore, in 2009 the Tamar field was discovered despite the fact that the commercial production from this field commenced in 2013. In addition to Tamar field,

a smaller one was discovered in 2013 8 miles southwest of the Tamar field. Although it contains 22 Tcf of recoverable natural gas, it provided Iran (along with the newly discovered Daniel East and Daniel West fields) with the opportunity to become a net exporter and supply neighbouring countries- such as Palestinian Authority) with natural gas from the Leviathan field.

With respect to the environmental aspect of the Israeli energy profile, ti what should be pointed out is the fact that the protection of envrinmenta tends to have become an integral part of national policy. To be more specific, the Ministry of Energy underlines that:

1. “The energy market needs to be reliable, clean and affordable.
  2. 90% of the total renewable energy in Israel is based on solar energy.
  3. The demand for electricity is expected to increase, due to the expected increase in the Israeli population.
  4. Land scarcity requires efficient and multilayered use of land and surfaces.
  5. Removal of bureaucratic barriers is a necessary step for achieving the target of 30% renewable energy.
  6. Inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral collaborations are crucial for success.”
- (Ministry of Energy,2021)

To this end, the solar power staions have drastically increased, while an action of utmost importance was the sign and adoption of Resolution/ Government Decision 542 in 2015. According to this Resolution, Israel’s objective was the decrease of greenhouse gas emissions to at least 27% per year by 2030 (Gratham Research Institute

on Climate Change and the Environment, 2021) due to the high percentage of CO<sub>2</sub> gas emissions, as illustrated in the table below.




Figure 13 Energy profile of Israel, Source: International Energy Agency, available online on <https://www.iea.org/countries/israel>

### 2.3.4 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF BAHRAIN

What strikes out attention about the Kingdom of Bahrain is the fact that Bahrain is a major oil producer among the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Bahrain's energy supply is primarily covered by the domestic resources, while, at the same time, it is an exporter of oil, petroleum products and natural gas (IEA, 2019)

### 2.3.5 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF OMAN

Oman is one of the largest oil and natural gas producer in the Middle East. In spite of this fact, Oman is not a member of the Organization on the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Furthermore, it covers its needs for energy primarily from domestic

resources, while, as it can be observed in the figures below, China has been Oman’s prime export destination (EIA,2019).

**Figure 2. Oman petroleum and other liquids production and consumption, 2007-2017**  
thousand barrels per day





Figure 14 Oman's production and consumption: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/OMN>

**Figure 3. Oman crude oil exports by destination, 2017**



*Figure 15 Oman's exports destination: Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/OMN>*

### 2.3.6 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF YEMEN

Despite the fact that Yemen is not a major hydrocarbon producer, what should be pointed out is the fact that the domestic production of oil and natural gas is capable of covering both the domestic demand and the exports. However, it cannot be denied that the unstable regional environment and the multiple hazards have hindered effective exploration and exploitation of the natural resources (EIA, 2020), while a large part of the population does not have access to electricity (IEA, 2019).

### 2.3.7 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF IRAQ

It goes without saying that crude oil is a fundamental factor of Iraq's economy. According to EIA, Iraq "is the second- largest crude oil producer in the OPEC after Saudi Arabia". However, it strikes our attention that it tends to depend on imports of petroleum products, such as gasoline. Furthermore, most of Iraq's important oilfields are located onshore (EIA.2021).






Figure 16 Iraq's petroleum and other liquids production and consumption, Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/IRQ>

### 2.3.8 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF EGYPT

The energy sector is a key component for the economic development and growth of Egypt, as it contributes as a whole by approximately 16% of the country's GDP. The programme for the modernization of the Egyptian hydrocarbon industry- implemented by the Ministry of Petroleum and is part of the government's development to be fulfilled by 2030- includes seven pillars. To be more specific, these pillars aim at improving and enhancing productivity as well as at the sustainability of the domestic industry in order to be encounter more effectively the volatile conditions at an international level. Among the innovations having been introduced, apart from the increase in the sources of supply and the modernization of the refineries- the Egyptian government has implemented the reduction of the production costs and the development of the human resources of the industry (EIA, 2022).

Figure 2. Total annual liquid fuels production and consumption in Egypt, 2012–2021  
thousand barrels per day





Figure 17 Production and consumption of liquid fuels, Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/EGY>

Furthermore, the Egyptian government has implemented a strategic plan whose fundamental objective is to establish the country as a major international hub in the region of the East Mediterranean. This strategy encompasses the scrutinization and the analysis of similar policies adopted by other international “players” / “agents” of the energy market, the elaboration of cost-benefit analyses, as well as the processing of specific short- term and long- term action plans to implement the particular policy. According to industry sources, among the strategy proposals are the creation of offshore gas supply stations in Egyptian ports, which will be an innovation in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Figure 4. Total crude oil and condensate exports from Egypt by country, 2021



Source: Graph by U.S. Energy Information Administration based on Global Trade Tracker data

Figure 18 Exports from Egypt, Source US Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/EGY>


### 2.3.9 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF TURKEY

Located at a region of paramount importance, it goes without saying that Turkey has been established as a crucial transit hub for oil and natural gas. To be more specific, the strategic position of Turkey renders it to a core transit hub connecting Central Asia, the Middle East, the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. However, Turkey is highly dependent on oil and gas imports despite the fact that it has put energy policy at a focal point. Furthermore, what should be stressed is the fact that during the recent decades a rapid and drastic increase in the energy consumption has been observed. In order to become more energy efficient, Turkey has enhanced the network of pipelines and LNG terminals (IEA, 2021).

### 2.3.10 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

United Arab Emirates is a country abundant in natural resources, while it has been established as a net exporter and since 2019 has been among the largest oil producer providing the world primarily with oil and natural gas. Moreover, according to EIA, the United Arab Emirates holds large reserves of oil, while the domestic needs are primarily covered by natural gas, as depicted in the chart below (EIA, 2020). What should be pointed out is that UAE

Figure 1. Total primary energy consumption in UAE by fuel type, 2018



 Source: BP Statistical Review of Energy, 2019

Figure 19 Energy Consumption in UAE, Source: U.S Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/AE>

### 2.3.11 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in OPEC and, as illustrated in the figure below, is the second- largest petroleum liquids producer in the world.

Figure 1. Petroleum and other liquid fuel production





Figure 20 Petroleum and other liquid fuel production, Source: U.S Energy Information Adiministratiom, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/SAU>

As it can be deduced, Saudi Arabia’s economy is primarily dependent on oil exports. However, what strikes our attention is the fact that during the pandemic Saudi Arabia reduced production (EIA, 2021) and has implemented a policy of energy efficiency in order to become greener via saving energy potential (IEA, 2019)

### 2.3.12 THE ENERGY PROFILE OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the largest oil and natural gas producer at a global scale, as depicted in the figure below.

Figure 1. Largest proved reserve holders of total oil, 2020  
billion barrels



Source: Graph by U.S. EIA based on data from *Oil & Gas Journal*, December 2020  
Note: Oil reserves include crude oil, condensates, natural gas liquids, and oil sands.

Figure 21 Reserve holders, Source: U.S Energy Information Administration, available online on <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/IRN>

Despite the fact that oil sector is of vital importance for Iran’s economy, Islamic Republic of Iran has managed to develop a diversified economy, contrary to other states of the Middle East. This could be understood should we take into consideration not only the fall in oil exports but also the sanctions imposed on Iran (EIA, 2021), not to mention the implementation of a greener policy towards the increase of renewable sources of energy (IEA, 2019).

## 2.4 THE ENTITY OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

### 2.4.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

Iran borders to the north by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkmenistan, east with Pakistan and Afghanistan and to the west with Turkey and Iraq. The capital is Tehran, which is the political, cultural, commercial and industrial center of the country. Iran is considered a regional power and occupies a significant position on global energy policy and economy, which emanates mainly from the large oil reserves and natural gas. The country is also a member of OPEC and the United Nations. The economy is largely controlled by the state itself, with the oil to be the most important economic resource of the country. Iran is the fourth largest oil producer worldwide. The majority of the Iranian population speaks one of the Iranian languages, although Persian is the official one. The most important ethnic groups are the Persians (51%), the Azeris (24%), the Gilaki and Mazandarani (8%), the Kurds (7%), the Arabs (3%), the Valouchi (2%), the Lurs (2%), the Turkomans (2%), the Cascais, the Armenians, the Jews of Persia, the Assyrians and others.

### 2.4.1 IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE

This section focuses on the practical application of the novelties, the “application of Islam” and the examination of the whole system of power in the single “theocratic” Muslim country. The supreme leader and judge (the position of Khomeini himself), is the most respected clergyman and, after his death, it is his chosen one, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The lifelong leader is elected by the “Assembly of Experts” (also known as “Parliament of the Experts”) which has 88 elected members, who

theoretically examine his actions. The term of the members of this council lasts between 8 and 10 years, and their work is small but particularly important since, besides electing the supreme leader, they also bear the responsibility of constitutional reformations (Buchta, 2000).

The supreme leader and judge, undoubtedly the most important political/religious figure, has life tenure. He is regarded as “Grand Ayatollah” and, besides other powers he is the Chief-commander of the Armed Forces, of the “Guardians of the Revolution” and of the “Religious Police”. In addition, the supreme leader “controls” the “Supreme National Security Council”, appoints half of the members of the “Guardian Council” and all the members of the “Expediency Council” (Buchta, 2000).

Examining the aforementioned institutions, the “Supreme National Security Council” assists the supreme leader as it is his main consultation body. The General Secretary of the National Security Council is appointed by the President and the council members are the most important ministers (foreign affairs, domestic affairs, defense and security), all of them chosen by the President, as well as military officers (Chief of the Army, Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) appointed by the supreme leader. The “Guardian Council” exercises judicial power. During the election period, the 12 members of the “Guardian Council” (6 common-law judges appointed by the Parliament and 6 Islamic-law judges appointed by the supreme leader) decide on whether a candidate is suitable to run for a position in the parliament or for the position of the prime minister. In previous elections, a total number of 3.600 reformist politicians were disqualified and were prevented from “standing for election”. Although there is a tendency towards liberalism, the number of the disqualified candidates for the position of President has almost always four digits.



In order to clarify the role of the “Expediency Council” we first have to refer to the main legislative body. The 200 parliament members (4-year tenure) are elected via democratic procedures. The parliament verifies the international treaties, approves the country’s budget and “controls” the government. The “Expediency Council” resolves any issues arising between the parliament and the “Guardian Council”. The executive power is exerted by the elected President. The last political institution that was established in Iran was founded by Khamenei in 2011 and is called “Supreme Body of Arbitration and Coordination of the Three Powers” (Flanagan, 2013).

Iran’s political system is not totalitarian, but it is authoritarian. It is complex, as we have determined and it is not the absolutism of the “supreme leader”. In fact, in 1988, Khomeini revised the Constitution because he aimed to “clarify the distinction among parliament, executive, government, judicial and magistrate power”. Certainly, Iran’s system does not permit the existence of political parties as it is considered “anti-Islamic” (Amidian, 2017). However, there are several political organizations that demand reforms: the Office for Strengthening Unity, a student organization which demands reforms and the Combatant Clergy Association, the members of which are moderate clergymen, are the most important ones. In fact, the former president Rouhani was a member of the latter association. Finally, there are some organizations that have been outlawed such as the Marxist (only regarding financial matters) organization of the Fighters of the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Iran Participation Front.

It is evident from the aforementioned practices of excluding “unwanted” President candidates, as well as prohibiting specific political bodies, that Iran is far from being democratic, yet, even as it is, it is more democratic than most countries in the Middle East. Women are not wearing chador, they drive, a high percentage of them are working and they receive mandatory education (which lasts 12 years), while they

constitute 60% of the tertiary education students. Moreover, women participate in politics since they have the right to vote, eighteen members of the parliament are women and, for the first time, the Vice President is a woman. In spite of all these, women are not allowed to become judges, while, every time a woman ran for President, her candidanship was rejected on some pretense. Also, in reality, they face particular social discriminations, especially in finding employment and in the amount of salary they receive.

The elections in Iran, after the candidates have been “selected”, may be minimally fraudulent and there is no serious doubt about their results. As a consequence, the lack of democracy does not exist due to unsuccessful separation of powers, or due to fraudulent election results or disruption of the elections, not even due to unconstitutional actions, since Constitution is strictly followed. The heart of the issue is that half the powers/institutions in Iran are not exercised by elected representatives. In addition, these non-elected but “chosen” ones control the Armed Forces as well as the Judicial power. Finally, they have the right to veto the decisions of the elected bodies. The non-elected leaders in Iran are traditionally the most hardline since they are both religious leaders and also older people. In any case, despite the requests for liberalization, the Iranian system has survived a long war, an unbearable financial embargo, a series of killings of many officials at the beginning of its foundation and, of course, the death of charismatic Khomeini. Even moderate leaders, like those of the “green movement” who demanded reforms in June 2009 when Ahmadinejad was President, did not seek to alter the system but to improve certain policies and parameters of power.

In particular, the leader of the “green movement”, who was Prime Minister in the 1980s, Mir Hossein Mousavi, rejected the divide between conservatives and

revisionists/reformists. His slogan was “change”, not a change of system but a change of democratization since he considered himself to be loyal to the principles of the Iranian Revolution. He talked about more democracy, something that appealed to both “seculars” and “Islamists”.

Returning to the Revolution era, the transition from the Shah to Khomeini was not actually a succession of absolutism but a continuation of absolutism with a more democratic veneer. The reason for this was that the authority of these two men was indisputable, for different reasons. The Shah was mentioned as “the king of kings”, “the light of the Aryans” and the “Founder of the New Civilization”, among others. Khomeini, in turn, was mentioned as “the great Imam”, the “hope of the oppressed people of the Earth” and, of course, the “commander of the believers everywhere”. There is an evident exaggeration and an emphasis on superhuman qualities for both leaders. The Shah, on the one hand, aimed at being identified as a nationalist and a modernist, while Khomeini personified populism, anti-imperialism and social justice, adding a universal dimension to his revolution. Khomeini’s speeches were always targeting the Shah as well as the American “toxic influence” on Iran. This “toxic influence” is not Khomeini’s observation or thought, but something that preexisted. When Khomeini rose to power, he appointed a committee (most members of which were clergymen) to write a new Constitution. This Constitution, influenced by the principle of west “toxic influence”, did not contain any references to Western politics or ideology. Everything theoretically revolved around Islam and took into consideration only the Iranian/Shiite traditions, while, in reality, they were clearly influenced by western thinking (Fairbanks, 1998).

The rise of Khomeini’s Political Islam created enemies, but – like all other revolutions – it was not without casualties, or respectful to the human and political

rights. Its greatest victim were not the Shah's supporters (he was never popular after all), but the Iranian Left-wing and, especially, the students and professors of tertiary education. During the "Cultural Revolution" (1980-1983), that brought to mind Mao's bloody and unsuccessful similar attempt in China, an unspecified number of students and professors were exiled, self-exiled, tortured or killed as enemies of the regime. When universities reopened in 1983, they were "Islamized". However, fanatic Muslims realized that there is no such thing as Islamic pedagogy, Islamic politics or Islamic science. Consequently, there were fewer changes than the anticipated upheaval.

It is of greater importance, to our study, to examine the percentage of "Islamization" of foreign and domestic politics, in other words, to observe if and to what extent foreign affairs policy has changed and if and to what extent Sharia law is implemented. The "Islamic" Constitution of the country consists of 14 chapters and 177 articles in total. It theoretically proclaims the equality of all people (obviously of both genders), ensures basic human rights, while articles 32 to 37 provide exceptional legal protection to everyone. The constitutional principles obviously have been violated many times. Although Prophet Muhammad married Aisha when she was 9 years old, it is forbidden to marry in Iran before the age 18 for women and 20 for men. Also, even though getting divorced is theoretically easy for Muslim men, in Iran there has to be a court trial (even for mutual divorces, in an attempt to limit divorce numbers). Regarding matters of the wife's protection, after the divorce the wife is entitled to receive half the husband's estate that was obtained during the marriage, to take back the dowry ("mahr") if she had paid one, something that is not common, and possibly (depending on the judge's decision) to receive a remuneration for household chores ("Ojrat al-Methl") equivalent to the years of the marriage. We could maintain that these provisions are not only non-Islamic, but they are also in contrast with the Sharia.

There are, though, other provisions that have been introduced because of the Sharia. For example, polygamy is not forbidden, although there are many conditions which must apply. Because of patriarchy, the father instead of the mother takes custody of the children in case of divorce. The worst part is that severe penalties have been included for adultery (from 100 whippings to death by stoning for single or married women, respectively), death penalty for being a male homosexual and 100 whippings for being a female homosexual, 75 whippings for promoting prostitution, 80 whippings for alcohol consumption, 80 whippings for slanderous adultery accusations, while there is also the penalty of wrist amputation in case of theft, but under such circumstances that it is nearly impossible to happen. The fact that apostasy and “war against God” are punished is even worse.

Most of these penalties are not actually implemented, in fact, there has been a formal moratorium regarding amputations and stoning since 2002. However, between 2006 and 2009, Ahmadinejad, in order to impress, permitted the killing of a woman and three men by stoning because of charges of adultery. It is evident that while these penalties are not banned from criminal justice system, there will be blatant violation of human rights.

Iran’s foreign affairs policy and its objective to become dominant in the Middle East remain constant ever since the period of the Shah’s rule. Tehran is engaging in geopolitical conflicts in this region with the Gulf monarchies. There have been only two instances of historical “alliance” between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The first approach between the two countries took place at the beginning of the 1960s, when Nasser’s pan-Arabism prevailed and the Chasemite king of Iraq was overthrown and the Baath political party prevailed both in Iraq and in Syria. At that time, Iran’s Shah and king Saud felt threatened by the revolutionary forces. The US was also pushing towards

closer relations between the two countries. The second approach was when Iraq invaded Kuwait, with the Iraqi forces being within close range of the Saudi-Arabian oil wells, obviously after the famous ten-year war between Iraq and Iran. At that time, both countries regarded Saddam Hussein as their greatest opponent. Even then, though, the relations between the two countries were not “heated”. Moreover, Iran’s “nuclear power program” began in 1957 at the time of the Shah’s rule, by a bilateral agreement with the USA regarding cooperation in matters of “peaceful” nuclear power.

The Islamic Revolution led to a different alliance orientation and not in a change of objectives. Ever since Tehran not only stopped being USA’s “favorite child” in the region, but also began being in absolute conflict with the Superpower, it tried to leverage the regime’s characteristics in order to create a Shiite crescent, which would affect developments and constitute Iran’s Long Arm in the wider Middle East region. In Syria, the Alawite Baath party, which was ruling and would, logically speaking, be regarded as an opponent, since they were “Shiites, but also heretics” and, of course, particularly “secular”, became Tehran’s major ally in the region under the pretext of religion. In its effort to assume a regional role, Iran has a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement (which has 120 member-states and 17 observer-states), of which was Chair for three years since August 2012, while it has overall significant political openness and diplomatic presence. Consequently, Iran is not an internationally-isolated country, as it is frequently represented. To sum up, there is an uncommon but not absolute “Sharia” in the country, while its international aim to assume a regional role remains unchanged.

#### 2.4.1 IRAN’S OBJECTIVES

Iran has existed as an autonomous state since the end of World War II and the withdrawal of Anglo-Soviet troops from the country. In 1946, new Shah of Iran is Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who has been described as pro-Western and who with the support of the USA revived Iranian society. The press had more freedom of speech and the country's political scene demonstrated the first western elements with the composition of the first political parties. However, Pahlavi's had caused opposition due to a large portion of the Islamic society of Iran who witnessed Pahlavi lead a most luxurious secular life, at a time when the Iranian people lived in poverty.

Pahlavi's dream of westernizing Iran failed as the country's relations with the US were drastically deteriorated after the student invasion in November 1979 at the US Embassy in Tehran. Shah Reza Pahlavi kept foreign policy balance between Iran and other powers. Keeping a low profile towards the West in matters of politics and attempting to distance oneself from religion and traditions the Iranian people, maintained good relations both with the Western powers and with the Iran's Sunni community, which was dominant in the Islamic world but minority in the country.

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the overthrow of the Shah's regime, Ayatollah Khomeini, taking over the government of the state, followed a theocratic policy in accordance with the submissions of Islam and Koran. Khomeini's policy led Iran to isolation and the severance of relations with some of its then allies.

Ruhollah Khomeini is one of the most emblematic figures of conservative Islam. Coming from a deep religious family and with religious education, the teachings of Islam played a catalytic role in his life and political work. His goal was to unify of the Muslims and he declared himself ready to defend them all oppressed Muslims regardless of dogma.

Upon the rise of Khomeini regime, Shiism and Political Islam was given the opportunity to make their presence felt on the international stage. The worldview of Ayatollah Khomeini was based on the need to promote Islam and Muslim society worldwide. After two transitional years of the newly formed government, Ayatollah gathered all the powers in his face. In order to secure power and citing the absolute need to submit to Islamic law, which only he could interpret, he neutralized his political opponents and those expressed doubts about his work. In the years that followed, Iran turned into a highly conservative state whose policy was based solely on religion. For the first time in the history of the modern world, there is a government with a single ideological, religious and political entity. Iran is dominated by two fundamental principles, namely Religion (Islam) and democracy, hence the name "Islamic Republic". The adoption of democratic mindsets in conjunction with religious despotism is a kind of compromise between the secular and the sacred element.

The Revolution of 1979 and the rise of the Khomeini regime meant the end of the Islamic Republic's relationship with both the West and Gulf countries. Iran, from a pro-Western country, had become a conservative Muslim state with anti-Western views. The Khomeini regime declared the beginning of a new era in Iran's foreign policy, which the Islamic State maintains to some extent to date. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, Islam must play a vital role in the course of a Muslim world and be directly intertwined with the policy, which should "comply" with the teachings of Islam.



## 2.4.2 CORE IRANIAN RELATIONS

### 2.4.2.1 IRAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

To begin with, Iran is one of the few states with which the European Union does not maintain conventional relations despite the fact attempts have been made establishing and strengthening relations between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of the economic and political interests that stem from such cooperation. The European Union ranks first in the country's trade relations, as it is Iran's most essential trading partner, both in imports and exports. The European Union considers that Iran tends to offer vital opportunities for development of bilateral economic and trade relation due to the fact that Islamic Republic of Iran is an important source of oil and gas in a most strategic location combined with remarkable human potential.

A moment of paramount importance for the bilateral relations was the election of Iranian President Khatami in 1997, which resulted in improvement of the relations between Iran and European countries. For instance, the Italian Prime Minister visited Tehran in 1997, while President Khatami visited Italy and France in 1999. As it was mentioned above, the relations between the European Union and Iran can be described all but conventional. It is worth pointing out the fact that the agreement that had been signed during the Shah's time and expired in 1977, prior to the Islamic Revolution (Dryburgh,2008).

However, with respect to the Iran- EU cooperation, significant difficulties have emerged not solely at economic level but at sociopolitical level as well. For instance, the problem of human rights, is one of the biggest thorns in each other arrangement and negotiations. In addition to the restrictions on freedom of speech and expression, the

issues of the position of women, and these of tortures and persecution of minorities are also crucial. The reluctance of a practical retreat on the part of Iranian government tends to pose serious problems of good faith.

Taking the above into consideration, until there is tangible evidence of Iran's political compliance with the new, global needs regarding peace and balance, the EU cannot face unreservedly the Iranian regime. From an economic point of view, the strengthening of trade and economic cooperation between the EU and Iran will depend on the implementation of political and economic liberalization by Iran, which constitutes a necessary condition for attracting essential investment flows to that country. As it can be concluded, the EU, despite its obvious desire to conclude an economic cooperation agreement with Iran, does not appear willing to move forward unless Tehran make concessions on key political issues.

Provided that the reforms continue, it is clear that the strengthening of EU- Iran relations in the economic and political sector, as well as the environment and migration is particularly beneficial, not only for the EU but also for Iran. It is understood that the promotion of bilateral relation shall depend on the progress made in the sector of political, economic and social reforms in Iran.

#### 2.4.4.2 IRAN AND ISRAEL

Despite the fact that the bilateral relations between Iran and Israel date back in ancient times and were particularly close, their relations have been subjected to multiple shifts. In particular, Iran was the second Muslim country after Turkey which recognized the state of Israel in 1950 and both countries had developed diplomatic contacts. Commercial and economic bonds had established with Iran supplying to Israel oil,

natural gas, raw material, food and commodities, while Israelis assisted Iran in agricultural technology, medicine and scientific research.

Upon the Islamic Revolution in 1979 the relations between Iran and Israel turned from friendly to utterly hostile (Holliday, 2020). The pro-American regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi was overthrown by the Iranians together with the Shah and, as a result, the multinational oil companies and the foreign ones American and Jewish interest banks were expelled. What should be stressed is the fact that the conversion of the relations emanated primarily from religious factors. In particular, Ayatollah Ruyollah Khomeini advocated that Israel located in the heart of the Islamic world has been a major obstacle for the idea of Islamic integration and the creation of a world Muslim community. In 1981 Khomeini had declared that religious Iran's leadership will never tolerate the occupation of its sacred lands Islam by the Jews. In practice, of course, this means full support the Palestinians' struggle for self-determination against the Israelis "Invaders" as the Iranians call them (Malhotra, 2019). This explains the financial support of Iran (but also in level military know-how) to the civil-military and by many western countries Hamas terrorist organization and to Lebanese Shiites Hezbollah, which Israel considers Iran's "long arm" in Lebanon.

However, the query arisen remains one: has the new turn that Israel- Iran relations have taken been due to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to the collapse of the pro-Western Shah's regime and in the establishment of a theocratic society, or due to changes in power distribution and geopolitics? The two states seem to emerge as regional powers and the once conditional allies now tend to treat each other as competitors and opponents.

In other words, the question is whether the hostility or the existential hatred of the two states is not just an ideological conflict but due to the shifts taken place in the geopolitical landscape, or due to the combination of the two factors. For instance, the alliance of a conventional foes and old sworn enemies, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia, against Iran.

#### 2.4.4.3 IRAN- GREECE

Greece and Islamic Republic of Iran are two countries with particular geopolitical significance in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. What should be highlighted is the fact that both countries are characterized by ancient civilization, history and long- lived presence in the world. Having a rich historic background of political and cultural relations since antiquity and the Middle Ages, Greece and Iran entered modern history with a century apart (19<sup>th</sup> century for Greece, 20<sup>th</sup> century for Iran), as long as it was necessary for the dissemination of the notion of nation state.

As far as the role of Iran for Greece is concerned, it is vital due to the fact that along Turkey, Iran constitutes the second most powerful country in the Middle East. From the Iranian point of view, Greece as a member state of the European Union is of paramount importance for the foreign policy of Iran. The cultural contacts between Greece and Iran, which are two peoples with ancient civilizations, form a solid foundation for further development of the bilateral relations. Our country monitors and participates as a UN and EU member state the developments with respect the Iranian nuclear programme. The two countries have signed during the recent years Agreement in the field of road and air transportation, as well as Cooperation Agreement in the fields of tourism and agriculture (MFA, 2022).

#### 2.4.4.5 IRAN- SAUDI ARABIA

The post-war period puts both Iran and Saudi Arabia under close influence of the American superpower, each facing its own internal and external problems. Both countries were ruled by Western-affiliated governments, Riyadh under House of Saud and Tehran under the Pahlavi dynasty, without having expressed particular rivalry, despite the hegemonic ambitions of the latter. USA, considered the two states as strategic partners and pillars of the Americans interests, following the so-called "two-pillar policy". This policy aimed at eliminating the Soviet presence in the region and achieved, until in 1958, with the triptych Iran-Saudi Arabia-Iraq. The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 and the fall of the Shah after demonstrations entailed in the changed of the scene. The establishment of the Islamic Republic and the emergence of radical Shiite regime under Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, have resulted in the total shift of its foreign policy in light of the fact that the Khomeini government would be intensely criticize the US and their allies, such as Riyadh and the Saddam regime in Iraq (Soltaninejad, 2019).

The new constitution of the Shiite Iranian was considered harmful to Saudi Arabia and was treated as a threat to Arab interests and its influence in the Gulf. According Khomeini, all Muslim societies that were, either Sunni regimes, or under pro-Western authoritarian regimes, were oppressed and called upon to uprising. Saudi Arabia was far from idle against these challenges Tehran, with successive conflicts that continue to this day, which unfold on various political fronts and war zones in the Middle East.

Despite the fact that both Saudi Arabia and Iran have not shown signs of an immediate military conflict, the confrontation between them is equally worrying, as it is durable over time. At an international level, external forces tend to play a crucial role and especially the economically powerful states, such as the US and Russia, while the EU remains a neutral diplomatic force.

The question that arises about the rivalry of the two forces of the Middle East is whether Iran has the ability to lead the Arab and what the options of the Saudi Arabia's respond to this threat would be. As it appears, Iran's goal is the rebirth of the Persian Empire, the continuation of the Islamic Revolution and the emergence of the state as a regional one superpower despite the fact that as a non-Arab state in an Arab-occupied area, always proceeded in a climate of insecurity and persistent ideological and religious confrontations with the Arab states have made progress in its purpose difficult. Albeit how Iran is gaining ground by engaging in the various crises that arise in the region, its achievements are weak to make him a dominant force.

In a nutshell, the bilateral relations are in a dangerous situation, to which it cannot be found solution through the use of force but through diplomacy. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue as long as both regimes use religion to legitimate their political basis. However, the ideal scenario for Saudi Arabia is the adoption of a more moderate foreign policy of the Iranian regime.

#### 2.4.4.6 IRAN- TURKEY

Historically the Ottoman Empire and Iran in the past had found in a long-running controversy, which was based on sectarian ideological, systemic, religious and cultural differences between the two states. However, there were periods during which

relationships between them they improved considerably and reached their peak during the Pahlavi dynasty. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Turkey sought a moderate policy towards Iran. Fearing the spread of Iranian Revolution, Turkey used its secular system as a pretext, distanced itself politically from Iran, while, at the same time during the Iran-Iraq War, tried to develop economic relations with Iran (Ozsahin et al, 2021).

Turkey's main problem has been and remains energy. Based on this necessity, Turkey- Iran relations were established, being at the same time systemic, religious and cultural competing countries. Both countries aspire to play key role in Central Asia, while seeking to transfer energy resources from the Caspian and Central Asia through their territories. Turkey as Sunni state promotes "secularized" model of Islam, while Iran as a Shiite promotes a "theocratic" political system. Both countries are trying to promote their own their political model and are not related to the Arab world. Iran's approach and strategy regarding Turkey seems to be based on pure economic interests, while Iran is seeking to break its international isolation into which it was subsequently placed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Apart from its economic interests, for Turkey there are the Azeri population for which Turkey tends to desire better living conditions, while Iran seeks non-interference with Azerbaijan. As for the Kurds who live in Iran, both countries are moving in the direction to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state.

In Iran's strategy for disintegration of its international isolation, Iran encompasses the pursuit of weakening the US-Turkey-Israel axis in view of upgrading its position in the Middle East.

## 2.5 LAW OF THE SEA- MARINE POLICY

The issue of maritime zones delimitation, as depicted through country practices and customary law, has focused primarily on expanding their state dominance over the sea as well as on securing their right to sail in areas beyond their state jurisdiction. It goes without saying, that the particular issue has endured periods of crisis and doubt as well as three International Conventions (1958, 1960, 1973-1982) on International Law of the Sea, which led to corresponding international conventions on international law, and has solidified and coalesced in stable and objective procedures of delimitating the maritime zones, and hence, the zones of continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) at 200 nm and of Territorial Sea at 12 nm have assumed the power of regulatory law.

On an international level, the most important Convention that has been signed regarding the field of EEZ was the International Convention of the United Nations on International Law of the Sea in 1982 (UNCLOS III). The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, among others, offers clear definitions of Territorial Waters or Territorial Sea, the Contiguous or Adjacent Zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The United Nations Convention was signed in 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, and was put into action on 16 November 1994. What should be pointed out is the fact that it replaced four international conventions. In a vote about the new Convention that took place on the 30th of April 1982 in New York 130 nations voted in favor, four voted against, and seventeen abstained from voting. Turkey was among the nations that voted against the Convention (Vaangal, 2022).

The main articles of this convention are:



Part II. It refers to the Territorial Waters, the Contiguous Zone, and the Innocent Passage.

Part III. It refers to the international navigation through the straits, defining two statuses: Passage through the straits via free navigation which connects a part of high seas or Economic Zone with the other party and unimpeded Innocent Passage through straits formed by land and an island, when, alternatively, there is an easy alternative passage, or straits between the high seas and an Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial sea (UNCLOS, 1982).

Part V. It provides the definition of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Exclusive Economic Zone is the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea not exceeding the 200 nautical miles from the coast. The coastal nation has sovereign rights of exploration, exploitation, and management of natural resources of the particular maritime zone. With respect to third-party countries, it generates- and maintain- the right of free navigation and overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone (UNCLOS, 1982).

Part VII. It defines issues related to High Seas. In High Seas there is the right of free navigation and overflight and, under certain conditions, the right to conduct scientific research, to fish, to construct facilities, and install wiring (UNCLOS, 1982).

Part XI. It defines everything related to the International Seabed. The International Seabed includes the seabed and the ground beyond the borders of national authority as well as beyond the continental shelf/the Exclusive Economic Zone. An interesting issue related to this term is the mining of metals such as magnesium, which requires a preliminary convention with the International Seabed committee, an organization designed to focus on this issue (UNCLOS, 1982).

The EEZ as a concept was legalized during the third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its rules have been included in the new Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. Its establishment is an important milestone as, in this way, a new sea zone of particular economic importance is legislated, which offers to coastal nations the right to exclusively exploit – utilize the sea and seabed resources of a marine zone that extends as far as 200 nautical miles (200 nm) from the coast.

According to the articles 55-57 of UNCLOS III, the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea with a breadth of as far as 200 nm beyond the baselines, by which we calculate the breadth of the territorial sea and within which the coastal country exerts sovereign rights regarding the exploration, exploitation, preservation and management of natural resources whether living or not in the sea, seabed and subsoil, is defined as EEZ. At the same time, the Convention on Law of the Sea clearly states (Article 121, paragraph 2) (UNCLOS, 1982) that all islands are entitled to EEZ and that the EEZ and the continental shelf of an island are defined in exactly the same way as those of continental areas (Schofield, 2019).

The present chapter aims to briefly examine the legal regulations and principles of delimiting the marine zones through the judgement of the international judiciary institutions, such as the International Court of Justice in Hague and other institutions of arbitration. There is an initial analysis of concepts such as territorial sea and contiguous zone, while there is in depth analysis of the continental shelf and the EEZ. There is particular emphasis on the particular and relative conditions which have the definitive role in the process of delimiting marine zones.

The Law of the Sea in its classic form included two fundamental zones in the marine space. Particularly, it included the marine space of the territorial sea, in which

the coastal nation exerted its sovereign rights, and the high seas characterized as “res communis”, since it does not belong to a particular sovereign nation, but it is open for every one of them to use and exploit. The fundamental area of national jurisdiction included the internal waters of every nation, while later on emerged an underwater one, the Continental Shelf as well as the Exclusive Economic Zone (hereafter EEZ) (Holst, 2022).

It is worth pointing out the fact that, according to the International Law, the enactment of a zone of jurisdiction happens unilaterally by the coastal nation and is applicable by the other nations provided that the applicable international law regulations are respected. These regulations, however, do not apply in the case of continental shelf, in which the coastal nation’s rights are “ipso jure” and “ab initio”. In other words, there is no need for the nations to declare it, but it is declared by the law itself and from the start.

Every coastal country usually defines with its legal system the limits of the marine zones surrounding it up to the highest limit the international law permits. When the geographical position of a particular coastal nation permits the accepted ultimate breadth limits of every marine and seabed zone to be exhausted without the risk of zone overlap, the delimitation, unilateral in this case, does not become the source of any issues. In cases, however, where the geographical position of a nation does not permit “a marine zone to reach its fullest breadth” the countries are obliged to share marine areas. There arises, therefore, the issue of delimitation between neighboring countries and it is necessary to draw virtual marine or submarine borderlines, which shall define the corresponding marine zones of the neighboring coastal nations (Walker, 2012). Drawing, for instance, a borderline in the continental shelf between opposite or adjacent states is a detailed definition of the seabed area to which each state is entitled. The delimitation takes place after the agreement of the states concerned.

The delimitation consists of selecting a marine limit, a line where the sovereignty and jurisdiction of one state stop and those of another one begins. The issue of delimitation springs from the process of selecting the proper sea limit, the decision-making process relating to the sea limit, the drawing and final depiction of the virtual line: in the national or in the territorial waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, continental shelf, EEZ. It is worth noting that there are the following delimitation cases: A) Defining different zone categories that belong to the same state, B) Defining the external limit of a marine zone (territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, EEZ), in other words, a state's proclamation of a zone of sovereignty (territorial sea) and then of national jurisdiction, when the state is in such geographical position that the Law of the Sea allows it to claim the ultimate width of its marine zones (unilateral delimitation that is always of international character). C) delimitation between states which is constituted by the need to clarify the borderline between them, as they lie in such geographical position that the zone lines overlap, whether it happens because their coasts lie on opposite sides to each other (middle line), or because they have adjacent coasts (line of equal distance).

In case the states are not able to reach an agreement, international disputes emerge, which are legislative by definition, and it is necessary for them to be submitted to an international institution, a court of justice (mostly the International Court of Justice) or arbitrator. The judicial resolution of an international dispute is not possible unless all states involved provide their consent to submit their dispute to a judicial settlement.

## 2.5.1 MARITIME ZONES

### 2.5.1.1 BASELINES

The baselines (article 3 of the 1982 UN Convention) are defined by the internal limit of the territorial sea. It is worth noting that there are methods which a state may choose (article 14 of the Convention) or combine in order to define them. The methods are the natural coastline, the straight baselines, and the straight archipelagic baselines.

Particularly, the normal baseline is the line where land and sea overlap, but it is not always stable since it depends on the tide, which creates the high-tide or, in the opposite case, the lowest tide. It is defined, in other words, as the line that follows the natural coastal formation of the continental coasts of the coastal state as well as of the island coasts. Regarding the method of straight baselines, it could be said that it was applied for the first time in 1951, in the dispute between England and Norway regarding fishing. This method is applied when the special conditions impose it, i.e., when the coastline “breaks abruptly, goes deep into the ground or when there are a lot of islands along the coastline”. By this decision, it became acceptable that if the application of the natural coastline became complicated the virtual lines along the state coasts would be used. As straight archipelagic baselines we can define the straight baselines which may be drawn by purely archipelagic states in order to encompass all the islands of the archipelagic state, delimiting at the same time the state territory. The fundamental condition for this is the fact that the main islands and an area whose ratio of the water area to the land area ranges from 1 to 1 and from 1 to 9 are included within the baselines (Lathrop et al, 2018).

### 2.5.1.2 TERRITORIAL SEA

Territorial zone (or territorial sea or territorial waters) is the marine zone that extends beyond the land and the internal waters and on which the coastal state has full sovereignty. It is notable that it is a zone of major importance to the state, for its security and defense as well as for the promotion of its economic and political interests. For this reason, this zone had become the object of particular interest by the coastal states, which either signed agreements or separate legal regulations.

In internal waters, which lie between the coast and the place where the territorial sea begins (according to the Law of Sea Convention in 1982 the waters located towards the interior of the straight territorial water baselines, article 8 par 1 of the 1982 Law of Sea Convention), the coastal state has full sovereignty with only the international law applicable limitations regarding the mooring and anchorage of foreign ships. It is worth noting that this term includes the bays, the shoreline, the beach, the harbors, the gulfs, and the historic bays of a state. Consequently, any activity within the internal waters, such as fishing or marine research is under the legal jurisdiction of the coastal state (article 2 par 1 of the 1982 Law of Sea Convention). The fundamental difference between internal and territorial waters, according to the international law, is that foreign ships have the right of innocent passage in the territorial waters only. As an exception the innocent passage may be allowed in internal waters, which have been formed by drawing straight baselines (Darusman et al, 2020).

In the First Conference conventions on the Law of Sea in 1958 the equidistance principle (middle/sideline) became the basic rule of delimiting the territorial waters with the exception of “special circumstances”. More specifically, the article 12 par. 1 of the Geneva Convention in 1958 on the Territorial and Contiguous Zone designated that, in case of absence of an agreement between the states involved, the delimitation

would be defined according to the middle line drawn by the locations closer to the baselines, from which the territorial waters of these states were defined. As an exception, the delimiting line could be drawn differently because of historic titles or other special circumstances which made a different kind of delimitation necessary. There is the characteristic case El Salvador/ Honduras<sup>13</sup>, which referred to the legal status of the Fonseca gulf. The Court Department that dealt with the case believed that the status of the gulf was included in the historic internal waters, which co-belonged to the three coastal states (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua) since they had undividable benefits from the marine zones towards the sea in the line that closed the gulf. From this status the special zones of 3 nautical miles from each state's coast were excluded. Despite the fact that the breadth of the territorial waters was expanded to 12 nautical miles, the aforementioned rule, with only few variations, was included in the regulations introduced by the Third UN Convention on the Law of Sea. The 1982 UNCLOS and, more specifically, article 15, mentioned that "when two states have adjacent or opposite coasts, none of the two states has the right to, unless there is an agreement between them that states otherwise, expand its territorial waters further from the middle line, of which every point is equally distanced from the closest baseline points, from which the breadth of the territorial waters of each state is measured (Hakapaa, 2013). However, this regulation does not apply to cases where historic titles or other special circumstances render a different way of delimiting the territorial waters of the two states necessary. The recognition of a historic title by the world community is based on certain preconditions. It is worth noting at this point that a historic title is the long-term practice of a coastal state, which was explicitly or implicitly accepted by the other states, and which legalizes a claim to a greater part of territorial waters in comparison to what they would be if the middle line was implemented.

A basic rule that is defined by article 15 of the 1982 UNCLOS is the fact that the delimitation of the territorial waters between neighboring states happens by an agreement between the two states and not unilaterally. In case there is no agreement the method of equal distance applies (middle line/ sideline) with the designated exceptions. The regulations of article 12 par 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention regarding the Territorial Waters and of article 15 of the 1982 UNCLOS constitute a complete sum of delimitation rules which consists of the following elements: a) the delimitation can happen after an agreement between the states involved, b) in the absence of such agreement, the method of equal distance is indicated unless c) special circumstances point to a different solution.

Regarding the issue of an external limit, the method of delimiting the territorial waters irrespective of the other states in the area, the Court of Justice in the case of fishing between the UK and Norway (1951) noted that there are three methods of dealing with the aforementioned subject, which may be applied individually or combined: a) parallel delimitation in case the coastline is a straight line, b) the multiangled method and c) the semicircle method, which corresponded to the court ruling and in the 1982 UNCLOS. It is worth noting that no severe territorial waters delimitation issues between the states emerged.

Following a series of repeated efforts within the framework of International Conferences and various disagreements among the states, article 3 of the 1982 UNCLOS was established, according to which “every state has the right to determine the breadth of its territorial waters without exceeding the 12 nm. States such as Greece, which have territorial waters that are shorter than 12 nm, are entitled, according to international law, to expand their territorial waters till the highest limit stated in article 3 of the 1982 UNCLOS, i.e. the 12 nm. When the distance between the coasts of two



neighboring or opposite states is less than the sum of the territorial waters, the sea limit is drawn in the middle of the coast distance (e.g., the middle line between Samos and Kushandasi). The 1982 UNCLOS confirmed the island's right to have their own territorial waters, continental shelf and EEZ. Unable to consent to this de facto confirmation of Greece's right to expand on the Aegean Sea, Turkey refused to sign the Convention, maintaining the same view till nowadays.

### 2.5.1.3 THE IDEA OF THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE AND ITS DELIMITATION.

Regarding the Contiguous Zone, it could be said that the 1958 Geneva Convention, in the only article mentioning the Contiguous Zone, article 24, referred to the coastal state's control of "a high seas zone which borders the territorial waters". In paragraph 3 of this article, it was mentioned that none of the two states had the right, objecting to them not reaching an agreement, to expand its contiguous zone beyond the middle line. In contrast with article 12 par 1 of the Territorial waters Delimitation in the 1958 Geneva Convention, this provision did not mention any special circumstances. This omission was due to the fact that in this zone, the authority of the coastal state was to a great extent limited to sections explicitly regulated by documents, as particularly defined by article 24 of the 1958 Geneva Convention regarding the Territorial waters and the Contiguous zone. In particular, it refers to the authority to prevent and suppress any violation of its customary, tax, immigrant, sanitary legislation that happened or was about to happen in the state's land or territorial waters.

As Contiguous Zone we can define the marine area adjacent to the territorial waters, in which an uncommon status applies. It is part of the High Seas, as is evident

by the wording in the UNCLOS, as in article 33 it is mentioned that it can be defined as “a zone that is the continuation of the territorial waters” and it is implied that it is a high seas zone, which cannot exceed the 24nm from the baselines of the territorial waters, while the contiguous zone is part of the high sea

It is worth noting that the origin of the institution of Contiguous Zone can be attributed to the British legislation of the 18th century (“Hovering Acts”) in order to deal with smuggling and to prevent violations of the customs legislation. Based on this, British ships had the right to control foreign ones outside the Territorial Waters and up to 300 miles from the shore. These regulations were abandoned in the following century, they remain important however, since they were established in a time period when territorial waters were not established in many coastal nations and there were not any regulations on a coastal nation’s authorities monitoring various marine areas.

However, it should be pointed out that the baselines delimiting the contiguous zone and the territorial waters overlap. This is confirmed if we consider national policies and the terms defined by article 24 of the 1958 convention about the Contiguous Zone and those of article 33 of the 1982 UNCLOS. However, there is no mentioning of the delimitation of this zone. This can be explained by the wish of the participants not to further complicate the already dire, complex, and more important negotiations on delimiting the continental shelf and the EEZ. It was also considered that a rule on the delimitation of the Contiguous zone was redundant since this zone was part of the EEZ, and therefore, the delimitation of the EEZ would automatically lead to the delimitation of the contiguous zone. Another explanation can be the argument proposed during the Third Conference, that the characteristics defined in article 33 of the 1982 UNCLOS could be implemented simultaneously by all the states involved rendering any thought of delimitation redundant.

It is notable that the UNCLOS does not refer to the legislation of the waters included in the Contiguous Zone, in contrast to the Geneva Convention on the territorial waters and the Contiguous Zone (1958), which maintained that the Contiguous Zone is part of the Open Seas. This differentiation is due to the latter institution of the Exclusive Economic Zone, which if declared by a state, includes the Contiguous Zone. However, if the state has not defined an EEZ the Contiguous Zone is part of the High Seas and falls under the legislation of the latter.

The Contiguous Zone, as geographically located between the Territorial Waters and the High Seas, falls under a legal status which can be characterized as an intermediate of these two statuses. The coastal nation's jurisdiction in these waters is determined by article 24 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, combined with article 33 of the UNCLOS. Thus, the coastal state has control authority, but under specific circumstances (Holst, 2022). This authority includes monitor in order to avoid obstruction of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary legislation and regulations in land or territorial waters of the coastal state as well as imposing penalties in case of violation of the aforementioned law and regulations in its land or territorial waters. Consequently, the coastal state does not have jurisdiction to control violations happening within the Contiguous Zone.

It is worth mentioning the fact that the coastal state does not have sovereign jurisdiction, or sovereign rights. The aforementioned jurisdiction of control does exist, but they aim to a more efficient exercise of its jurisdiction within the territorial waters. Given that the status in the Contiguous Zone is basically that of the High Seas, the jurisdiction of the coastal state is of exceptional character, while there is absolute need to interpret them restrictively. It is not allowed, therefore, to extend them in order to

pursue other purposes than these already mentioned (article 33 of the UNCLOS), like, for example, for security reasons or to safeguard fishing.

However, a different view has been supported regarding the coastal nation's jurisdiction in the Contiguous Zone. In other words, in this area there is extended responsibility of full jurisdiction, similarly to the territorial waters. The basis of this interpretation is the fact that, based on article 111 par 1, there is the right of continued pursuit which may begin in the Contiguous Zone. This view, however, can be refuted by the argument that implementation of article 111 par 1 does not impact with the regulation of the 33rd, which determines that in order for the coastal nation to exert control, the violation has to happen within the territorial waters, while the vessel has moved away from them and is located in the Contiguous Zone. It is not allowed, however, to pursue incoming ships which did not commit any violation of those mentioned in article 33.

#### 2.5.1.4 HIGH SEAS

In the international regulatory documents of the Law of the Sea there is no positive definition of the High Seas, however, it is notable that there is a negative one. In Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, it is defined that “the High Seas include every part of the sea except from the Territorial Waters and the internal waters of a state”. Moreover, according to article 86, it is maintained that “the regulations regarding the High Sea apply to all sea areas that are not included in the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Territorial Waters or the internal waters of a state.

The High Seas is no one's property and no one's jurisdiction. Therefore, there has been the conclusion that it is *res nullius* (nobody's property). However, this view is not totally right, since its strict application would lead to it being considered as

nobody's property. This, however, may raise questions regarding the area's property rights, something not possible due to the article 89 of the UNCLOS, according to which "no state can legally claim having jurisdiction over any part of the open sea". However, the view that it is characterized as *res communis* is also wrong, since it does not belong, and it cannot belong to all states. It's notable that the most appropriate characterization of the Open Sea's legal status is *res communis usus*, which means shared-use object.

Moreover, the 1958 Geneva Convention in article 2 defines the liberty declarations in the Open Sea by all countries. These liberties are exerted by all countries provided that the interests of the High Seas are accounted for. In the High Seas the coastal nation's jurisdiction is weakened. It is notable that there are many sectors of jurisdiction where the coastal nation has the right to exert jurisdiction. More specifically, it has jurisdiction in the following sectors:

- i. Fishing (articles 87 §1 and 116-120, UNCLOS)
- ii. Laying submarine cables and pipelines (articles 87 §1 and 112-115)
- iii. Scientific research (articles 87 §1, article 257 and 246)
- iv. Artificial island and other installations that are allowed by the International Law (articles 87 §1 and 88)
- v. Aid to a vessel at risk (article 98)
- vi. Taking measures to prevent and suppress slave trade (article 99)
- vii. Taking measures to suppress piracy (articles 100-107)
- viii. Taking measures to suppress drug trafficking (article 108)

ix. Taking measures to suppress unauthorized broadcasting  
(article109)

A particularly important institution is the Hot Pursuit, which customarily appeared in the 10th century and was established at the beginning of the 20th century by the USA during the Prohibition. It was initially included in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and later in the Montego Bay Convention (article 111).

As Hot Pursuit we define the continued pursuit of a person or moving object by a country in an area outside its jurisdiction, due to an illegal act that was performed within its jurisdiction. In other words, “hot pursuit constitutes in the legal pursuit of a foreign vessel in the High Seas due to a violation of the coastal nation’s law, which was performed in the sea areas of its jurisdiction.

The Hot Pursuit may begin when the legal authorities of the coastal state have serious reasons to believe that the foreign vessel violated the state laws and regulations. It is notable that it is necessary to begin the pursuit when the vessel is in the internal waters, the territorial waters or the Continental Shelf of the pursuing state and it is possible to continue it outside them on condition that the pursuit has not been stopped. If the foreign vessel is in the Contiguous zone, the pursuit can only be attempted for violations related to the rights protected in that zone. This jurisdiction of the coastal state is only applicable *mutatis mutandis* for violations inside the Exclusive Economic Zone. Exerting this jurisdiction ends once the pursued vessel enters the territorial waters of its country or of a third state (Holst, 2022).

### 2.5.1.5 CONTINENTAL SHELF

The time threshold when the interest in the continental shelf began to rise is the technological and scientific progress, which made possible the exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the seabed in a greater depth and at a wider scale. The continental shelf zones are an important factor for the marine economy since they include rich biological resources and important deposits. In the concept of seabed, which encompasses the ground and underground of the bottom of the sea, the continental shelf consists of a) the continental shelf, which is the continuation of land under the sea, which starts from the coast and ends where the sloping of the sea bottom becomes steeper, a slope normally found 130 or 200 meters under the sea, b) the continental slope, the part of the sea bottom which is deeper than 200 meters under the sea surface, it has a slope of 30-45 degrees and it begins from the 200 meters, that is the external point of the continental shelf, till the 3.500 meters in depth, which is included with the continental shelf in the more general category of the continental margin, c) the continental rise which is formed by precipitations or other geological phenomena at the basis of the continental slope (till 5.500 meters in depth) and d) the ocean abyss, which can be divided into abyss valleys and abyss pits (from the 5.700 meters onwards).

It is notable however that the geological divisions of the seabed do not necessarily coincide with the legal approaches related to the continental shelf. The need for equal treatment among the coastal states, some of which do not have a continental shelf under the geological definition or have a narrow one, compelled legal experts to distance themselves from the geological definition. For this reason, the 1958 Geneva Convention maintained in article 1, that the continental shelf goes as far as 200 meters

under the sea, but if the seabed exploitation happens deeper than the 200 meters, then the continental shelf is extended up to that point. Moreover, the sea bottom and the subsoil of the areas towards the island coasts belong to the continental shelf. As a consequence, the outer limits of the continental shelf may vary.

Truman's proclamation in 1945 constituted the beginning of the state demands and confrontations about the continental shelf zone. A Second Convention in 1960 in Geneva in order to regulate the range of the territorial waters did not reach any conclusion. However, the cornerstone of the delimitation issues was the development of the idea of the continental shelf during the 1950s and 1960s as well as the establishment of extended fishing zones and EEZ by almost every coastal nation under the 1982 UNCLOS. Similar issues tended to arise when most countries extended their territorial waters till the permitted limit of 12 nm. The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea introduced in the 1982 UNCLOS a complicated system of delimiting the outer limits of the continental shelf which does not correspond to geological or other scientific data but expresses political compromise aiming to define the longest possible continental shelf area of the nations privileged by nature. As the Law on the continental shelf has been defined, through the 1958 Geneva Convention, the 1982 UNCLOS and the customary law, the coastal nation has inherent authority on all the rights that allow the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf (Lin, 2019)

#### **2.5.1.6 THE DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF ACCORDING TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION**

The delimitation of the EEZ between two or more neighboring states (adjacent or opposite), of which the marine borders are less than 400 nm apart and consequently



it is not possible to declare an EEZ of 200 nm at the same time, falls under article 74 of the 1982 UNCLOS. According to this article, the delimitation of the EEZ between adjacent or opposite states initially happens with the established international law principle of the agreement among states, as it is defined by article 38 of the International Court of Law Charter, in order to find a fair solution. If, however, the states interested are not able to reach an agreement in a logical time frame, they will have to resort to an international juridical procedure, as it is defined by the settlement of disputes procedure in Part XV of the Convention.

The geographical characteristics, however, were so varied that made difficult, if not impossible, the establishment of clear and specific rules on the delimitation of marine zones and the creation of marine borders among states. In the Guinea/Guinea Bissau arbitration case (1958) the arbitrator reported: “the factors and the methods mentioned are the result of legal regulations”. However, they are not limited to a specific number and none of them is mandatory for the court since every case of delimitation is unique, as the International Court of Law pointed out.

It is worth mentioning that in the 1958 Geneva Convention there had been an effort to delimit the continental shelf of the coasts of the states. Article 6, in particular, stated that the equal distance principle (middle line / sideline) was established as the main method of delimitation with the exception of the “special circumstances: “In case the continental shelf itself is situated in the territory of two or more states whose coasts are opposite to each other, the continental shelf borders are defined by an agreement between these states. In the absence of an agreement and in case special circumstances do not justify a different delimitation, the limits are defined by the middle line every point of which is in equal distance from the closest baselines from which we define the breadth of the territorial waters of each of these states. In case the continental shelf itself

is located in the territory of two neighboring states, the continental shelf is delimited by an agreement between these states...as well. In the absence of an agreement and in case special circumstances do not justify a different delimitation, the limits are defined by the middle line every point of which is in equal distance from the closest baselines from which we define the breadth of the territorial waters of each of these states". The state policy of the parties involved in the Convention was dictated by the Convention whereas for the parties not mentioned in the Convention the policy did not result in a customary rule.

The delimitation of the continental shelf between states with adjacent or opposite coasts brought about severe confrontations and conflicts leading to a wide range of conventional regulations and judicial practice. The regulations of article 6 par 1 and 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental shelf are similar to those of article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone, which stated the middle line and the equal distance and of article 15 of the 1982 UNCLOS, about the delimitation of the territorial waters in the sense that they repeat the three-fold rule agreement-equal distance-special circumstances with the only difference being the case of the 1982 UNCLOS where the emphasis is on the delimitation by agreement and there is no mentioning – for good reason it appears – of the historic title as a special circumstance (Barbosa, 2017).

#### **2.5.1.7 THE RIGHT OF THE COASTAL NATIONS ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF**

Regarding the rights of a coastal state on the continental shelf, it is worth noting that they are related to the research and exploitation of the resources located in that sea. In other words, these rights, contrary to state sovereignty, are granted to the coastal

state for specific functionality purposes. Furthermore, they are exclusive, which means that no other state has the right to conduct research or exploitation without the first state's consent. The rights in question are related to natural resources, which consist of mineral, mining and other living and non-living organisms which are detected on the seabed surface or under it.

#### 2.5.1.8 THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

The Exclusive Economic Zone is the youngest defined marine zone. Until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century everything that was not included in the Territorial Sea or Territorial Waters of a state was regarded as High Seas. However, since 1930 it was aimed to create this type of institution, since in the Hague Conference it was stated that there is a dire necessity to make provisions for coastal states in order for them to protect and also exploit the marine resources even outside their territorial waters and up to some more nautical miles.

The first significant claim of exclusive jurisdiction on marine resources outside the territorial waters happened in the USA on 28 September 1945 in the 2667 Declaration by President Truman about the continental shelf. This Declaration stated that “taking measures for the preservation and the rational use of its natural resources, the US government considers the natural resources of the subsoil and the bottom of the continental shelf under the high seas, which are neighboring to the US coasts, as belonging to the USA and as being under their jurisdiction and control”. Despite the fact that the Truman Declaration did not claim an exclusive fishing zone, it served as the catalyst towards evolution.

Afterwards, the Declaration 2668 followed on the same date, regarding coastal fishing. In this Declaration it is defined that: “Due to the dire need to preserve and

protect fishing resources, the US government considers it appropriate to establish preservation zones in high seas areas adjacent to its coasts, in which there has been fishing activity or in which there may be in the future and will be maintained to a significant scale. In areas where these activities have already developed or may develop in the future and maintained by US citizens, the US government considers it appropriate to establish clear delimited preservation zones in which fishing activity will be under the regulation and control of the USA.

It is worth mentioning that while some of the concepts expressed in the Truman declarations were encompassed in the 1982 Convention, the concept of EEZ belongs to the Latin American countries Chile and Peru. On the 23 June 1947, the President of Chile with his declaration established a marine zone of two hundred nautical miles, where the “national sovereignty on submarine areas, irrespective of size and depth, as well as on adjacent seas which will extend till the point necessary, in order to be able to preserve, protect, maintain and exploit the natural resources and wealth” was declared. Peru, as well, in the declaration 781 on the 1<sup>st</sup> August 1947, established its own marine zone of two hundred nautical miles. In both aforementioned cases, the right of navigation is maintained.

The Third UNCLOS began its procedures on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December 1973. The issues of marine areas under national jurisdiction and high seas, including the territorial sea, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and the status of the straits used internationally to sail were assigned to the Second Committee. In the second conference during the summer of 1974 in Caracas, the Second Committee, drafted a report of “Important Tendencies”, which aimed to cite the principal tendencies that arose by the state proposals which were submitted as plans either in the Submarine Committee or in the Conference. Despite the fact that there were many versions of the resolution of

important issues, the main focus of discussion was the nature and concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone, for the definition of which more than a hundred countries had submitted proposals.

The next step was the signing of the new Convention in Montego Bay in Jamaica on the 10<sup>th</sup> of December 1982. In this Convention the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone is adopted (article 55). All the fifth part (articles 55 to 75) is dedicated to this new concept analyzing its nature and status. This new Convention was put in practice on the 16<sup>th</sup> of November 1994, twelve months after it was recognized by the sixtieth state on the basis of article 308. It is worth noting that till nowadays, 166 have recognized the content of the New 1982 UNCLOS, while there are many states that have declared an EEZ of 200 nm. Moreover, the EU as a unified formation has recognized this privilege to its northern coasts and in the coasts towards the Atlantic Ocean.

On the basis of article 55 of the new UNCLOS, as an Exclusive Economic Zone we define the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, which falls under a special legal status. Regarding its breadth it is worth noting that article 57 states that it is possible for it to extend up until 200 nautical miles from the baselines, from which we estimate the breadth of the territorial waters. Given that the maximum breadth of the Territorial Waters is 12 nm, the maximum breadth of the EEZ does not exceed the 188nm. The establishment of 200 nm as breadth is attributed to the customary practice of fishing, while it is the limit within which the 99% of the estimated universal fishing takes.

In case in the 200 nm distance from the coastal state it is now High Seas, article 74 of the UNCLOS applies, according to which the delimitation of the EEZ among states with opposite or adjacent coasts takes place after an agreement based on

International Law, as defined by article 38 of the International Court of Law Charter, in order to find a fair solution. In case there is no agreement within a logical time frame, the interested states resort to procedures specifically outlined by the Convention, such as the settlement of disputes by peaceful means procedure, conciliation etc. In the time frame within which the agreement is pending, the states involved are obliged to make all necessary efforts to reach temporary settlements of practical nature in a spirit of communication and cooperation without obstructing the achievement of a final agreement.

It is worth noting that articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 UNCLOS are characterized by the absolute absence of any practical method to find the necessary solution. According to the first paragraph of these articles, there has to be an agreement on the basis of international law in order to find a lenient solution. As a consequence, the states are free to choose any method they prefer provided that it leads to a lenient solution. The rules included in articles 74 (1) and 83 (1) of the 1982 UNCLOS are the result of deliberations between the president of the Convention and the specific representatives, which aimed to find a compromising solution, are not able to satisfy all participant states and on a technical level they have their advantages and drawbacks.

This new wording fully satisfies the demand that the delimitation which is a result of this will be fair. In other words, while the new text does not specify the content of the rules it refers to, it emphasizes on their most important characteristic, the fair solution which would come as a result of their application and, consequently, there is dire need to make the delimitation rules fair so as to achieve the best delimitation possible. However, in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case (2002), the Court applied the equal distance method in the framework of these articles as it was considered that this method would lead to a fair result. The jurisprudence regarding the marine delimitation moves

towards applying the corrective equity approach. The recent jurisprudence indicated the application of this method not only on delimiting opposite coasts but adjacent coasts as well under the category of customary law. Therefore, it is possible to say, that the customary nature of the corrective equity approach, is clearly established in the law of marine delimitation. From the Cameroon/Nigeria case (20002) we can conclude that this approach could be applicable under the spectrum of the 1982 UNCLOS as well as that of customary law.

It is worth mentioning the fact that although the Exclusive Economic Zone is, geographically speaking part of the High Seas, it is not governed by the right of full free navigation. On the other hand, however, it is not similar to the coastal nation's sovereignty status on the Territorial Waters. In the EEZ there is a *sui generis* status so that in case of dispute, it is not possible to serve as proof either in favor of the coastal nation or in favor of the free navigation of the seas. In other words, it is a sea of a purely functional status, on which it is possible to say in reality that the free navigation applies with the limitation of exerting specific duties by the coastal nation.

On the basis of the UNCLOS the coastal state's duties are largely defined. In particular, in article 1 we can observe the difference between sovereign rights and jurisdiction. In the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal state has sovereign rights with regards to research, exploitation, management, and preservation of natural resources, living and non-living ones, of the waters above the sea-bottom, the seabed and the subsoil.

At this point it is worth noting that as non-living natural resources are considered the minerals or other materials that can typically be found on the seabed and its subsoil. For this reason, the content of the rights on this sector is identical to that of those exerted by the coastal state on the Continental Shelf. As living natural resources,

we regard every form of marine or submarine organism, plant, or animal. On them, the coastal state has a series of rights, which legalize the corresponding duties in order for them to be established and exerted.

In particular, the first group of rights and duties included their preservation. Based on article 31 of the UNCLOS, the coastal state has the duty to define the limit of allowed fishing of the natural resources within the EEZ. This is achieved by taking into account reliable scientific data in order to ensure that the preservation of the living resources within the EEZ is not in danger of excessive exploitation.

Furthermore, the coastal state has the right to “use” the living organisms. Article 62 of the UNCLOS allows taking on the necessary duties in order to exploit the living resources of the EEZ in the best way possible, subject to the aforementioned preservation.

The aforementioned duties-rights are exerted on condition that they are assumed with simultaneous provisions on protecting the marine organisms. This particular protection is an obligation and at the same time a right of the coastal states.

Besides the duties regarding the preservation, the exploitation and the protection of natural resources, the coastal state can exert other ones which stem from the sovereign right of economic exploitation and exploration of the Zone. These aforementioned duties also include the installation and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures (article 60 is also relevant). Furthermore, there is provision for the right to conduct marine scientific research (as is specifically regulated by article 246), which means that the other countries need the agreement and license of the coastal state in order to conduct research.



However, in order to exert these rights, there is the necessary condition that the coastal state in question should proclaim its EEZ, which entails that all other states be informed about it. Therefore, the rights regarding the EEZ are of preferential nature, in contrast, of course, with the continental shelf where the rights of the states are exclusively innate. Moreover, the coastal state is necessarily obligated to issue new maps once its EEZ is declared. More specifically, in the maps the limits and coordinates of the EEZ will be clearly outlined and they should be submitted to the General Secretariat of the UN (article 75).

The establishment of the EEZ signifies the recognition of rights to the coastal states, since they are those who obtained the greater part of the privileges this establishment entails. Nevertheless, the EEZ does not affect other liberties beyond those transferred to the coastal jurisdiction under the new status. So, third states enjoy the rights they have in the High Seas (article 87). In particular, they have the right of free navigation, free overflight, free laying of submarine pipelines and cables and any other internationally legal use in general. This is possible on condition that third-party states respect the coastal state's rights and obey the laws and regulations that have been adopted by it in the EEZ (Hannesson, 2008).

More specifically, regarding the freedom of all states to use the EEZ in any other legal way, during the preparatory proceedings of the 1982 Convention, there had been a discussion regarding if this freedom included military activities. So, regarding military exercises and arms testing, there is ambiguity on whether the coastal state can object. It is generally believed that as soon as the coastal state declares its EEZ, it can object to all military activities that could potentially harm the living resources and the natural environment or jeopardize the security of navigation. Regarding fishing, land-locked states are examined in parallel with the coastal ones. On the basis of article 69,

they have the right to equally participate in the exploitation of the appropriate part of surplus living resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the coastal states in the same subregion or area, taking into account the relevant economic and geographical conditions of all the interested states.

At this point, it is worth noting that three categories of states have, as an exception, the right to fish in the EEZ of a coastal state in case the latter's potential in fishing the resources of the EEZ are lower than the permitted fishing standard. In particular, the land-locked states of the area, which have the right to participate in fishing the living organisms only after the coastal state has finished doing so, according to the provisions of article 69 of the Convention (Holst, 2022). Moreover, the geographically disadvantaged states, namely those who are in a disadvantageous position compared to other coastal states, which participate in fishing with exactly the same conditions as the land-locked states, according to the provisions of article 70 of the Convention. Finally, the other states and mainly those which used to fish in the EEZ or to contribute in the research to determine the remaining fishing resources (article 62) can participate in fishing, but only if there is surplus fishing prey.

The close relationship between Continental Shelf and EEZ has shed light on the issue of drawing a unified marine border where the outer limits of these two zones will overlap. This issue arises in the case of delimiting the continental shelf, which will not exceed the 200 nm whether it concerns states with adjacent or with opposite coasts. According to articles 74 and 83 of the new Convention, states are free to draw through agreements different limits for every zone. As a result, different limits would be drawn regarding the superjacent waters and different ones for the seabed and subsoil, something which could create problems, since a state's EEZ waters would overlap with the continental shelf of another one. For instance, the production of artificial islands or

installations on a coastal state's continental shelf, would automatically be subject to the jurisdiction of another coastal state, due to the jurisdiction the latter would have on the water column. In practice, most states have agreed on drawing a unified border, since the majority of the delimitation agreements follows the procedure of delimiting a mutual border on their marine zones. Also, the legislative practice of the International Court of Justice whether arbitration cases or judicial settlement cases of the issues among states regarding their marine border delimitation are concerned has moved to the same direction.

On the basis of the 1982 UNCLOS (article 121) the islands can have an EEZ something that is not true about rocks, since they cannot sustain human life. Moreover, the rocky islets, which do not have an EEZ since they are uninhabitable and they do not have an economic life of their own, have the right to have only territorial waters and contiguous zone.

Regarding the artificial islands, it is worth noting that according to article 60 of the UNCLOS, the coastal state has the authority to lay artificial islands and installations within the EEZ for any operational and economic purposes the zone has been created, it has the exclusive jurisdiction on them, including jurisdiction on matters of customs, finance, sanitation, migration as well as security. The exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state also includes criminal law for crimes committed on the installations or causing damage to them. Security zones, not wider than 500 m, are rightfully defined around the installations or the artificial islands, without obstructing international navigation in any way. Moreover, there arises the obligation to withdraw the installations which are not used or abandoned, taking into consideration the internationally acceptable standards, for reasons of navigation safety, protection of natural environment and protection of the rights of third-party states. Finally, as regards

the legal status of the artificial islands and installations, it is determined that the artificial islands and other installations do not have the same status as the natural islands, in other words they do not have territorial waters, their existence does not affect the territorial waters delimitation.

At this point it is worth referring to the Archipelagic States. More specifically, the Archipelagic States, are defined for the first time as a concept and there are favorable regulations (for those exclusively consisting of islands or mostly of islands and not for the blended ones, like Greece, which have a vast continental mainland), with the waters surrounded by the outer limits of the archipelago assuming a powerful status, almost similar to the one of the inner (territorial) waters.

Another focal point is the status formed by the “declaration” of the EEZ by the coastal states, which border enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. On the basis of article 123, the states are obliged to delimit their EEZ after an agreement between them. A typical example of an enclosed sea is the Mediterranean. The EEZ of the Mediterranean countries overlap and the breadth of 200 nm is not applicable. At the same time, the coastal states, due to their singularity and interests in the area have not shown any intention to cooperate in order to establish that particular zone.

## 2.5.2. THE DELIMITATION PROCESS

### 2.5.2.1 THE ROLE OF THE RELATIVE AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

During the proceedings of the International Law Committee on the Law of the Sea in 1953, occurred concerns that the middle line was the rule and, in the attempt to find a solution, the possibility of the geographic environment rendering more efficient a different delimitation line was discussed. The rule of equidistance (middle/side line),

which can be found in article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone and on article 6 of the same Convention on the Continental Shelf, would risk being deactivated on some occasions without the complement of the one about the escape clause of the special circumstances, given that there was the actual possibility that the particular geographic environment with its singularities would make another delimitation line more appropriate. According to the rule included in the aforementioned articles, in the absence of agreement the states would have to adjust the delimitation on the basis of the equal distance principle, which could be diverted, if necessary, due to special circumstances. The special circumstances appear to be totally connected to the equal distance principle and at the same time they function as the exception to the rule of equal distance, aiming at alleviating the strict implementation of the middle line and at allowing the diversion from it in the delimitation points where their contribution is necessary. The delimiting line is simply adjusted to the special demands of space (UN, 2006).

Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 UNCLOS make clear that the preferable method for drawing the marine borders (EEZ or Continental Shelf) between neighboring states is initially the established by the International Law principle of the agreement between them, according to the content of article 38 of the International Court of Law Charter, in order to achieve a fair solution. In many delimitation cases, however, this was not possible, since the states invoked relative or special circumstances, which did not allow the delimitation of marine borders on the basis of the middle line/ equal distance rule and, as a result, the delimitations happened after court or arbitration rulings by international juridical organs. The simple circumstances of an area become “special” when the implementation of a particular delimitation method may create inequalities. Their function preresquires that if they are not taken into account, the result of the

delimitation will not be equal and, hence, it will not be fair. Examples of special circumstances according to the International Law Committee are navigation, fishing interests and special geomorphological data.

To conclude, despite the fact that “special circumstances” and “relative circumstances” appear to be identical, nevertheless, the concept of special circumstances functions as the exception to the equal distance rule. In contrast, the relative circumstances indicate a fair delimitation method and contribute to the implementation of a fair solution. They are not, in other words, the circumstances that function as the exception. Some of the relative or special circumstances, which have been invoked by states during the process of delimiting their marine borders with neighboring states are the following:

#### **A) Geographical Circumstances**

The factor of the geographical formation of the coasts of the parties appeared in this issue as a consequence of the proposal that the title depends on describing a country's state as coastal. As the Court of Law highlighted in par. 96 of its ruling, it is necessary to closely examine the geographical singularity of the area of the country that needs delimitation. The geographical overview does not necessarily constitute the sole factor that has to be taken into account when levelling off the leniency principles. However, it plays a more important part than the others to the extent that the fair result that needs to be accomplished is nothing more than drawing a line in equal distance from both coasts so as to avoid jeopardizing the political and economic interests of the parties. As it has been noted, the geographical characteristics are the cornerstone of the fair delimitation process.

#### **B) Mutual Mineral Reserves/Natural Resources**

In the initial disagreements in the International Law Committee, there was particular emphasis on the possibility of mineral reserves overlapping an equal distance line and on the possibility of that constituting a situation where the adjustment or shift of the equal distance line would be required. It is worth noting that in the case of oil reserves the main target should be to preserve the reserve's unity. The Committee did not take this factor into consideration and, although it was highlighted in the Geneva Convention, it did not play any part in the individual conflicts. In the North Sea Continental Shelf case (1969), the Court of Law mentioned that the unity of the natural resources should be taken into account in the negotiations among the different parties, but it was not made clear whether that constitutes a special circumstance and not a mere characteristic of the actual. Judge Ammoun in his divided opinion in the case above highlighted that "if the preservation of a reserve's unity is a matter that should concern the parties, they should deal with it by signing an optional agreement". In this way, a mandatory rule on this matter would be avoided.

### **C) Navigation and Fishing Rights**

In the Geneva Convention both these two kinds of interests proved to be special circumstances. In the Conflict between Yemen and Eritrea case (1999), there was particular emphasis on the fact that fishing was not the main aim of the parties despite the fact that they both employed fishing arguments in order to persuade the arbitration tribunal that each of them should be granted land and sea space corresponding to their objective. As the arbitrator noted, "it can be concluded that fishing as a present or future possible source is important for the population of every part of the Red Sea. It can also be concluded that, as a matter of common sense and legal observation, the interest in and the development of fishing as a source of nutrition is a significant and admirable occupation». However, from these two conclusions, the arbitrator could not find any important reason based on them, in order to accept or reject the arguments of any party regarding their influence on the delimitation line as each of the parties

or the arbitrator suggested. The marine delimitation, according to the arbitrator, was mainly geographical and, as such, relevant to the progress of the International Court case. It also noted that the occasional fishing practices of the parties are not relevant to the issue of drawing the delimitation line. The arbitrator not only disregarded some tendencies completely, but it also created some important innovations and categorizations. Finally, irrespective of the area where the citizens of each state fish, the continuation of the fishing right was recognized. The arbitrator also took under serious consideration areas, where there was concession of research and exploitation licenses to multinational companies. Referring to the 1969 case, it claimed the solution of this was joined management of resources. The International Court Committee in the Gulf of Maine case (1984) highlighted that, USA and Canada had traditionally and successfully resolved the fishing management issues through international agreements.

#### **D) Historic Title**

It is worth noting that a state having developed for a long period of time exclusive or special interests in the area can be regarded as having a means of jurisdiction on the area, diverting from the established rules, and for this reason, this could constitute a special circumstance. The difficulty is the fact that the doctrine of innate continental shelf is contrary to the common rule of the historic title rights so that something excluded by theory cannot be allowed to become acceptable as a matter of exception. As a general principle, a historic title in the international law is the title whose creation and power constitute an exception from the applicable rules of the International Law. The recognition, however, of the historic title, should be mentioned in the international law as a special circumstance. The historic title prerequisites a) long-lasting and peaceful practice and b) lack of dispute by other states (UN, 2006).

This view appears to be recognized by Tunisia in the Continental Shelf between Tunisia and Libya case (1982), when it stated that any delimitation should not trespass historic rights



in combination with fishing and sponge fishing rights. This argument was not established on the basis of historic rights themselves, but on the basis of the system of straight baselines which included the Tunis and Gabes Gulfs. Since neither the territorial waters' seabed nor the one of the internal waters legally constitutes the continental shelf, Tunisia underlined that these areas should be excluded from any issue of proportionality overview. The Court rejected that argument without commenting on the validity of Libya's objections to Tunisia's baselines. Although it restated that the continental shelf in its legal sense does not include the seabed areas under the outer limit of the territorial waters, the Court regarded the question as a matter of proportionality as a function of leniency and that all seabed areas should be taken into account so as to agree with the leniency principles, in the same way someone should compare equal things. The issue whether historic title rights could constitute special circumstances was avoided from the moment when these areas were not trespassed during the delimitation process

#### **E) Proximity**

In the North Sea Continental Shelf case (1969) the International Court of Law underlined that the expression "adjacent to" of article 1 regarding the definition of continental shelf in the 1958 Geneva Convention, did not mean "close to" and, consequently, in the interpretation of article 6, proximity was to a large extent not related to the designation of the ground area to which the continental shelf is adjacent for delimitation purposes. The issue of a part of the ground being in the wrong side of the possible middle line does not mean that it has no continental shelf rights.

#### **F) Geology and geomorphology**

The definition of the Continental Shelf includes the idea of natural extension and that means that the continental shelf is, legally speaking, continuous as much as the geophysical

frame of the continental shelf is not interrupted. If bathymetry is considered unrelated to the issue of the area of continental shelf, then discontinuities under the geomorphological and geophysical sense are unrelated to the definition of the natural extension limits. It is logical to suppose that, provided that there is a continental shelf in this sense, when there is the issue of dividing the area among neighboring states, the discontinuities are not considered relevant. However, states attempt to make the issue of delimitation dependent on the existence of discontinuities. Until now, no relevant case has referred to anything similar, when the discontinuities do not affect the similarity of the underground part of the soil, and the issue appears to have been posed to create confusion rather than to offer a clear delimitation criterion (UN, 2006).

### **G) The Idea of Natural Extension**

The specific relevance of this idea is considered problematic. Its initial meaning, which was reflected in the Ruling on the North Sea Continental Shelf case (1969), was the emphasis on the geological structure of the continental shelf as part of the land area and as the natural extension of the ground towards and under the sea. This strengthened the view that geological factors should assume a certain superiority in the delimitation procedure. In practice, these views constituted only a simple miniature of the idea of continental shelf and the origin of the title of coastal states. The International Court of Law indicated the principle of equal distance as the basis for the title and concluded that within the areas and at a distance smaller than 200nm away from each of the coasts in question, the geological and geophysical factors do not have any contribution either to the validation of the title or as delimitation factors.

It is additionally worth noting that the International Court of Law, highlighting that the equal distance principle was not mentioned in the customary law and that there was no separate method of delimitation that could be implemented in all cases, noted that “the delimitation should take place by agreement in accordance with the leniency principles and taking into

account all the relevant circumstances in such a way that it allows to every party as much part of the continental shelf areas that constitute the natural extension of land under the sea as possible, without, however trespassing the natural extension of another state”. In case, however, the implementation of these rules resulted in the overlap of the continental shelf areas of the parties, the Court underlined that “these areas would have to be separated in parts after an agreement, or, in case of no agreement, in equal parts unless there is the decision of joined usage and exploitation jurisdiction of the parties’ overlapping zones. The delimitation, the Court added, is not a sea area allotment procedure de novo, but its sole aim is to allot to every coastal state the areas that constitute the natural extension of its land under the sea and which belong to it solely since it dominates its own land. The continental shelf is ancillary to the main thing – the land – and its delimitation is of a merely declarative character as regards the ancillary’s limits without dividing it in the first place.

#### **H) The Islands As Relevant Circumstances**

As already mentioned, on the basis of article 121 of the 1982 UNCLOS “an island is a naturally formed land area surrounded by water and remaining above the water surface at the highest flooding”. On the basis of the provisions of article 121 of the 1982 UNCLOS, the right of islands to have marine zones can be deduced. This article underlines that the islands are estimated as the state’s territory, since they are bound by the same status as the continental area (see article 10 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone). Consequently, the islands are able to have territorial waters and continental shelf as well as EEZ, something that supports the completeness and independence of the existence of all islands in the sense of the International Law and the Law of the Sea. According to par 2 of article 121, the territorial waters, the EEZ and the continental shelf of an island are defined by the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS, which apply to the continental areas.

Moreover, article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the continental shelf clearly highlights the term continental shelf in relation to the submarine areas adjacent to the island coasts. This

fact on its own seems to add continental shelf rights to the island areas of the members of the Convention and, since the International Court in the North Sea Continental shelf case (1969) maintained that this article was a declaration of customary International Law, it is admitted that the same applies to countries not bound by the Convention. This can be verified by the drafting of article 1, the legislative and diplomatic practice of the states and the opinion of various writers. It is clear that no theoretical discrimination among the islands based on their size, importance, population, or other factors influenced the development of article 1 and no such discrimination was observed in the legislative practice regarding the continental shelf. The islands are considered to have continental shelf rights correspondent to their geological character. Practically speaking, many things depend on the particular geographical relationships of the islands rather than on its classification as such.

The difficulty in clearly determining the relationship between the continental shelf and the EEZ is revealed through the role of the islands in the formation and delimitation of the areas corresponding to them. And the idea of natural extension in the case of continental shelf indicates that the islands that can be said to constitute natural extensions do have continental shelf rights, even if the countries' positive practice has not adopted the rule that all islands, irrespective of their geological structure, have continental shelf. However, the question whether an island has an EEZ or not, cannot be deduced by general principles, since this ensues by the practice of the states (UN, 2006).

## 2.6 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Political psychology tends to constitute a point to which great interest has been drawn especially during the past decades. It could be advocated that it may be a scientific discipline on its own albeit political psychology encompasses miscellaneous traits from multiple different disciplines. The present chapter attempts to scrutinize three major personalities of the Iranian political stage. The structure is based upon the

combination of brief biographies and linguistics. What is worth being highlighted is the fact that the process of political profiling while taking critical discourse analysis can be proved of paramount importance and at the same time function as a cornerstone facilitating the global understanding of the principles and policies.

The analysis of the internal environment (intrinsic drivers) is a cornerstone to the comprehension of one's personality. The internal environment is divided into two constituting parts; namely, the ability of situation perception in terms of real factors—which involves primarily cognitive skills—and internal drivers. Cognitive skills include the factual perception of every situation without arbitrary interpretation.

With respect to internal drivers, what we take into consideration is psychobiography, psychodynamics, and historic patterns. More specifically:

- The term of psychobiography consists of the study of the lives of exemplary individuals from the point of view of psychological analysis and it encompasses the synthesis of multiple sources of information, such as childhood and subconscious motives

- The notion of psychodynamics tends to explore the psychological interaction between subliminal/ subconscious mind with the conscious one. It also encompasses the forces determining human behaviour in terms of emotions, and how this is to be projected onto human attitude as well as critical discourse analysis of leader's political speeches.

- When it comes to historic motives, what will be studied is how socio-historic patterns of the specific region determine and function as stimuli to the development of political leaders' personality traits. It remains to be shown that the internal drivers and forces determine the leaders' optimism or pessimism status and

how that reflects on their capacity for crisis management under pressure which is a crucial element in negotiation dynamics.

The interrelation between behavioral characteristics and institutional framework is shaping, to some extent, the political leader's negotiating performance (at both local and international scale) and the way they likely to move on the global geopolitical chessboard.

## 2.6 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Prior to any analysis, it is of utmost importance that we briefly scrutinize the domain of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which, as explicitly expressed in the name, involves a critical approach towards the discourse (parole). Furthermore, it puts particular emphasis on social and political analysis- criticism (Catalano & Moeller, 2013) by shedding light on how text tends to reveal and function as a means of shaping and constructing meaning and, consequently, realities and identities. It can be concluded that Critical Discourse analysis constitutes an interdisciplinary domain scrutinizing both written and oral texts. However, it does not mean that CDA is a methodology. On the contrary, it is a type of research enabling us to comprehend further how power functions by examining three level: micro, meso, and macro (Davies & Koller, 2012), while it tends to focus on structures and word choice.

To be more specific, the micro-level analysis puts particular emphasis on the genre and the audience of the text analysis among others the grammatical and syntax features opted for. Moving on to the meso- level analysis, what is examined is the reason behind the specific choice of linguistic feature, or, to put it in other words, why the author/ speaker would incorporate them into their text/ speech. Finally, the macro-

level enables us to shed light on how social agents tend to be a vital factor for determining how texts is formatted (Davies & Koller, 2012).

In accordance with Van Dijk's theory on Critical Discourse Analysis, what is stressed is the fact that the fundamental point of Critical Discourse Analysis is the meticulous and systematic analysis and study of the linguistic strategies employed in the text (Van Dijk, 1993). Furthermore, we should bear in mind that Critical Discourse Analysis can manifest and unveil the interrelation between the actors/ agents and the contextualized (Gholizadeh & Hook, 2011).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **MAJOR PERSONALITIES OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL STAGE: A LINGUISTIC APPROACH**

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Political psychology tends to constitute a point to which great interest has been drawn especially during the past decades. It could be advocated that it may be a scientific discipline on its own albeit political psychology encompasses miscellaneous traits from multiple different disciplines. The present chapter attempts to scrutinize three major personalities of the Iranian political stage. The structure is based upon the combination of brief biographies and linguistics. What is worth being highlighted is the fact that the process of political profiling while taking critical discourse analysis can be proved of paramount importance and at the same time function as a cornerstone facilitating the global understanding of the principles and policies.

The analysis of the internal environment (intrinsic drivers) is a cornerstone to the comprehension of one's personality. The internal environment is divided into two constituting parts; namely, the ability of situation perception in terms of real factors—which involves primarily cognitive skills—and internal drivers. Cognitive skills include the factual perception of every situation without arbitrary interpretation.

With respect to internal drivers, what we take into consideration is psychobiography and psychodynamics. More specifically:



The term of psychobiography consists of the study of the lives of exemplary individuals from the point of view of psychological analysis and it encompasses the synthesis of multiple sources of information, such as childhood and subconscious motives (Schultz, 2005)

The notion of psychodynamics tends to explore the psychological interaction between subliminal/ subconscious mind with the conscious one. It also encompasses the forces determining human behaviour in terms of emotions (Petriglieri & Petriglieri, 2022), and how this is to be projected onto human attitude as well as how it is projected via language

When it comes to the external environment, we primarily shed light on historic motives and patterns. What will be studied is how socio-historic patterns of the specific region determine and function as stimuli to the development of political leaders' personality traits. It remains to be shown that the internal drivers and forces determine the leaders' optimism or pessimism status and how that reflects on their capacity for crisis management under pressure which is a crucial element in negotiation dynamics.

The interrelation between behavioral characteristics and institutional framework is shaping, to some extent, the political leader's negotiating performance (at both local and international scale) and the way they likely to move on the global geopolitical chessboard.

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To be more specific, the micro-level analysis puts particular emphasis on the genre and the audience of the text analysis among others the grammatical and syntax features opted for. Moving on to the meso- level analysis, what is examined is the reason behind the specific choice of linguistic feature, or, to put it in other words, why the author/ speaker would incorporate them into their text/ speech. Finally, the macro-level enables us to shed light on how social agents tend to be a vital factor for determining how texts is formatted (Davies & Koller, 2012).

In accordance with Van Dijk's theory on Critical Discourse Analysis, what is stressed is the fact that the fundamental point of Critical Discourse Analysis is the meticulous and systematic analysis and study of the linguistic strategies employed in the text (Van Dijk, 1993). Furthermore, we should bear in mind that Critical Discourse Analysis can manifest and unveil the interrelation between the actors/ agents and the contextualized (Gholizadeh & Hook, 2011).

The present chapter is to scrutinize the linguistic strategies utilized in speeches in order to unfold profiles of major Iranian political figures. The factors/ linguistic items

to be taken under examination are primarily the tenses and voices of verbs, actors and pronouns, and metaphors.

### 3.3 BASIC CONCEPTS OF ISLAM

On the ground of the fact that the legal framework has remained the same for the Islamic Republic of Iran, it shall be the point we commence for the profiling.

To begin with, the ancient history of Iran has served as a factor dictating- in a way- the regimes of the region. To be more specific, located at a geographical, cultural, and political crossroad Iran has itself legitimized its rulers to experience less control and more freedom in order to unify and “nationalize” the entities comprising Iran. It was precisely that factor leading to the notion of *Psycho- nationalism*. (Moghaddam, 2018). *Psycho- nationalism* is inextricably linked with the notion of *Otherness*. Both notions tend to create in group a psychological/ mental sense of belonging not by defining the features and characteristics of the particular group, but rather by excluding the describing features pertaining to other groups, such as linguistic elements and racial, religious, or ethnic reasons. Ergo, the ultimate objective is a kind of narcissism by establishing and preserving differentiating factors among groups, nations, and tribes (Staszak 2009)

It is not possible to analyze the Political Islam without highlighting the characteristics of this religion, which, at the same time, is a justice system. There is no need for a detailed analysis of the Islamic theology in this study and this is the reason why we focus on specific fundamental concepts which pinpoint the differences as well as the similarities with the other monotheistic religions. Furthermore, we present the

pillars of this faith and the two concepts that have created friction with the Western world, as well as the need to revive the religion through an uncommon fundamentalism: the Islamic Law and the “Sacred War” (jihad). Finally, by mentioning Sunni schools of thought along with Shiism, Sufism and sects/subdivisions within Islam we demonstrate/prove that Islam is far from being a monolithic homogenous religion.

Despite the fact it tends to share common roots with Judaism and Christianity (such as God, Creation, Prophets, the existence of Satan and The Second Coming) and geographical proximity to the regions where these religions prevail, there are significant differences as well as historic dispute. Islam means to fully obey God’s will. The word “ungrateful”, “unappreciative” is the closest to the concept of the “infidel”, the “heathen”. A faithful Muslim’s life must strictly follow the rules of the Quran, which is God’s word. To the Muslims, the fact that it is written in excellent Arabic is evidence of the book’s holiness, something inexplicable and admirable since Muhammad was illiterate. It consists of 114 chapters (sura) which, with the exception of the brief first chapter, are gradually decreasing in length. So, the longest sura is the second one which has 286 verses and the shortest one is the last one with only 4 verses.

It is important to understand that the Quran is not a sacred, God-inspired book. To the Muslims it is eternal and uncreated, existing before Muhammad and it demonstrates the Divine will to the world. Muslims learn by heart parts of the Quran or the whole text (the person who managed to learn everything is called “Hafez” which means “protector” of the Sacred Text).

Since Islam does not have a clergy per se, it does not include any Sacred Mysteries as is the case with Christianity and, consequently, it is a sin to give any form to God (so any form of illustration similar to the Christian religious paintings is

forbidden). Obviously, the Quran is the ultimate moral as well as legal compass. In light of the fact that it is God's word, it is not written in a narrative, linear way, but it is rather poetic and fragmented. For example, the story of Moses cannot be found in a single sura, but in segments found in 44 chapters. Revisiting the issue of the absence of the clergy, it is logical to wonder what the authority of the simple priest (imam) of a mosque is. In every mosque there is someone who has exceptional knowledge in religious matters, probably someone who has received denominational education in a religious school / seminary (madrassa) or theological studies and also has the necessary communication skills. In any case, there is no clergy or religious leadership in the Sunni Islam.

Due to humanity's advancements, no holy book can answer every question. Consequently, religions try to either interpret the essence of the holy books or to provide answers from the Holy Tradition. In Islamic tradition, there are the Hadiths and the Sira (for some it is part of the hadiths). The Hadiths report the Suna (the verified behavior) of Muhammad, whose life is considered to be the example every Muslim has to follow. For every modern challenge which requires new guidelines, these must follow the contents of the Suna and the Quran. A typical Sira begins with the chain of report on authenticity ("isnad"), in other words its journey till its collector found out about it and, naturally, the first to narrate it is one of the ancient fellow travelers of the Prophet of Islam. Then, the guidelines to the believers follow ("matn"). Of course, something that occurred in Christianity as well with the "apocrypha gospels", hundreds of hadiths occurred and there was a careful selection process. A typical example is that of Al-Buhari, one of the greatest collectors of the holy tradition who, after studying almost 60.000 hadiths, considered less than 7.500 to be absolutely correct. By the way, the

Shiites find acceptable only the hadiths that originate from Muhammad's family and not those of any of his "companions".

The main topic of Islam is Monotheism, a monotheism that is distant, unapproachable and absolute. God simultaneously created Adam and Eve out of clay, while he created the Angels (most important of which is Gabriel who "gave" the Quran to Muhammad) out of light and the jinni (intangible creatures) out of fire. Following God's commands, the Angels and Jinns bowed before the first created humans, except Satan who was banished and later tricked the first humans with the forbidden fruit. Adam and Eve were banished from Heaven, but they repented, and God forgave them. Consequently, in Islam, man is not born with the original sin.

The relationship between Islam and the Western religions is particularly important for our analysis. Muslims, according to God's word, should respect the Jews and the Christians since the Divine Apocalypse, which was tainted, preexisted in them. The believers of these religions are called "People of the Book" ("Ahl-al-Kitab") and they are under protection. Of course, they are second-degree citizens since they are obliged to pay a tax (jizya"), they are not allowed to preach their religion and they cannot occupy high office positions. The 4th Shiite Imam, Hazrat Zayn al-Abidin, states in 700 A.D. (in a particularly dark period when the word "right" was almost forbidden): "The rights of the non-Muslims are: To be allowed to perform their religious duties. Not to disturb the security that God gives them. In your transactions and social contacts with them behave as God behaves to you. Since they are under the protection of Islam, be merciful to them. Whatever the circumstances, do not exceed their boundaries".

At this point we should understand that the spread of Islam, besides the fighting ability of the Arabs and the decrease in the Byzantine and Persian power due to the long

wars between them, can be attributed to the behavior of the Muslims towards conquered people. The strict Orthodox Christianity of the era gave the impression that Islam was more progressive. The paid tribute, as well as the persecution of the heretic Christians by their fellow-believers, made people either convert to Islam or to accept the Islamic protection by paying a smaller tax than the one they paid to the Byzantine empire. Some law teachers, a typical example of whom is the Andalusian Ibn Hazm, broadened the meaning of the “People of the Book” so as to include other people “under protection”, such as the believers of Hinduism. Moreover, Christ to Muslims is a great prophet, the only one whose soul (like the soul of Adam) was created by God. Great prophets are also Noah, Abraham and Moses. Among others, David, Isaac, Jacob, Solomon, Zachary, John the Baptist and, strangely enough, Alexander the Great are also considered prophets.

Holy Mary has a special place in Islam. She enjoys absolute respect as Virgin Mary who by divine intervention gave birth to Jesus. In fact, there are more citations in the Quran about the Virgin Mary (who is not identified like this) than in the New Testament. There is a whole sura devoted to Virgin Mary (“Mariam”). Jesus, who shall return to the Earth in the Second Coming to fight the Antichrist, was not crucified according to the Quran but he ascended to the heavens. There are several similar differentiations in the narratives like, for example, according to the Muslims, Abraham’s attempt under God’s orders to sacrifice Ismael instead of Isaac. The relationship with the other “Abraham religions” can be found in the diagram below, where we can see that by Abraham, Judaism and Christianity are born through Isaac, while Islam is born by Ismael.

The interpretation of the Quran by well-known seminary teachers / law teachers provided Sunni Islam with 4 major legal schools of thought (in chronological order

Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali), though none of them intended to do so when they began teaching. From these schools, Hanbali accepts a very strict form of Islam, without any particular Quran interpretation, and with strict obedience to it. In any case, God in Quran is merciful and compassionate, as is stated 192 times, while his wrath and vengeance are mentioned only 17 times. Noticing the similarities with Christianity, we can say that “to a lot of Muslims, Christianity is a tainted, counterfeit Islam, while, to a lot of Christians, Islam is a corrupt Christianity that was not adequately understood and assimilated”.

### 3.4 THE ISLAMIC LAW

Islam projects as its comparative advantage the fact that there is no clergy and no complex theology. What makes things easier for the common and especially for the uneducated man is having to follow simple and precise instructions, in other words, for their religion to be at the same time a political and a justice system.

The most important subject for our study is the relationship between religious power and other types of power. In essence, in order to understand the Political Islam, we have to perceive the ease or difficulty to distinguish between religion and the state and, even more, between secular and religious justice. As is the case in every legal system, the Law of Islam, called “Sharia”, has its own procedures and norms. However, because, as we have seen, religion is differently perceived by different societies, the Islamic Law was developed and is applied differently in different countries. The Sharia, of course, has the same origins as the rest of Islam, namely the Quran (approximately 200 of the 6.000 verses have legal content) and the Hadiths that describe the Sunna. However, two norms that cannot be found in secular legal systems have been developed: the “*idabad*” that refers to matters of the faith and religious rituals and the



much more interesting “muamalat” which refers to the social relations and, also to family and civil law. To offer an example, as regards financial transactions, the Quran has only one commandment, the one that forbids usury (2:275). We can understand that this concept may be differently understood by various audiences. However, there are several commandments regarding family, inheritance and criminal law. When Islam first emerged and gave to every heir part of the inheritance (wife, children – boys and girls – and not only to the first-born son), it was an actual social revolution.

According to the Islamic Law, man’s actions can be classified into five categories which receive the appropriate social/state treatment: The duties (“wajib”) whose breach is punishable, the virtuous actions (“mustahabb”) whose neglect is not punished, the unpunished permitted (“mubah”), the ones that should be avoided but are also not punished (“makruh”) and finally the sins (“haram”) which are explicitly punished in a specific way. If, for example, the caliph declares Holy War and the believer deserts it, he violates a wajib and he must be punished.

The techniques used to restore justice can be found in other systems as well, and they are, in essence, pre-Islamic. The consensus among well-known teachers of the law and, especially of those who have created schools of thought (“ijma”), the analogy between the Quran and the Holy Tradition (“qiyas”), the necessity (“natrura”), the search for the optimal solution (“istihsan”), the community’s common interest (“maslaha”) and, of course, the custom (“urf”) are taken into consideration. Moreover, the practices of the first four “fair” (“Rashidun”) caliphs are used to always abiding by the Sunni doctrine. Justice is served by the issue of a consulting opinion (“fatwa”), which is essentially the same as a court ruling and is based either on strict application (“taqlid”) or on the interpretation of the Holy Texts as regards issues that have first emerged promoting the development of the doctrine (“ijtihad”).

Consensus can be reached either actively with the agreement of all the most important teachers of the law, or passively with one of them stating their opinion and the absence of objection/different view of the others (Hanifa, Maliq, Shafi and Hanbal). For example, there was consensus on forbidding believers from consuming pork fat, while the Quran only mentions meat. The analogy provides also solutions: the use of narcotic substances by Muslims is forbidden in analogy to alcohol. We can understand that the other techniques add flexibility. For example, when the community did not have any money, they were allowed to impose unplanned taxes for “the community’s common interests”. Even though a lot of judges are still searching for the meaning of the holy texts, most matters have been resolved since the 10th century through the preaching of the four schools of justice and, since then, “ijtihad’s doors have been closed”.

Specific matters are considered problematic according to the Islamic Law. The first one is undoubtedly woman’s position in society and family. Domestic violence is allowed up to an extent, their testimony in court is treated half as seriously as the one made by men is, and they do not have the right to take custody of their children after divorce. In a following chapter, where the modern Islamophobia will be analyzed, some serious answers will be provided, however, strict theology in Islam believes, indeed, that women should dress themselves respectably and that men can marry even four women, on condition that they treat them the same way, so that no one is treated with injustice (4:03). In practice this polygamy incites monogamy. Because of the era when it emerged, Islam accepts the existence of slaves, especially women, after a victorious war. However, when the slave converts to Islam, he is instantly free, something that served as an additional motive for heathens to be directed to the “correct path”. Moreover, Islam rejects incest and gives the right to Muslims to marry Christian or

Jewish women without them being forced to convert (5:07). On the contrary, they are free to go to churches and synagogues and even to have the same rights as Muslim women. There is also a legislated “dowry”, but of the opposite direction: the man provides a dowry to be accepted as husband. Finally, divorce is an easier procedure for men and a more difficult one for women, it is, though, totally acceptable, in contrast with the initial provision of the Christian faith (“what God had joined together, let no man separate”).

The Islamic Law provides indeed strict penalties for theft (mutilation of the right hand at the wrist joint, 5:42) and adultery, according to hadiths, (from one hundred whippings for the unmarried to stoning for married people), but as will be explained in a following chapter, there are such limitations (such as the existence of four eyewitnesses at the time of the sexual act, 4:19) that render the draconian measures impossible. Of course, the Quran forbids pork, alcohol and gambling but, in contrast with common belief, there is no mentioning of circumcision or, most importantly, clitoridectomy anywhere (not even in any of the Hadiths).

### 3.5 THE PILLARS OF ISLAM

Islam has five main pillars, rules that the believers must strictly obey and which were highlighted by Muhammad himself in his final sermon, as is known by the “Holy Tradition”. The first of them is the “Declaration of Faith” (Shahadah). “There is no other god except the one and only God and Muhammad is God’s prophet”. This sentence contains the two main elements of Islam, namely, monotheism and the differentiation from the other “Abraham” religions (Judaism and Christianity), that is, the fact that Muhammad is God’s prophet, in fact, he is the last and the greatest prophet, the “seal of prophets”. In the Quran the first part of the “Declaration” is repeated many

times, and the second part as well, but never in a single sentence. The Muslim ought to say the Shahadah at least once in his lifetime correctly, loudly, clearly and with devotion and full recognition of his act. The “Declaration”, written in Arabic of course, is the main visual symbol of Islam. It goes without saying that the Shahadah is part of the daily prayer. In order for someone to convert to Islam, they must recite the “Declaration”. The Shahadah is the first thing a newborn child hears and the last thing a dying man says.

The second pillar of the faith is the constant prayer (Shalat). The Muslims believe that men ignore God’s laws and become arrogant. The solution is praying regularly and thanking God. All believers pray in the same way, which indicates that they are equal in the eyes of God and that they are members of a uniform worshipping community (ummah), which is above races or nations. Humility and equality in prayer are of significant importance and are highlighted many times. The Quran explicitly states three mandatory prayers, with the midday prayer being the most important one, while five prayers per day have been established by the Hadiths: at sunrise, at noon, in the afternoon (from noon till sunset), at sunset and before the believer goes to sleep. Now believers – though it is not common – pray eight times per day. The direction of the prayers is Mecca. If circumstances are not favorable, the believer may pray fewer times or postpone the time of the prayer.

The most important prayer is the Friday one, something that is not stated in the Quran, but it has customarily prevailed. In this prayer, which should take place in the mosque, prayer is followed by a sermon (“khutbah”) delivered from the pulpit (“minbar”) usually by the imam of the mosque. The content of the prayer is simple: doxology, thanksgiving and submission. The content of the sermon always begins with doxology as well, continues with a matter of the community usually regarding moral

issues and ends with a request to bless the community leader. Generally, it is good for men to pray in a mosque and women at home, while the children should begin praying from 10 years old (they learn how to pray 3-4 years earlier). In any case, everyone can pray wherever they want, provided that the place is clean and that so are they. A consequence of the five prayers is that, in Muslim countries, personal and professional life is accordingly adapted so as not to hinder the believer's religious duties.

The way they pray, which, as mentioned, indicates modesty, is dictated at the Quran. Before praying, the believer has to wash his face, his arms from the elbows down and his feet from the ankles down. There is, in fact, a specific order: first the hands are washed, then the mouth, the nose, the arms till the elbow level, the face, the head, the ears and then the feet. Cleanliness of the soul should also mean a clean body. They use a specific rug, as mentioned, and the place they pray should be clean. The muezzin calls the believers to prayer from the top of the minaret. The believer standing first in upright position raises initially the hands at ear level and exclaims "God is the greatest". The initial upright position indicates worship, admiration and requests the mercy of God. The prayer continues with the right hand in the chest and then he falls to his knees realizing in awe the greatness of God, exclaiming three times "Praise the Lord". He rises up and then, exclaiming "God is the greatest", he kneels in worship. This is the moment he fully realizes his own unimportance, as well as that of all worldly things before God. Remaining face-down with his forehead touching the ground he praises God once more. He raises the head remaining on his knees and places the hands on his lap to rest before the next deep kneeling. Afterwards, he stands up. This ritual ("rakat") is repeated twice in the Sunrise prayer, three times in the Sunset prayer and four times in the other prayers. The reasoning behind the prayer ritual is the following: the fact that the shoeless body is shrunk so as to occupy as less space as possible

signifies man's unimportance before God, while the fact that the believer kneels and bows during prayer denotes the ultimate submission and surrender to God's will. In addition, during prayer, Muslims lie very close to each other, almost "side by side". In this way, they indicate the uniformity and unity of the "ummah" and prevent Satan from breaking that unity by "locking" him outside the community.

A third pillar of the faith is that of almsgiving ("zakat"). Muslims believe that everything is ephemeral and belongs to God and that it is a sin for someone to eat while their neighbor is hungry. There is no other obligation that is stated more times in the Quran than that of almsgiving/charity. Believers are generally encouraged to give "as much as they can" (2:219). More specifically, those who have crops, should donate 5% of their harvest. Any Muslim who has had fortune for a whole year ought to donate zakat since "any nice action done by one person to another for their soul, shall be rewarded by God" (2:110).

The first who deserve this are the slaves who have to buy their freedom, since slavery is acceptable to Islam only under specific conditions. Next, those who are unable to pay back their debts should benefit from this, as well as other paupers, widows, foreigners, travelers and strangers. They also believe that charity donations should be humble, or, according to Muhammad's teaching "the left hand should not know what the right hand is doing". In fact, according to Islam, God's command is that "if you give your poor brother something, wishing to get closer to me and gain my favor, then this is like offering something directly to me, on condition, though, that you do not give it to your Muslim brother if he does not deserve it, that you do not harm him, that you do not despise him, that you do not ask from him any favor or reward and also that you do not do it in order for people to know and praise and point you with their fingers". There are governments of Muslim countries which "collect" the zakat,

but normally this is a personal responsibility that is not related to state taxes. Furthermore, benevolence (“sadaqah”) is a broader term of zakat and includes among others “helping two people fighting make peace, helping someone put the load on his horse or ride it, removing an obstacle from the road...”.

The fourth pillar of the faith is fasting (“sawm”). Fasting lasts for 29 or 30 day per year, is mandatory and is practiced in the ninth month of the Muslim lunar year, the month of Ramadan. Children (under 14 years of age) and very elderly people are exempt from fasting. Also, sick people, travelers and pregnant women are temporarily exempt from fasting since, after the special condition that prevented them from fasting ends, they ought to do so (2:185). The objective of fasting is to abstain from sin (2:183), to become self-disciplined and the obvious, even for a little while, equality of all people in sharing a common fate and difficulty. Because it is important for everyone to read the Quran during the Ramadan, it has been divided into 30 equal parts so as for the believers to read specific verses per day. In the first 10 days of the Ramadan, according to the “Holy Tradition”, God shows his mercy. In the next 10 days He shows forgiveness. In the last 10 days He offers protection from Satan and Hell.

Fasting requires total abstinence of the body from any outside substance (consequently, all types of food and drink, smoking and sexual relations are forbidden) from sunrise till sunset. If a Muslim breaks his fasting by mistake, then his fasting remains valid. If he breaks it voluntarily, he must purify himself by fasting the same number of times or by almsgiving. Fasting is, generally, a means to purify one’s self and this is the reason why a lot of Muslims that feel burdened by one of their actions voluntarily fast more times besides that particular month. The Muslim family wake up long before sunrise in the month of Ramadan so as to eat a breakfast that will help them cope till sunset. When the sun sets, the family members drink water and eat a date.

Afterwards, they pray and eat dinner. In the last days during the suffering of hunger, Muslims try during the “night of power”, when Gabriel the archangel revealed the first part of the Quran to Muhammad, to remain vigilant. Their vigilance is of course combined with praying and reading the Quran.

The month of Ramadan ends with a glorious three-day celebration, the “Eid al-Fitr”, with which fasting comes to an end and families are united and exchange wishes and gifts, in a Muslim combination of “Thanksgiving” and Christmas day for the Christians.

The fifth and final pillar of the faith is the pilgrimage, the “holy journey” to Mecca (“hajj”). Hajj happens in the final month of the lunar year. Muslims are obliged to do it at least once in their lifetime, if conditions are favorable (health, financial situation etc.). The pilgrims ought to be ready to travel to the “holy ground”, having settled their debts and provided what their family may need during their absence. They have to be psychologically purified. When they reach Mecca, they have to wear a white tunic and sandals. Of course, wearing jewelry or using perfumes are forbidden. The point is once more total equality in the eyes of God. Women are accordingly dressed in their everyday clothes, but ought to be fully covered. The simple, plain tunic and the removal of all objects (keys, wallets, watches, mobile phones...) are reminders of the ultimate equality. At the same time “hajj is a “death” and a meeting with God and the return from the hajj signifies a person’s rebirth”.

In order to understand the Iranian worldview, it is worth mentioning what Khomeini states in his “final message”: “I simply note in my consignment, and I hope that historians and sociologists will save Muslims from making this mistake: Maintaining that the Prophet was concerned only with spiritual issues and dismissed



the problems of the state and government, as well as that all Prophets and Imams did the same, and so we should all abstain from all these, is a painful mistake which will destroy Muslim nations and pave the way for bloodthirsty imperialists. And that is because the powers that should be banished and condemned are those of evil governments which serve evil purposes, dictatorships and tyrannies. The whole world for them is the accumulation of wealth, goods and power, it is, in other words, a world that leads man away from God. The “divine government” that we pursue in order to put an end to tyranny and secure social justice is the realization of the achievements of the blessed Prophets Solomon and Muhamad. We clearly see the three aspects of government: revolutionary, social, and religious.

### 3.6 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Although the Islamic Republic of Iran is described as a theocracy in terms of its political system, we should stress that according to its Constitution, Iran is defined as an Islamic Republic focusing on united the nation and which divides the power into three branches, namely executive, judiciary, and legislative (Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014),

It goes without saying that *Supreme Leader* is at the top of the hierarchy in the Iranian legal framework. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 only two people have serviced the particular post, namely Ayatollah Ruyollah Khomeini and the present Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. The Supreme Leader is the highest religious, constitutional, and political authority. The Supreme Leader is elected by the *Assembly of Experts* and his tenure lasts for eight years. With respect to the Assembly of Experts, it comprises of 88 muhtahids and ayatollahs. What draws our attention is the fact that Supreme Leader may not be subjected to public criticism. In accordance with Iranian

Constitution, the Supreme Leader holds the responsibility for “the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, which means that the Supreme Leader dictates and defines how domestic and foreign affairs are exercised. Furthermore, the Supreme Leader is the one that appoint (or dismiss) the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as well as six out of twelve members of the Council of Guardians, which to be examined below (Kurun, 2017).

As mentioned above, *the Council of Guardians* consists of twelve jurists and they are responsible for interpreting the Constitution and examine whether the newly-adopted laws are in line with it. As a matter of fact, that Council of Guardians is the institutions that vetoes laws and mandates regarding women’s rights and reformation. Furthermore, the Council of Guardians is responsible for approving- or not- of the candidates for elections. As it can deduced, the Council of Guardians constitutes a prohibiting factor against democratization and reformism of Iran and, on the contrary, it functions as a mechanism for dragging on and perpetuating the principles of the Iranian Revolution (Kurun, 2017).

Moving further with the Iranian legal framework and institutions, *the Expediency Council* is of paramount importance. Its focal point is providing advice to the Supreme Leader and second, it serves as a legislative body following the screening procedure of the Council of Guardians. It goes without saying that we cannot exclude the Parliament from the core institutions of Iran. The Iranian Parliament is unicameral and comprises of 290 members, while elections take place every four years. The Iranian Parliament is primarily a legislative body serving in accordance with the Iranian Constitution (Kurun, 2017).

## 3.7. PROFILING

### 3.7.1 AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI

#### Analysis

With respect to the first step regarding the cognitive skills, what is worth being highlighted is the fact that Ayatollah Khomeini was described as “bright” and was an independent, self- sufficient, and disciplined man.

However, moving on with his psychodynamics, what draws out attention is his childhood. Ayatollah Khomeini’s childhood was determined by his family’s poverty (they used to live in a mud- bricked house). He was an orphan (as prophet Muhammad) and it can be suggested that it was precisely that factor that significantly contributed to Khomeini’s probable identification with the prophet apart from the fact that he could trace their ancestry to prophet Muhammad, not to mention that the name Ruhollah means “soul of God”. Furthermore, originating from a rigid, religious family with political involvement (his grandfather was a high- ranking cleric and participated in Tobacco Protest) resulted in his animosity towards non- Muslims. The role of his rigid Shiite upbringing is clearly manifest

#### Speeches and analysis

The notion of *autarky* is of paramount importance for the Iranian culture. In order to fully understand this notion/ concept, it is advisable that we make a brief mention to the notion of struggle. To be more specific, autarky emanates from the

struggle, which tends to serve as a driving force, or- to put it in a less sophisticated manner- a motive to accomplish the realm of “awaken” through sacrifices.

What is considered to be a breakthrough in Ayatollah Ruyollah Khomeini’s approach is the fact that he attempted and succeeded in reinforcing the notion of sovereignty especially through the creation of “other”. Khomeini reinforced in his teachings the essence for a country to preserve its purity through rejecting features and characteristics pertaining to Other countries, nations, and entities. What strikes our attention is the background of Khomeini’s followers, which spanned from middle- class to young women and Muslim leaders.

Moving forward, it is imperative that we scrutinize phrases from Ayatollah Khomeini’s speech, which are to unveil core features of his approach and are compatible with his psychodynamics. To begin with, we are going to shed some light on the lexical and vocabulary choice. Most of the lexical items used tend to stress the necessity for unity and depict enemies as satan and evil Vocabulary items that are frequently utilized throughout the speech are the following:

- **Unity**
  - “I hope that all strata of the nation, especially these two respected strata, will not be negligent of plots and conspiracies in the new year and will nullify the evil plans through their unity of expression”
  - “Turning toward God and the unity of expression was the basis of our victory.”
  - “If we forget the secret of victory and we turn away great Islam and its holy teachings and if we follow the path of disunity and

dissension, there is the danger that the bounty of God almighty may cease...”

- **Noble**

- “...let me congratulate all oppressed people and the noble Iranian nation on the occasion of the new year, whose present is the consolidation of the foundation of the Islamic Republic.”
- “The noble nation should know that the entire victory was achieved through the will of almighty God and by means of transformation...”
- “This year is a year in which security should return to Iran, [shouts of "God is great"] and the noble people live in utmost comfort.”
- “The noble people of Iran can no longer pay unearned salaries to a number of ungodly people...”
- “Throughout the rightful struggles of the noble nation against the Shah and America...”
- “The noble Iranian nation, by supporting the genuine and committed Iranian clergy, who have always been the guardians and protectors of this country...”

- **Justice**

- “...world-devouring America, and to unfurl the banner of Islamic justice over our beloved country”
- “They should observe complete care. They should sit in justice with revolutionary patience.”

- **Satan**

- “The will of almighty God, may He be praised, decreed the release of this oppressed nation from the yoke of the tyranny and crimes of the satanical regime and from the yoke of the domination of oppressive powers, especially the government...”
- “...that the deceits and plots of the satanical powers may put our beloved nation in bondage and waste the pure blood...”
- “...that our islamic country may forever endure that which passed during the satanical regime...”
- “I see that the plots of the anti-revolutionary satans aimed at providing opportunities for the East or the West are increasing.”
- **Sacrifice**
  - “The noble nation should know that the entire victory was achieved through the will of almighty God and by means of transformation which came a bout throughout the country, and through the spirit of faith and a spirit of self-sacrifice, which was manifested in the decisive majority of the nation.”
- **Independence**
  - “put our beloved nation in bondage and waste the pure blood which has been shed on the path of independence and freedom and spoil the hardships which our dear young and old have endured...”
  - “...and the oppressors and advance the Islamic movement in united ranks and protect independence and freedom as they would their own dear lives.”

- "...the clergy, who are the foundation of independence and freedom of this country."
- "Today the insulting and the weakening of the role of the clergy is a blow against independence, freedom and Islam."
- **Religious**
  - "Therefore, being conscious of my divine and religious duty, I remind you of certain point."
  - "All confiscations should be carried out according to religious regulations, with the verdict of the prosecutor or the court judges."
  - "The distribution of land should be carried out according to religious regulations..."

Moving towards another aspect of discourse analysis, we shall scrutinize the usage of pronouns throughout the speech. In particular, Ayatollah Khomeini primarily opted for the use of "we" and "our", and less the pronouns "I" and "my". It is firmly established that the particular lexical and grammatical selection is utilized to stress the importance of both individual and public responsibility for the growth and development of the nation. In order to elaborate further, it is crucial that we underline the fact that "*we*" and "*our*" constitute personal and possessive pronouns signifying the collectivism of an act and action, not to mention that they constitute a contributing means of shaping national identity, reinforcing the feeling of belonging, and creating and strengthening the notion of Other. On the contrary, "*I*" and "*my*" are personal and possessive pronouns indicating personal responsibility and duty and attribute the sense of individualism to the text/ speech.

- 'We shall confront the world with our ideology'

- “**We** are fighting against international communism to the same degree that we are fighting against the Western...”
- “... if **we** show the slightest negligence we shall be destroyed. Both superpowers have risen for the obliteration of the oppressed nations and **we** should support the oppressed people of the world.”
- “...**we** shall definitely face defeat. **We** should clearly settle **our** accounts with the powers and superpowers and should demonstrate to them that, despite all the grave difficulties that **we** have, **we** shall confront the world with **our** ideology...”

Another cornerstone lexical item that should be examined is the utilization of verb. To be more specific, what shall be shed light on is the application of tenses and whether Ayatollah Khomeini opted for active or passive voice. With respect to the tenses used, present and past tenses are primarily selected. The use of present and past tenses aims at giving temporal specification while demonstrating that the present conditions is the outcome of past actions (or lack of it). The use of Present Perfect and Present Continuous points out the fact that the current circumstances are the effect and the manifestation of the past. Furthermore, the majority of verbs are non-modal, which signifies authority and knowledge. However, in cases of modal verbs, they tend to signify necessity and obligation of the Iranian people and clergy to fight against their foes.

- “**We are fighting** against international communism to the same degree that **we are fighting** against the Western world- devourers led by America, Israel and Zionism”
- “... if **we show** the slightest negligence we **shall** be destroyed.”



- “The noble nation **should know** that the entire victory **was achieved** through the will of almighty God and by means of transformation which **came** a bout throughout the country, and through the spirit of faith and a spirit of self-sacrifice, which **was manifested** in the decisive majority of the nation.”
- “On the other hand, all the superpowers and all the powers **have risen** to destroy us.”
- “... which **has been shed** on the path of independence and freedom and spoil the hardships which our dear young and old **have endured**, and that our islamic country may forever endure that which **passed** during the satanical regime...”

Regarding the use of active and passive voice, it is of paramount importance that we stress the fact that the mention and the position of the agent withing the sentence is indicative of the importance- or not- of who committed the action. To be more specific, active voice puts particular emphasis on the subject/ agent and their responsibility and, at the same time, volumize readers’ responsibility and their integral role in decision making. On the contrary, passive voice is utilized to downgrade- or hide and conceal- the agents’ responsibility while simultaneously, highlighting the act rather than the person.

- “As soon as an offense **has been determined**, the president should immediately expel the guilty individual from the Armed Forces and begin legal proceedings against him.”
- “My dear military brothers, O you who **turned** your backs on the vile Shah and his plundering agents and **joined** the ranks of the nation.”

- “Is it true that the Foundation of the Oppressed **has been turned into** the foundation of the oppressors?”
- “The people of each city, as soon as they **learn** of a strike at a factory, should go to that factory, should go to that place and see what they want.”
- “These days, through the agents of the Shah and his lackeys, attacks **have increased** on the true clergy...”

### 3.7.2 MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD

#### Biography

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a rather controversial political leader. He was born in Aradan- a village near city of Garmsar (southeast of Tehran) in 1956 and belongs to a generation that was deeply affected by the experience of the Iran- Iran Was (1980-1988). What draws our attention is the fact that the former President of Iran was born Mahmoud Saborjhian and his family changed their name upon their relocation in Tehran in view of possessing a more religious surname (<https://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-A-Bu-and-Obituaries/Ahmadinejad-Mahmoud.html> , Accessed on 15<sup>th</sup> September 2021). Although Ahmadinejad himself does not belong in clergy, he comes from a religious family. Furthermore, he joined the revolutionary guards in 1986 in the war against Iraq (Hussein, 2008) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad holds a Doctoral Degree in traffic and transport and was the first Iranian President after the Iranian Revolution that had not been part of the clergy. During his tenure, the reformist policy that had just

commenced ceased and instead severe restrictions were implemented, not to mention the fact that he was judged for the financial situation of Iran.

### Speeches and analysis

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad adopts a different approach in his speech in the UN General Assembly. To begin with, his tone is imperative rather than Khomeini's dialectical tone not to mention the fact that he attempts to stress words and structures with positive and optimistic connotation and denotation. Furthermore, the majority of the vocabulary utilized tend to signify and underline the culture stemming from the history of Iran as well as the notion of sacrifice in their civilization. In terms of vocabulary items selection, the words mostly used are the following:

- Glory/ glorious
  - "...the land of **glory**..."
  - "...achieving its glorious and eternal ideals..."
- Beauty
  - "...the land of glory and **beauty**..."
  - "...for a more **beautiful** life blessed with..."
  - "Imagine how **beautiful** and pleasant our lives..."
- Knowledge
  - "He will come and he will cut through ignorance, superstition, prejudice by opening the gates of science and **knowledge**..."
  - "...the flourishing of **knowledge** and constructive thoughts..."
  - "Despite advances in scientific **knowledge** and technology, the aspirations of Adam's children have not yet been fulfilled"
  - "...by opening the gates of science and **knowledge**."

- "...the land of **knowledge**..."
- Culture
  - "...the land of knowledge, **culture**..."
  - "Pure and indigenous **cultures** as the product of centuries..."
  - "...**cultural** vividness..."
  - "...**cultural** and political interactions in independent and specialized organizations."
- Moral/ morality
  - "...wisdom **and morality**..."
  - "...who control the world power centers, concepts such as **moral** principles ..."
  - "...that is why it is in no way bound to **moral** values... "
  - "His arrival will be the end of oppression, **immorality**, poverty... "
- Pure/ purity
  - "...who as the purest and most compassionate human beings are the gift of the Almighty to humanity ... "
  - "From the standpoint of the politicians who control the world-power centers, concepts such as moral principles, **purity**..."
  - "Pure and indigenous cultures as the product of centuries."
  - "They are all devoted to the cause of justice, **purity** and love."
  - "An order in which man is recognized as God's Supreme Creature, enjoying material and spiritual qualities and

possessing a **pure** and divine nature filled with a desire to seek justice and truth.”

- Noble
  - “I am now here for the eighth time in the eighth year of my service to my **noble** people...”
  - “...their aspirations to build a **noble** society...”
  - “Family as the **noblest** institution of societies...”
  - “The general tendency of nations has always been to accomplish positive common aspirations reflecting exalted divine and human beauties and **nobilities**.”
- Divine
  - “I am here to voice the **divine** and humanitarian message of learned men and women...”
  - “...human beings and **divine** messengers...”
  - “...a manifestation of **divine** image...”
  - “...possessing a pure and **divine** nature...”
- Sacred
  - “...offending the sanctities and most **sacred** beliefs of human beings...”
  - “Authority is a **sacred** gift from people to their rulers, not a chance to amass power and wealth.”
- Sacrifice
  - “From the standpoint of the politicians who control the world power centers, concepts such as moral principles, purity,

honesty, integrity, compassion and **self-sacrifice** are rejected as defunct and outdated notions...”

- “Human and ethical values are **sacrificed** in order to win votes and the willingness to listen to the demands of the people has become only a tool at the time of election.”

With respect to the pronouns used, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad primarily opted for “we” and “our” to demonstrate and put particular emphasis on the cohesion of society.

- “**We** must, therefore, think of a solution.”
- “Are **we** to believe that those who spend hundreds of millions of dollars on election campaigns have the interests of the people of the world at their hearts?”
- “Therefore, Together **We** Need to...”
- “Fortunately, **we** are now at a historic juncture.”
- “Now **we** can sense the sweet scent...”
- “Imagine how beautiful and pleasant **our** lives and how lovely the history of mankind would have been.”
- “...against **our** great nation is a clear example of this bitter reality.”
- “...most all vices in our world are the result...”

Another discourse strategy utilized in the speech is metonymy. In particular, Ahmadinejad has used “*Adam’s children*” instead of humankind in order to reinforce the religious connotation. Furthermore, he adopted a metaphor with source domain the seasons of the year, while the target domain is flourishing and development:

*“Now we can sense the sweet scent and the soulful breeze of the spring, a spring that has just begun and doesn't belong to a specific race, ethnicity, nation or a region, a spring that will soon reach all the territories in Asia, Europe, Africa and the US.”*

Moving to the aspect of verb, what strikes out attention is the extensive use of passive voice. The objective of this selection is double. On the one side, passive voice tends to play down the level of responsibility of the agents- or the culprits in case of a malevolent action. On the other hand, taking the whole approach of the speech into consideration, it constructs the feeling that living in a world of beauty, peace and culture, shall not be confined solely to a specific people or nation, but, on the contrary, it will be a compassionate world welcoming everyone wishing to contribute towards its growth and development. With respect to the usage of active voice, it denotes that imminent action should be taken immediately. To this end, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has utilized a great number of modal verbs, which stress not only the necessity but also the obligation that leaders of the nations and the peoples have towards the creation and development of a world of peace and stability. Regarding the tenses used throughout the speech, it is imperative that we mention the fact that Future tenses are extensively used signifying the hope as well as the subliminal promise to the audience. Finally, a linguistic device/ strategy utilized is the inversion of third conditional. However, have we considered what can be achieved in view of this technique? Third conditional combined with inversion attempts to exhibit and make the audience visualize how the world would have been like had the actions of the past been different.

- “...stability and tranquility which **can be only realized** through harmony, cooperation and joint management of the world.”
- “**Had there been** no egoism, distrust, malicious behaviors, and dictatorships with no one violating the rights of others;”

- “**Had humanitarian values been viewed** as the criterion for social dignity in place of affluence and consumerism..”
- “**Had humanity not experienced** the dark age of medieval periods, and centers of power not hindered the flourishing of knowledge and constructive thoughts”
- “**Had the wars of Crusade and the ensuing periods of slavery and colonialism not happened**, and had the inheritors of these dark periods followed a course on the premises of humanitarians principles”
- “**Had the first and second World Wars in Europe, the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Africa, Latin America, and in the Balkans not happened**, and if instead of the occupation of Palestine and imposition of a fake government, displacement and genocide of millions of people around the globe, the truth behind these wars had been revealed based on justice”
- “If this inefficiency persists, nations **will lose** hope in the global structures to defend their rights.”
- “...the spirit of collective global cooperation **will be tarnished** and the standing of the UN **will be damaged.**”
- “The Almighty God has not left us alone in this mission and has said that **it will surely happen.**”
- “Imagine how beautiful and pleasant our lives and how lovely the history of mankind **would have been.**”
- “Rulers **must** love people.”
- “Leaders of the world **must** regard themselves as committed servants of their people, not their superiors.”



- “Together We **Need** to...”
- “What **should** be done and what is the way out of the current situation?”

### 3.7.3 HASSAN ROUHANI

#### Biography

Hassan Rouhani was born in was born on 12 November 1948 in Sorkhe (Semnan province) and was Representative of the Supreme Leader to the Supreme National Security Council, Member of the Assembly of Experts, head of the Political and Social Committee of the Assembly of Experts, President of the Center for Strategic Research. Hassan Rouhani comes from a religious family, which can be highlighted by the fact that he would attend religious seminars in Qom and would visit Ayatollah Khomeini. It goes without saying that this period firmly affected his perception and profoundly determined his religious and political course. Following Ayatollah Khomeini, he fought for the Islamic Revolution and preached against the Shah. This had as a result to be exiled in Paris, where he joined Khomeini once again. As a leader, Hassan Rouhani was depicted as a tough negotiator but “strategic realist” who pursued the combination of Islamic Law and reformism (Harris, 2014).

#### Speeches and analysis

In the present study, we are going to shed light on the linguistic techniques and devices utilized in the UN speech in 2013. As Ayatollah Khomeini, Hassan Rouhani adopted an approach whose focal point is the raising and *greatification* of Iran and the Islamic values while at the same time downgrading western values and institutions. As

it can be concluded, Rouhani's speech firmly contributes towards the creation of the "Other". In terms of vocabulary selection, he opted for:

- **Stability**
  - "...Iran is the anchor of **stability**..."
  - "...in an otherwise ocean of regional **instabilities**."
  - "...The firm belief of our people and government in enduring peace, **stability**, tranquility..."
- **Sanctions**
  - "Unjust **sanctions**, as manifestation of structural violence..."
  - "as a result of **sanctions** covered in international legal jargon..."
  - "These **sanctions** are violent..."
  - "**Sanctions**, beyond any and all rhetoric, cause belligerence..."
- **Security**
  - "...old superiorities and dominations have been pursued in a conceptual mindset that negates peace, **security**, human dignity..."
  - "Propagandistic and unfounded faithphobic, Islamo-phobic, Shia-phobic, and Iran-phobic discourses do indeed represent serious threats against world peace and human **security**."
  - "...my country has been a harbinger of just peace and comprehensive **security**."
- **Fear**
  - "Our world today is replete with **fear** and hope;"
  - "...**fear** of deadly confrontation of religious, ethnic and national identities;"

- “Fanning **fear** and phobia around the emergence of new actors on the world scene is another.”

It is of paramount importance that we notice the metaphor employed in the speech “...*Iran is the anchor of stability in an otherwise ocean of regional instabilities.*” The source domain of the metaphor is sea and navigation, while the target domain is regional policy. What is stressed at this point is the fact that Iran constitutes a factor of stability in a rather unstable region.

Furthermore, the speech encompassed hyperboles, which would imply the great differences between Iran and the West and their allies.

- “The catastrophic impact of violent and extremist narratives should not - in fact, must not - be underestimated.”
- “Ignoring differences between societies and globalizing Western values...”

With respect to the pronouns used in the speech of the Iranian President, Rouhani has profoundly employed techniques to further re-establish his opposition towards the West and their allies and at the same time highlight the differences between Iran and its enemies. In particular, Hassan Rouhani employed the pronouns “we” and “our” in order to stress the strengths and the values of the Iranian people, while, on the contrary he utilized “they” and “their” to demonstrate and illustrate the fact that the West has been responsible for corruption and destruction. It could be advocated that Hassan Rouhani used pronouns in order to create antithesis between the two worlds by positively describing the Iranian people and present them as victims and martyrs. In addition to that, Hassan Rouhani used “we” in order to demonstrate that Iran is willing

to take more action towards democratization, which was depicted- as he stated in the speech- in the latest election.

- “**We** should rise above mere tolerance and dare to work together.”
- “**We** defend peace based on democracy and the ballot box everywhere...”
- “...**we** remove any and all reasonable concerns about Iran's peaceful nuclear program.”
- “**Our** world today is replete with fear and hope...”
- “The firm belief of **our** people and government in enduring peace, stability, tranquility...”
- “Nuclear weapon and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran's security and defense doctrine, and contradict **our** fundamental religious and ethical convictions.”
- “**Our** national interests make it imperative that **we** remove any and all reasonable concerns about Iran's peaceful nuclear program.”
- “...**they** are deprived of the right of return and access to **their** homes, birthplace and homeland.”
- “Commensurate with the political will of the leadership in the United States and hoping that **they** will refrain from following the short-sighted interest of warmongering pressure groups...”
- “At this sensitive juncture in the history global relations, the age of zero-sum games is 1 over, even though a few actors still tend to rely on archaic and deeply ineffective ways and means to preserve **their** old superiority and domination.”

Moving to the aspect of verb, the former President of Iran employed primarily Past Simple, Present Simple and Present Perfect, while it becomes apparent that he used Passive voice in an attempt to legitimize Iran's past actions and at the same time to adopt a moderate approach with respect to Iran's relations with other countries.

- “One such imaginary threat is the so-called "Iranian threat" -which **has been employed** as an excuse to justify a long catalogue of crimes and catastrophic practices over the past three decades.”
- “In Fact, in ideals as well as in actual practice, my country **has been** a harbinger of just peace and comprehensive security.”
- “Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran **invites** you and the entire world community to take a step forward;”
- “Iran **seeks** to resolve problems, not to create them.”

### 3.8 CONCLUSIONS

As it can be deduced, realities are created by concepts, rules, and values. Accordingly, existing concepts, rules and values in a given country influence the kind of perception towards identity. National identity is the outcome of national and transnational norm. Through shaping different national roles, this identity strengthens the interests pursued by the country in its foreign policy.

Different dimensions of the identity and states' objectives compel the employment and resort to different language sources and strategies projected onto how a political leader depicts their reality and approach. Variety of language sources has been implemented to compel the readers to accept the speaker's positive or negative attitude towards a fact.

Implementation of discursive strategies can alter, reproduce, reverse and reinforce the existing realities. Using language as a shield means utilizing language as a tool to overstate the positive side and understate the negative side of an event.

In a nutshell, analysis of speeches in the context of discourse analysis offers an opportunity to shed light not only on effectiveness in achieving message promotion but also on contribution to the shaping of national identity.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **IRAN AND THE FUTURE OF MARINE POLICY**

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

What we should bear in mind is that geopolitics of Iran is not merely about territory and expansion. It encompasses features of Iranian modus vivendi such as language, religion, language, and culture. The competitions in the region can be viewed as struggles between among “maritime realm” (Cohen, 2015) states. The region has faced multiple and utmost challenges and there will be many more to come. It cannot be denied that shifts at such a major and crucial location can be function as a pivot for maritime struggles.

To be more specific, it cannot be denied that geopolitics and geoeconomy tend to play an integral role in marine policy. Competitions, conflicts, environment and regional security are the cornerstones for the establishment and development of not only national marine and maritime policy but also the global one. As connectivity and environmental conservation are of paramount importance, we should streamline possible scenarios affecting the marine policy.

In this chapter we shall streamline possible scenarios of Iranian chessboard with marine policy, maritime delimitation, and transportation be on our focal point. At the same time, we utilize a strategic management tool, namely SWOT analysis, which includes the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats.

## 4.2 IRAN AND THE LEVANT

The regions of the Levant the Mediterranean Sea have been strongly linked to the notion of nationalization due to the fact that the dissolution of the USSR entailed in the emergence of several regional disputes not only among the neighbouring states but also among powers desiring to establish their status quo in the area. To be more illustrative, European states as well as the US have perpetually attempted to establish their influence either by their military presence or by creating alliances. Furthermore, marine governance has been an integral part of the disputes arisen in the region.

As it can be observed, the region of the Mediterranean is being led to an era of shift in light of the fact that geostrategic attention is gradually drawn towards Asia. However, it is a turning point of Iran due to the fact that it is the right spatiotemporal point for Iran to expand its influence beyond the Middle East. To this aid, Iran has initiated the construction of a land bridge or- as it is known- “Iranian corridor”.

Throughout its history, Iran’s tendency has been to expand its territory eastwards, namely towards Mesopotamia. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Islamic Republic of Iran has attempted to extend its influence towards the region of the Levant. To be more specific, Iran’s recent objective has been to establish a “land communication: westwards, and especially in the complex region of the Levant via the construction of land corridor- a land bridge in particular- towards the Mediterranean Sea (Torres, 2021).

The region of the Levant can function and serve potentially as a cornerstone region for Iran due to the fact that it can constitute a threshold to an area with less authoritarian regimes. One of the main strengths of Iranian presence in the region of the Levant is to promote an anti- Israeli policy and upgrade its influence against Sunni world. To this end,



Iran can deploy a combination of hard and soft power, which can be demonstrated via a strategically designed discourse and via forming solid alliances. However, what should we perceive as weakness of the particular scenario, is the leadership profile of Iranian political scene. Will the leaders to come be willing to utilize smart power in order to pursue Iranian objectives? As far as the opportunities that can drive up this scenario, we should highlight the ascension of Hezbollah in Lebanon, a traditional ally of Iran, which will provide Tehran with strong relations. Moving on to the threats of the scenario, two main threat should be highlighted. First and foremost, sanctions imposed on Iran, which, without saying, constrain Iranian activity and economy. The second one is the US present in the region of the Levant. Having their own agenda, the US tend to develop their strategy of influence in the region.

#### 4.3 THE CASE OF THE CASPIAN BASIN

*Based mainly on “Persian – Arabic Gulf: Old Conflicts, New Solutions: The Convention of the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea” (Koutsouradi, Chondrogianni 2019)*

The Caspian Basin- despite its paradox regarding its nature- constitutes an integral part of Iran. In order to fully comprehend its significance, it is of paramount importance that we meticulously scrutinize its background, its impact on the littoral states, as well as its legal framework, which is characterized by a plethora of peculiarities. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a domino of consequences. The emergence of newly independent states, namely Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, was the most prominent one.

In light of the fact that the Caspian Basin has been endowed with vast amounts of resources, mainly oil and gas (Koutsouradi et al 2018). It is located in the North- West Asia.

According to the estimations of the US Energy Information Administration it holds 7bil barrels of oil and 312 trul of natural gas. 8 At the same time, it goes without saying that littoral states have had contradictory interests in the region, which has led to multiannual disagreements and disputes among states.

The Caspian basin, despite the fact that its legal status has not been established yet as to whether it is a sea or a lake, is one of the most important and significant regions of the world. The reason? The vast amount of hydrocarbons deposits that lie along both the coastline and inland and they can be used as an alternative source to meet the global energy shortage. Specifically, the Caspian basin is an enclosed or inland body of water, which is located in the northwest Asia and is surrounded by five littoral states; Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. According to the estimations of the US Energy Information Administration, there are 48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet (henceforth Tcf) of natural gas in proven and probable reserves in the Caspian region (EIA, 2013). Additionally, according to the estimations of the Iranian company “*Petroleum Iran*” the region of Caspian holds 17-33 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and about another 233 billion barrels of probable oil. Moreover, according to the estimations of the aforementioned company, it holds 177-182 Tcf of proven natural gas deposits and 293 Tcf of unproven natural gas reserves (Petroleum Iran, 2019). The difference in estimations lies on the ground that its legal status has not been determined yet and each of the littoral states tend to claim the “lion’s share” of the deposits. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the Caspian basin was identified as a lake and was controlled only by two littorals states, namely

Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Their relations were regulated by two treaties; the first one was the “*Treaty of Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic*”, which had been signed in 1921, recognizing equal rights for both parties in the Caspian basin, as long as the right of free navigation was under their flag, while the second one was the “*Treaty of Commerce and Navigation*”, which was signed in 1940, reaffirming the same rights (Treaty of Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, 1921: Article 11 ; Pawletta, 2007 ; Bahgat, 2007; Koutsouradi, et al, 2018). The situation changed drastically in the beginning of 1990s when the USSR was dissolved and the new independent states (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) claimed more space in the region and asserted equal rights and participation in the oil and gas deposits. The last ones belonged to the category of the “land-locked” states (UNCLOS, 1982) and the access to the high seas was of vital importance to them. As a result, they were in favor of its proclamation as a sea and wanted to be enforced the 1982 Convention in order to ensure their rights in the region (Koutsouradi et al, 2018). After twenty years of lasting and active conflicts and turmoil in the region, the solution to this situation seems to be the newly adopted Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which had been signed on 12th August 2018 by the five littoral states and according to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, “*it replaced the aforementioned treaties of 1921 and 1940*” (BBC, 2018 ; Putin, 2018). The Convention tries to establish a stable, secured and peaceful

environment for the littoral states, by eliminating the hostilities of the past and by prohibiting the presence of third parties' armed forces. In order to achieve these, it is pointed out that each country in the region could claim a territorial zone, which cannot be extended more than 15 nautical miles (henceforth nm). The delimitation of the maritime zone between states with adjacent coasts shall be determined in accordance with the rules of international law (Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, 2018: Article 7). Moreover, the states shall delimit the seabed and subsoil into sectors by mutual agreements, which should be made between their adjacent and opposite states. In its sector, every state shall exercise exclusive sovereign rights and the rest of the countries can not interfere in its sector (Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, 2018: Article 8).

Additionally, the neighbouring states could have the opportunity to delimit a fishery zone until 10 nm, in which every coastal state shall hold an exclusive right to harvest aquatic biological resources (Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, 2018: Article 9). The remaining the sea is called "common maritime sea" and is free and open for all the surrounding countries. In this area every littoral state shall enjoy the freedom of navigation, the freedom of transit and the freedom of access to the oceans (Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, 2018: Article 10). As it is concluded from the above analysis, the Convention divides the Caspian's water into three zones; the territorial waters, the fishery zone and "the common maritime space", which operates as the high seas.

The Caspian Sea is of vital importance to the littoral states and each of its “players” knows it. Although the Convention does not define the Caspian basin as a sea or a lake and it has not entered in force yet<sup>1</sup>, its “special legal status” may be a positive step towards settling this long-lasting dispute for all the surrounding states. Moreover, it can be advocated that the aforementioned Convention is a milestone and establishes a “sui generis” regime for the Caspian basin, which may lead to a positive outcome for the stability and the good – neighbourly relations among the states not only in the region, but at a global scale as well.

It is a fact that by signing the Convention the parties accept that they have the same rights and duties, enjoy the freedom of navigation and reassure their access to the oceans regardless of whether it is a coastal state or a land-locked one. This prospect seems to be favourable for all the participants and especially to Iran for multiple reasons. First of all, the prohibition of any armed presence in the region of a third country, which does not belong to the Caspian basin, means that Iran is protected from the absence of the USA and their allies. Second of all, although Iran has the least oil and gas reserves in the region, it could use the Caspian basin as one of its diversified energy sources, in order to confirm its reputation as one of the major oils and gas producers in the world. Thirdly, by the adoption of the Convention it is probably that new, foreign companies will be willing to invest in the region, in order to construct new pipelines and new projects. This is a very positive prospect because the economy of the country will flourish. Last but not least, Iran’s position and role in the region is being upgraded by the fact that without

its acquiescence the rest of the countries cannot exploit the available deposits.

Convention in the Caspian Sea tend to be an integral part of Iran's upgrading. However, in order this prospect to be achievable, Iran should solve its regional active disputes and settle down its conflicts in accordance with the international law, international rules, and to its commitments to its neighbouring states

However, could all this pursuit be demonstrated on the press? Since the Iranian Revolution, Iran has attempted to render itself into regional hegemony and establish a status quo consistent with its geopolitical goals. At this point, it is crucial that we shed some light on how Iran has utilized press to promote not only its national interests in the region of the Caspian but also the principles established by the Iranian revolution.

Prior to the Convention, the Iranian media presented the Caspian as a region where the US could jeopardize the security, destabilize it and create perpetual crises. For example,

*“U.S. policy in the Caucasus region is to fan the flames of regional disputes”* is a typical example of a discursive strategy called “topicalization”, which is the use of active voice and where important facts are put in initial position in the sentence. Consequently, the agents- in our case the US- become prominent and hence, their responsibility becomes much more immense.

Furthermore, it's worth pointing out the use of conceptual metaphors. A plethora of metaphors with negative connotation and denotation was integrated to indicate enemies' corruption and lack of religiosity.

On the contrary, the signing of the Convention entailed in a shift of the discursive and linguistic devices utilized to refer to the region of the Caspian. First and foremost, the Caspian is now pictured as a "corridor of peace". It is presented as a region with cooperation and collaboration among the littoral states- and especially between Iran and Azerbaijan emphasizing the similarities between their cultural heritage. Moreover, the Caspian is deemed a region with peace and stability, which outbalances the dangers of the Persian-Arabian Gulf emerged due to the presence of the US and the Saudi Arabia. Another fundamental concept promoted with the aid of the press is that of self- sufficiency. The notion of self- sufficiency and autarky is of paramount importance for the Iranian people and is an integral part- or cornerstone if you wish- for their identity and national perception. In other words, Iran's quest for self- sufficiency has deep historical roots and abolishing luxury from daily practice constitutes a most essential aspect of national culture.

As it can be concluded in light of the above, the Caspian Basin tends to constitute a vital factor for gaining and increasing the power of the States, due to the fact that the more commodities, resources, and goods are transported, the more the economy is flourishing. However, can this be possible without the contribution and the aid of transport and shipping? It is evident that the answer to this rhetoric question is definitely "no". The collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of ports in the Caspian- Baku Bay is the oldest port in the Caspian Sea- provided a solid and safe alternative to the rather unstable and prone to

hazards Persian- Arab Gulf and ergo, the trade and transportation of resources have become an integral and essential part of national strategy in the coastal states (Akbulaev & Bayramli, 2020),

Moving forward to exploring the opportunities arising from these circumstances, it should be pointed out the fact that Iran can expand not only its territory but also its influence on the Middle East. To be more specific, the expansion of its territorial water in the Caspian Basin, provided Iran with the opportunity to have access to a greater territory and allocate its legislation. In light of the Convention on the legal framework for the Caspian, Iran gained strength and consequently, it was able to promote and solidify its pursuits in the region. As it can be concluded, Iran can possibly grab the opportunity and become regional hegemony due to the fact that expands its influence both in the Caspian and the pivotal region of the Persian- Arabian Gulf. However, from the Iranian point of view, the Convention on the legal framework of the Caspian is deemed to have put an end to the dream of Iran for greater expansion in the area. Furthermore, during the recent years it is evident that there is a tendency towards irredentism of minorities, which can give birth to ferocious disputes and ergo, function as a threat to stability and peace.

#### 4.4 THE PERSIAN- ARAB GULF

*Based primarily on “Islands; Simple Geographical Features or Factors of Great Impact? Their Role in Global Chessboard through the analysis of case studies” by Markella Koutsouradi*

The Persian- Arabian Gulf falls into the category of Closed or Semi- Enclosed Seas according to the Article 122 of UNCLOS 1982 (UNCLOS, 1982, ARTICLE 122) and is surrounded by eight states. The area of the Gulf is synonymous not only to the huge amount



of resources but also to the fact that it resembles to the setting of inexorable disputes and fights. Concerning the recourses of the region, the Gulf and the coastal areas are the biggest source of crude oil on a global scale. Typical instance is the field of Al- Safaniya, which is the biggest worldwide. Huge amounts of oil have also been found with Qatar and Iran sharing a field along their maritime boundaries (Dehghani,2009) The disputes in the Gulf emanate from various reasons, namely religious, factious, national and racial. Undoubtedly, disputes over sovereignty, boarders and resources have human, economic, environmental, and cultural cost (Askari., 2013), It may be suggested that the evolution and the continuity of such disputes in the region mainly depict an effect of a perpetual quest for power and resources.

The dispute between United Arabian Emirates and Iran concerning sovereignty over Abu Musa and Greater and Lessen Tunbs dates back in 1971. It can be seen from the figure below that Abu Musa Island (measures 12,8 km<sup>2</sup> and inhabited by approximately 2000 inhabitants) is located on the east part of Persian- Arabian Gulf , on the mouth of the strait of Hormuz. Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands<sup>1</sup> (only Greater Tunb is inhabited by 350 residents) are of great geopolitical importance due to the fact that their seabed and subsoil are rich in natural resources (Rubin B, 2002). In addition, their strategic location is of great geopolitical importance on the grounds that that they are in control of energy, environmental, commercial, and shipping activity not only in regional but in global level as well.

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<sup>1</sup> Iran claims that the word “Tunbs” is of Iranian linguistic origin and means “hill”. On the contrary, the UAE claim that the word is purely Arabic and means “long rope being used for assembling a tent”




Figure 22 Under- dispute islands in the Persian- Arabian Gulf Source: *IranShouldRecognisetheUAEIslands*, available at [http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Iran\\_should\\_recognise\\_the\\_UAE\\_islands/49043.htm](http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Iran_should_recognise_the_UAE_islands/49043.htm)

The springboard to the dispute between the UAE and Iran over Abu Musa Island and Tunbs Island was 1971 (Al- Nayhan 2013). In 1968 Great Britain announced the end of its administrative and military presence in the region of Persian- Arabian Gulf. Consequently, the administration of Abu Musa Island was assigned to Sharjah (one of the seven sheikdoms that later constituted the United Arab Emirates). However, Tehran stated that Iran is historically entitled to the Persian Gulf, while sovereignty over the under- dispute islands were given to the Arabs during 19th century (Ahmadi 2008).

After Great Britain had resigned from the Persian- Arabian Gulf in 1971, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Iran and Sharjah sheikdom, according to which Sharjah would retain sovereignty over Abu Musa island, while Iran was entitled to establish military troops on the island (Ahmadi, 2008). Furthermore, according to the aforementioned MoU, oil deposits and natural resources surrounding Abu Musa island

would be allocated. After Iranian military force's establishment on Abu Musa island, Iran occupied Tunbs island, which entailed in triggering a new sequence of reaction in the Arab world. In 1980 (a few years after United Arab Emirates were constituted) United Arab Emirates appealed to United Nations and simultaneously collaborated with five states of Persian- Arabian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman) founding Gulf Cooperation Council- GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council, 2020).

A pivotal moment-period for the evolution of this dispute was 1992, when Iran- despite the MoU- denied access of non-UAE nationals to the Sharjah-administered part of the island, mobilized troops to the island, and fortified its settlement. Events of 1992 were determining for the region of Persian- Arabian Gulf as a new strategy against Iran was established by not only United Arab Emirates but also by moderate conservatives. The particular strategy focused on Abu Musa island, while it extended to Greater and Lesser Tunbs later, due to which the dispute was intensified. The peak of intensity was the Abu Musa occupation by Iran and at the same time the expulsion of island's Arab population (Ahmadi 2008). This action suggests an Iranian attempt for the island to be entirely inhabited by Iranian population so that it could be integrated in the corpus of Iran and, consequently, be under Iranian governance. It can be assumed that this circle of actions and reactions having taken place in 1992 pertain to a byproduct of new tendencies in the region (Askari 2013) as well as the deterioration of relations between Iran and states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Ahmadi, 2008). Thus, the dispute over Abu Musa island was both a product and means of promoting a strategy aiming at confining and isolating Iran. Bilateral relationships had already suffered were it to be taken into consideration that Arab nations did not recognize the diplomatic approach of Iran (Ahmadi, 2008),

The Mubarak oilfield located six miles off Abu Musa island is claimed to be “an inseparable part of Iran” (Rahnema & Behdad,1996,) and it was a fundamental reason for Iran’s extending its continental shelf up to 12 nautical miles (Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea,1993). The particular expansion is of paramount importance should be taken into account the size and the proximity in the Persian- Arabian Gulf.

On the contrary, United Arab Emirates, whose economy is based upon oil (UAE Economic Report, 2015), attempt to gain as many as possible oilfields. Despite the remaining dispute, neither United Arab Nations nor Gulf Cooperation council have planned to escalate the dispute. The major reason of choosing this particular policy is the border dispute between United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

Overall, Iran has recognized the significance of the three islands in the region of the Persian- Arab Gulf. The islands dominate in the mouth of the Gulf and it seems that control and sovereignty over the islands is the key to regional security and domination in the particular area.

Regarding the dispute between Iran and UAE, it should be stressed that since 2014 the bilateral relations have been gradually improving, which means that the fundamental step towards an equitable solution is the willingness for its achievement. Taking the above into consideration, it appears that UAE have adopted a much more

moderate approach towards the dispute over the three islands compared with Iran's which is compatible to UAE's capabilities and to International Law.

It is worth being pointed out the fact that that the origin and the evolution of the dispute over Abu Musa and Tunbs islands is a dispute of peculiar type being not confined to territorial dispute. On the contrary, it consists the outcome of not only regional but also international complexity, as well as the aftermath of political and diplomatic conflicts having taken place since 19th century. Although the natural resources in the Persian- Arabian Gulf make the dispute, not only between Iran and UAE but among all littoral states as well, much more adverse, it is claimed that the difficulties of solution to the regional disputes are the effect of third states' actions who have continually longed for access to the vast deposits of the region.

Furthermore, as it has been stated before, the tension between Iran and UAE is not a matter of maritime delimitation but rather a matter of sovereignty that stems from insolvable disputes dating back to prior centuries. To be more specific, the matter of sovereignty reflects cultural, ideological, and religious controversies. The importance of islands often lies more in its symbolism than in the precise value of their natural resources. In other words, throughout history, disputes related with sovereignty over islands have constituted indication or symbol of a wider regional competition and rivalry. Arab- Iranian rivalry has been expressed through the territorial dispute having been analyzed above. The matter of control over a particular area has determined the strategy of both sides as well as the level to which the regional power is prepared to compromise its claims. For instance, contemporary reality demonstrates that during the

last decades Iran has used a vast amount of means since Great Britain resigned from the region so that Iran could establish itself as regional power and impose its status quo.

As it derives from the analysis above, resources and the pursuit of their exploitation tend to trigger hostilities among coastal states. It appears that the disputes in the Persian- Arabian Gulf will continue to exist. It is of utmost importance that sovereignty over Abu Musa, Tunbs as well as Hans be determined so that there would be an object of negotiation and thus, an object of maritime delimitation. It is suggested that the first step towards solution is the exploratory stage of negotiations and subsequently the commence of negotiation. In case of deadlock of negotiations, a solution should be sought through an arbitral tribunal or court. However, appealing to court is not a panacea. It may be argued that it is an abdication of responsibility by political leaders. In addition, optimum solution is not guaranteed owing to the fact that geopolitical games tend to take place, while geopolitical objectives are promoted.

The case of Abu Musa and the Tunbs can be compared to these of Serpent Island in the Black Sea and Hans Island between Greenland and Canada. The Black Sea constitutes a region with special geo-economic interest owing to its richness in natural gas and petroleum. The Black Sea is characterized by a triple geostrategic importance based upon the fact that it is a direct source of energy, a main channel of Eurasian-energy transmission to European Union and a vital factor for the energy security in the European Union. It is obvious that the access of the coastal states to the Black Sea is of paramount importance for the coastal states, while the presence of military power in the area entails in power projection to the neighboring states. In other words, whoever controls or predominates in the region of the Black Sea is capable of projecting their

power over the European inland and especially, over the Balkans, the Central Europe and also over the East Mediterranean and South Caucasus. Hence, the region of the Black Sea is the cornerstone of the future and the global economy, as it functions as a transit junction not only for goods, but for recourses as well. It is important to mention that the increase of Russia's naval force in the region is able to cause turmoil on the energy supply of energy in Europe. As far as the Arctic Sea is concerned, taking the phenomenon of global warming into consideration it is obvious that the area of the Arctic Sea is of particular interest on the grounds that the aforementioned region has been becoming ice-free. The perspectives and the potential for search and exploitation and, simultaneously the potential of control over nautical routes in the North passage have triggered the revival of interest for claims in the area. Recently, Denmark and Canada have been led to dispute over a small, inhabitant rock, known as Hans Island, which will be analyzed. An issue drawing the international interest from a jurisdictional point of view concerning maritime delimitation is the ICJ case related to the Ukrainian island of Serpent, which is located 30 nautical miles from the Ukrainian- Romanian borders. The dispute between Ukraine and Romania concerned the delimitation of continental shelf and EEZ between the aforementioned states. Owing to Serpents' Island, Romania appealed to ICJ in 2004 against Ukraine for the delimitation of their single maritime border.

As it was stated formerly, the emphasis was first and foremost on Serpent Island. It has been inhabited since 2004, while the nearest cities are Sulina (Romanian) and Vylkove (Ukraine) (ICJ, 2009). It is a fact that the particular location of Serpents is exceptionally rich in resources of oil and natural gas.

With respect to Ukraine's arguments, Ukraine advocated geographical feature's designation as island on the grounds that it had been inhabited since 2004 (Tanaka, 2012). That would mean that Serpents' continental shelf would belong to Ukraine, while it would be the fundamental cornerstone for the creation of EEZ. On the contrary, Romania pointed out the nature of the semi- enclosed Black Sea. Additionally, the isle was claimed to lie alone secluded from Ukraine's mainland (Chrysochou, 2014).

Regarding the delimitation methodology having been followed by ICJ, the Court followed the three- step procedure plus a preliminary stage for determination of relevant coasts (ICJ, 2009). In other words, the preliminary stage particularizes the adjacent coasts being in dispute. The ratio of coasts is of utmost importance as it determines the ratio of relevant areas of both states and entails in determination of relevant sea (Siousiouras & Chrysochou, 2014). The preliminary stage is succeeded by the three- step methodology (ICJ, 2009). The first step contains the establishment of a provisional delimitation line (using methods that are geometrically objective and appropriate for the geography of the area in which the delimitation is to take place). Furthermore, regarding adjacent coasts, equidistance line is to be drawn, a line which is always at the same distance of the baselines of both States, while when opposite coasts, the provisional delimitation line shall be a median line between the two coasts. At the second stage, relevant circumstances, if any, are meticulously examined to establish whether they can lead to the adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result. During the final stage a verification of examination and the accomplishment of an equitable solution are aimed



under the scope of proportionality criterion (ICJ, 2009). In the particular case, the Court zoomed in Sulina dyke extending seaward from the Romanian side of one of the branches of the estuary of the Danube, and Serpents' Island. The length of relevant coasts is of utmost importance as it determines the arithmetical ratio of each one's. This consists relevant circumstances and eventually will determine the relevant sea area where EEZ or Continental Shelf will be delimited.

On 3rd February 2009 the ICJ rendered its judgement on the merits in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea between Romania and Ukraine in accordance with the three-step method analysed above. In respect of Serpents Island's effect, the ICJ did not proceed to legal characterization of the small feature as an island or a rock (Rozakis, 2013). In case that the particular geographical feature had been characterized as island, it would be entitled to full rights of maritime zones. On the other hand, had it been characterized as rock, it would be entitled to territorial sea. It was decided that Serpents' Island cannot be considered to form Ukraine's coastal configuration and consequently, it was disregarded in drawing the provisional equidistance line.

Moving on to the third case, On 20th July 2005, Canadian Minister of Defence visited Hans island. Hans is a geographical feature of 1.3 km<sup>2</sup> located between Ellesmere island (Canadian territory) and Greenland. This particular brief visit included the placement of Canadian flag on Hans, an event triggering diplomatic tension between Canada and Denmark. In particular, the aforementioned actions were characterized by Denmark as occupation, while at the same time it established military force on Hans. Both countries decided to come to terms and on 19th October 2005, truce was

established. However, in 2006 the dispute reemerged due to the construction of three heavy icebreaking ships, a northern deepwater port, and an underwater network of listening posts. Despite the fact that the events took place in 2005 and 2006, the dispute has emanated since 1973. Both countries have ensured that the dispute is over sovereignty, albeit its major root is the exploitation of natural resources as well as the control over ships' navigation given the determining location of the island to the Northwest Passage.

The history of the dispute in the area of Davis Strait is long-lasting. In particular, Canada claimed Ellesmere at first based on British Adjacent Territories Order of 1880, according to which all British possessions in the Arctic were given to Canada (UN, 2008). The U.S.A claimed the north part of Greenland, however, they resigned as it was a main presupposition for purchasing the Danish West Indies from Denmark (Stevenson, 2007). The first explorer having discovered Hans was Charles Francis Hall of American origin. The island was named after his Inuit guide from Greenland. The issue about sovereignty over Hans dates back in 1971 when Canada first claimed Hans (Stevenson, 2007). Since then, Denmark has stressed the fact that Hans appears to bear geographical similarities with Greenland and additionally, native inhabitants of Greenland had used Hans island in the past.

Discussions about delimitation were completed when both countries signed Agreement on 17th December 1973. Under that particular Agreement, the borderline between Greenland and the "Canadian island of the Arctic" was established (UN, 2008) However, given the lack of determining sovereignty over Hans island, Hans was

exempted from the Agreement. Furthermore, Danish military force visited successively Hans in 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2003 raising each time a Danish flag (Stevenson, 2007).

Taking the above into consideration, it could be assumed that the cornerstone root of the dispute is the geopolitical importance of Hans island. Natural deposits in the continental shelf of Hans islands are estimated to be in high concentration. In addition, the increase of temperature in the region of the Arctic Sea has rendered the sea routes between Canada and Greenland navigable for longer periods in comparison to prior years. Consequently, the amount of ships passing will radically increase entailing in the increasing of venues for the state controlling the sea passage. The region of Arctic Sea is not considered an inaccessible area, but rather an area linking America and Eurasia given that the North Passage has been navigable during specific periods of the year. Furthermore, adjacent countries addressed the issue of rising temperature in the area as an opportunity of conducting research for gas deposits, whereas Denmark has already permitted research in Davis Strait.

As it emanated from the analysis above, the solution to disputes demands a comprehensive and holistic approach. The first factor that needs to be considered is the recognition of inherent contradictions and inconsistencies as well as the acceptance of their complexity. Regional dynamics are reflected on the type and the tension of politicization. Disputes over islands, as most disputes, tend to facilitate an opportunity for collaboration, cooperation but also for conflict.

Appraising islands, not only in the aforementioned area, but also in the global geopolitical chessboard, it should be stressed that at a great extent islands' symbolic importance- as they often serve as buffer zone- has outgrown the value of their natural

resources, which has led to revitalization of disputes. It is assumed that the settlement of sovereignty disputes as well as that of maritime delimitation is a procedure, both national and international, which creates a virtuous circle of geopolitical objectives. In other words, it is a procedure involving interaction between geostrategic pursuits and tensions in which islands is of catalytic effect. In a nutshell, shifts in insular status quo tend to entail in shift in the geopolitical equation, as they constitute the area of sovereignty manifestation, which, combined with the rights generated in each maritime zone, can be the field of territorial expansion.

In view of the future Iran's actions with respect to the islands and the dispute could trigger a further vicious circle, which would, ergo, potentially benefit Iran to establish itself as regional hegemony by expanding not only its territory but also its soft power. However, this could trigger further reaction by United Arab Emirates and their allies. In order to be more specific, it is worth highlight the fact that during the recent years the relations between Iran and UAE and the US, which have entailed in revitalizing and escalating both the disputes/ conflicts as well as the sanctions imposed on Islamic Republic of Iran. From this point of view, Abu Musa can serve as a pivotal element by providing naval aid (through ports and facilities).

#### 4.5 IRAN- RUSSIA

Prior to any analysis of scenarios, it is of paramount importance that we stress the fact that during Cold War the Middle East was an integral part and location of the rivalry between the UUSR and the US. To begin with, the Soviet Union had expressed its support for decolonization in both African and Arab countries, while it provided

assistance to infrastructure projects, such as the construction of Aswan Dam, as well as to Arab countries, for example Libya. Albeit after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the relations between the Middle East and the latter had paused, since the 1990s and then a renewed effort to re-establish cooperation. Russian policy in the region has been energy- oriented, not to mention its involvement in the irrigation, infrastructure and armaments industries. It is worth pointing out the fact that the great number of Russian-originated population living in the area tend to constitute a solid and strong impetus for the development of cultural and religious relations and ties with multiple states. In recent years, Russia has developed bilateral relations with Islamic Republic of Iran in light of economic reasons. The fruitful and successful cooperation between the two states was sealed with the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant in view of the peaceful use of the atomic energy.

Furthermore, Russia is a major energy producer, while energy has played a crucial role in the Russian national economy, and ergo, the energy diplomacy has become an integral part in its diplomacy. To this end, Russian companies tend to carry out a variety of practical activities for achieving the objectives of foreign energy policy. In addition, Russian constitutes a global oil and gas producing state. During the recent years, it has steadily enhanced, which has entailed in the fact that the oil is utilized in order to not only improve the economy but also to be used as a tool for the implementation of Russia's foreign policy. Despite the fact that the oil advantage of the Middle East still exists, the importing countries are trying to find new sources of imports in order to reduce energy dependence on the Middle East, with Russia being a very good selection.

With respect to the fundamental idea of Russian energy diplomacy, what should be stressed is the fact that the roots of the diplomacy with the major exporting countries

lies in strengthening and promoting of cooperation and fair competition and maintaining energy market stability through communication. Russia competes and cooperates with OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), with the aim of jointly promoting international energy, which shall be beneficial to all oil-producing countries. In addition, Russia's strategic goals in the Middle East are to recognize countries of the Gulf as "energy partners", which are actively engaged and involved in the development and refining of oil and gas as well as in the supply of oil and gas production equipment. To this end, Russia has utilized the energy collaboration in view of strengthening the relations with the states of the Gulf and consequently, to be actively involved in the Middle East affairs, break the US energy monopoly and ultimately improve its international influence.

As far as the scenarios regarding the relations Russia- Iran are concerned, the Russian strategy has two components, initially seeking to challenge pro- Western instincts of the governments of the Arab countries. Consequently, the collaboration between Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia is the undermining of the image of the West and the Western intentions and at a second level the cause of disruption between the pro- Western alliances, which initially were created to stop the Soviet Union. From the Iranian point of view, the sanction having been imposed on Iran have led to the economic suffocation. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran supports Putin's Russia. With respect to the weakness of such collaboration, what should be pointed out is the fact that Russia's footprint in the Middle East is primarily in the field of security. Russia tends to sell weapons systems for billions of dollars, but the sector of trade and investment in civilian areas is rather confined and limited. Moving on to the threats, unlike Iran, Russia's economy is inextricably linked to the West, and Putin has developed close ties with Israel, which can cause imbalance in the Iranian- Russian

relations. Nonetheless, as Russia's conflict with the United States escalates, Moscow is putting aside any differences with Tehran.

In a nutshell, Russia does not hesitate to approach Iran despite their religious and ideological differences, in its attempt to progressively complete the closest strengthening Iran- Russia relations. The real aim of the country, however, is the establishment of a rival force against the US expansionist policies. Regarding the nuclear issue, it turned into a field of interests, negotiations, exchange of power and alliances, strong confrontation and deplorable developments. the collaboration between Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrates that Russia continues to create and form new ties that shall serve as the counterweight to Western domination, while Iran attempts to show that despite the Western sanctions, it has its own alternatives.

#### 4.6 IRAN- INDIA

When people think of India's role in the Middle East, they cast their mind on Delhi as a benevolent force that directs the security issues and focuses on labor export and oil import. However, India is starting to think and act in a more strategic manner in the region. For most of the period since India's independence, India-Middle East relations focused on economic bonds. Political relations were largely determined by the Cold War alliances and rivalry with Pakistan. The intense interest in the economic sector is reasonable, given the Middle East is crucial to India's prosperity. Despite the fact that India constitutes a global economy, it is not capable of exercising its economic influence in order to achieve its political interest abroad. During the recent years, it has become commercial partner of the countries of the region, in which there are Indian minorities, while at the same time, it has

managed to improve its bilateral relations with Israel. Furthermore, India's security ambitions are growing in what it appears as its extensive neighbourhood, including the Indian Ocean. It is worth noting the fact that Indian politicians have been worried about the increasing instability and weakening of the countries in the Middle East, which can threaten Indian imports of energy and dispersion. In addition, India's lack of ability to affect and determine geopolitics in the Middle East, combined with its lack of security presence, has led to costly movements of its dispersion, including the largest in its history, when 200,000 Indians had moved from Kuwait during the Gulf War. Furthermore, contrary to Russia's and China's tactics, which are established forces in the Mediterranean, India has not succeeded so far, but aspires to carry out this objective in the coming years.

It is vital for India to maintain close ties with the states of the Gulf in order to ensure energy security, perpetual remittance flow, the well-being of its expatriate workforce, and tackling the terrorist threat. Equally important for India is developing a friendly relationship with Tehran. In fact, efforts to strengthen bilateral relations commenced shortly after the Iranian revolution. Iran's importance to India stems mainly from its immense energy resources and strategic importance of its location, which connects West and Central Asia.

In terms of energy ties, Iran was the second largest India's oil supplier after Saudi Arabia, until the New Delhi reduced imports after international sanctions were imposed on the country for its controversial nuclear program. Nonetheless, regarding future scenarios, what should be highlighted is the fact that should Iran give operational rights to India, it will lead to a close strategic partnership between one of the largest energy exporters in the world and one of the largest importers of energy. The implementation of a relevant



Agreement will function as a cornerstone for the development of these two states. From the perspective of Iran, such cooperation shall be able to stabilize the country's economy, which, in turn, is tantamount to ensuring the much-needed security policy. As India is expected to become an even larger importer of energy in the coming years, Tehran is trying to "lock" India in a long-term agreement. Nevertheless, Tehran and Delhi still have to determine favorable trade terms between them.

In a nutshell, a strong cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran with India is bound to create security stability in the region and reinforce Iran's objective for becoming regional hegemony, while at the same time they will exclude Saudi Arabia and Pakistan from any benefit. Regarding the weakness and the threat of this scenario, we should bare in mind that India has economic relations with both Saudi Arabi- a conventional foe of Iran- as well as with Iran, which may trigger imbalances in their relations.

#### 4.7 IRAN- CHINA

China developed rapidly in the 80s, 90s and 2000, with industries of production and investment to be provided by ever-increasing percentages from the country's growing integration into regional cross-border networks production. China, in line with its development strategies, has expanded to the wider region of the Middle East, having developed secure energy relations with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran, countries of vital importance for the region we are referring to. India- China relations have not only improved, but the two countries have made energy agreements with Iran.

China was a state that used to rely entirely on coal. However, in recent decades it has taken environmental issues and their consequences more seriously. Therefore, China has made a significant shift to the use of renewable energy resources. China has always aimed at its economic recovery, at growth of employment and production aid. However, in recent years it has adopted new attitudes about the social problems of the past decades and on environmental and pollution issues, while it strongly addresses the issue of energy consumption rate, which tends to exceed even the growth rate of the country itself, with domestic resources not sufficient enough for the growing demand for energy. A landmark in Chinese history was the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, which was a meeting of the states of Asia and Africans who had just declared their independence. Furthermore, China expressed its support for the national independence movements and the anti-colonial movements, advocating for the rights of social groups to choose their own political and economic systems, with China's role to remain quite limited in the Middle East. In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping implemented reforms aiming at strengthening Chinese crops, Chinese industry, science, defense and technology, thus laying the groundwork for expanding economic relations with the Middle East. Later, Beijing's economic and trade role in the region grew and diversified.

What should be pointed out is the fact that the country is the largest and leading importer of crude oil and is utterly dependent on the Middle East to meet its energy needs. In 2018, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Oman were the second, fourth and fifth largest suppliers of crude oil. Therefore, a regional conflict or a disruption in the supply chain, as noted by the attacks on Aramco's facilities in Saudi Arabia, would have a negative impact on the Chinese economy. Over the years, China has become more involved in the region's geopolitics, helping to strengthen the current heads of state through economic investment and

infrastructure investment. When Beijing decides to keep up with its growing economic dominance with a stronger political influence, then China will soon have to make difficult political decisions and may have enemies during the process.

To date, China has concluded mainly economic-based agreements with 15 Middle Eastern countries, and is actively involved in maritime security and anti-piracy missions in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden. As a result, future military cooperation between China and the Gulf states is still in its infancy, with Beijing having limited capabilities to compete with Western arms suppliers. China's security ties with the Gulf states are limited to counterterrorism cooperation, joint exercises, the sale of certain weapons systems and the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). However, the increase in economic incentives certainly precludes greater Chinese involvement in Middle East diplomacy, with escalating US-Iran tensions further facilitating China to become directly involved in Tehran's diplomatic affairs.

Iran, as it has already been mentioned, is going through a period of hazardous relations with the United States and therefore, it is cooperating in assisting China in the energy sector and in return, China is helping Iran to land softly in intense conflicts and UN measures. The excellent relations between Moscow, Beijing and Iran are troubling the United States and come to confirm the announcement of the "anti-hegemonic" coalition that is united by complaints and reactions, despite the already existing ideological or religious bases.

The Russians and the Chinese are putting on the table for the first time the construction of a pipeline from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf through Iran, as China has worrying tendencies for US domination in the Gulf and especially after the invasion of Iraq, because outside Russia it sees theocratic Iran. Furthermore, due to its dependency on the Iranian oil, China has invested millions in modernization of energy networks and facilities of Iran. From this point of view, China and Islamic Republic of Iran have developed multiple relations that depend on the need of alliances.

Another fundamental factor that should be taken into consideration is a similarity between Iran and China, as both states are located in semi- enclosed seas. In particular, China is located in South China Sea, which is of vital importance due to its resources and its geostrategical location. Furthermore, the South China Sea is rich in fish, which is a contributing factor for the economy and the nutrition of the majority of the littoral states. What should be taken into consideration is the fact that the maritime zones of the surrounding states have yet to be delimited, which entails in deviation in estimation of the resources and holdings. Additionally, any conflicts arisen from the lack of maritime zones delimitation function as a fuse for further hinders in cooperation and collaboration among the littoral states.

With respect to the strategical location of the South China Sea, its significance to shipping and transportations is manifest on the grounds that it s large maritime path for oil trade.


Regarding the scenario concerning the future relations between Iran and China, we could say that it is most optimistic. A fruitful collaboration and cooperation shall counterbalance their targeting by the West, while at the same time there is an exchange between China's energy needs and Iran's vast resources.

At the moment, the Beijing- Tehran agreement demonstrates a political and strategic reality and a long- term alliance. It is a political decision on both sides, and it constitutes a key alliance in international issues, issues that provoke serious reactions between the partners at the level of the UN and at the level of the Security Council as well as on issues including National Security. In light of the recent multi- level strategic agreement, on the one hand, the round of negotiations between the two has been going on for years and is coming to an end. On the other hand, it definitely tends to delimit the new geopolitical policy and action line of the two countries. Furthermore, the presence of 5,000 Chinese troops inside Iran render magnifies the importance of the agreement, due to the fact that implies a permanent force of impact. In terms of marine policy, this permanent force of impact shall also be visible in the waters of the Persian- Arab Gulf and the Indian Gulf.

The conclusion of an economic and strategic agreement is crucial. It focuses on areas that Iran needs due to the economic embargo of both the EU and the US with in-depth sanctions coming. In a nutshell, the geostrategic needs of the two countries do not conflict, albeit they are not identical. However, could this agreement and cooperation be solely advantageous? It goes without saying that there are hurdles and restraints pertaining to the fact that American and European companies tend to have conquered the largest share of the region, whereas China has acquired solely a confined part due to its late arrival in the region. Furthermore, the Chinese oil companies lack the ability of encountering the competition and the challenges of European companies and American enterprises being involved in the same industry/ field. It is worth pointing out the fact that the energy cooperation is largely confined in oil and gas trade.

## 4.7 CONCLUSIONAL REMARKS

In a nutshell, what outcomes should we anticipate with respect to maritime geographical scenarios as well as to policies and marine governance? It goes without saying that the perpetually shifting chessboard tends to trigger chain reactions at a global scale. Following the post Cold War era, the regions of the South- Eastern Europe and the Middle East have faced multiple crises and have been the theatre of competitions and conflicts. Should we scrutinize the aforementioned scenarios, we can draw conclusions regarding their feasibility. In order to be ore illustrative, we present a holistic SWOT analysis for the scenarios explored above.



• **OPPORTUNITIES**

- Solar power potential
- Wind power potential
- Hydropower potential
- Development in infrastructure
- Emerge of maritime clusters

**THREATS**

- Sanctions
- Inter-regional issues
- Shifts of major strategic interest towards Asia
- Regional and global conflicts

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

#### 5.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS- THESIS CONTRIBUTION

The current PhD aims at researching the interrelation of merging the specificities of the study area with common geopolitical strategies from the point of view of linguistics, which apparently tend to reveal and unfold covered behavioral patterns and possible streaming strategical attitudes of the future. More specifically, Geopolitics, Marine Policy, Middle East, and Linguistics pertain the core domains of this research, while the objective of this research is to apply Critical Discourse Analysis methods and concepts, in an attempt to interpret current features and characteristics in the study area in the broader framework of well- established geopolitical strategies.

The present thesis makes three contributions to the current state-of-knowledge. In particular, the creation of a fusion area among Geopolitics, Marine Policy, specificities of the Middle East region, and psycholinguistics domain pertains to the first contribution. Despite the fact that the cornerstones of the current- state-of-knowledge in the field of geopolitics are energy- especially oil and natural gas- and pure politics, the author of this thesis provides an insight to a significantly less explored area, namely a correlation among four different fields. With the use of established linguistic tools and techniques, a cross-field approach has been attempted, so that a holistic result is reached. Each of the aforementioned core components provides a significant feature entailing in the formulation of a groundbreaking fusion area which shall encompass geopolitics, marine policy, linguistics, and psychology.



The second contribution of the present research is the development of leadership profiles based on factual documented behavioral characteristics. The profiles will be the outcome of a developed conceptualized model examining political leaders' internal environment, such as psychobiography and psychodynamics, intertwined with the decision-making framework.

The third contribution is the development of action- reaction scenarios for ten years. Applying a strategic tool, namely SWOT Analysis, we establish strengths, weaknesses, opportunities as well as threats and we attempt a holistic evaluation.

In a nutshell, the thesis aims at contributing to the literature in the field of marine policy by developing interdisciplinary research and bring together disciplines that appear to be diametrically opposed. It offers an innovative approach and wishes to provide an essential step for further research in the academia.

## 5.2. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

Regarding the case study at hand, what outcomes should we anticipate with respect to maritime geographical scenarios as well as to policies and marine governance? It goes without saying that the perpetually shifting chessboard tends to trigger chain reactions at a global scale. Following the post-Cold War era, the regions of the South- Eastern Europe and the Middle East have faced multiple crises and have been the theatre of competitions and conflicts.

As it can be deduced, realities are created by concepts, rules, and values. Accordingly, existing concepts, rules and values in a given country influence the kind of perception towards identity. National identity is the outcome of national and

transnational norm. Through shaping different national roles, this identity strengthens the interests pursued by the country in its foreign policy.

Different dimensions of the identity and states' objectives compel the employment and resort to different language sources and strategies projected onto how a political leader depicts their reality and approach. Variety of language sources has been implemented to compel the readers to accept the speaker's positive or negative attitude towards a fact.

Implementation of discursive strategies can alter, reproduce, reverse and reinforce the existing realities. Using language as a shield means utilizing language as a tool to overstate the positive side and understate the negative side of an event.

In a nutshell, analysis of speeches in the context of discourse analysis offers an opportunity to shed light not only on effectiveness in achieving message promotion but also on contribution to the shaping of national identity.

Regarding the application on the Iranian leadership with respect to the national marine policy, we should stress the fact that aggressive discourse has decreased. However, the future leadership of Tehran shall employ a combination of loyalty to the regime at the same time build a revolutionary path by revising the revolutionary discourse, address and tackle external pressures, and give space to modernization, the restrictions against which have caused mounting domestic anger, in order Iran to fulfil and accomplish their national objectives not only in terms of marine policy, but also in terms of their holistic policy.

### 5.3 LIMITATION OF RESEARCH AND SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE WORK

What we should bear in mind is the fact that in Critical Discourse Analysis of political speeches, the written evidence (i.e speeches) is produced at a great extent by third persons and ergo, there is biased information (input) used. Furthermore, in light of the high level of censorship in the region of our interest, there is limitation of data and primary sources of information.

As far as suggestion for future work is concerned, we suggest the adjustment of Critical Discourse Analysis Methods at a generalized scale. On the ground that the present thesis focuses on the analysis and interpretation of well- established linguistic methods in terms marine policy in the Middle East, a core contribution will be the broader application of a developed tailor- made method in the field of marine policy without geographical restrictions. In other words, the implementation as well as the explicit incorporation of the developed conceptualized method into geopolitical complexes apart from the Middle East will be a contribution of paramount importance.

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